Units

THE FIRST AND THE LAST:  A SHORT HISTORY OF V CORPS LRRP A/75 RANGERS 1961-1974 WILDFLECKEN, FRANKFURT/MAIN, FORT BENNING, FORT HOOD

V Corps Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company, later Co. A, 75th Infantry (Ranger), was the longest serving DA authorized LRRP/Ranger Company in the US Army.

The USA LRRP Co (Abn) 3779 was activated at Wildflecken, Germany by 7th Army on 15 JUL 61 to serve as V Corps LRRP Company in Germany.

It was deactivated on 19 DEC 74 at Ft Hood as Company A, 75th Infantry (Ranger) where it was performing Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol work for the 1st Cavalry Division.

The company was initially assigned to the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment for administration and court-martial jurisdiction. At that time the company wore the 7th Army shoulder patch with blue and white Airborne tab and was the only unit near the East German border on jump status.

The first Commanding Officer was Major Reese Jones and first 1st Sergeant was Gilberto M. Martinez.

V Corps was deployed across the West German states of Hesse and the Bayern (Bavaria), facing four of the six most likely Soviet penetration corridors into West Germany. Company field training exercises included extensive patrols in the Bad Heisfeld-Giessen, Fulda-Hanau, Bad Kissingen — Wurzburg and Coburg – Bamburg corridors to include rehearsals for deep penetration missions against Thuringian targets typically including Soviet Weimer – Nobra air installation and Army facilities around Ohrdruf and Jena. The Company would be used also for special missions of infiltration that included team placement of T-4 Atomic Demolition Munitions and locating enemy battlefield targets for Army tactical nuclear delivery systems.

In autumn 1962 LRRP LT Robert C Murphy flew to England and purchased maroon berets for the company from his own funds. They were authorized for wear by the CG of 7th Army for both V and VII Corps LRRP Companies.

The company crest was designed at that time by then Sgt Mike Martin and the motto “Cum Animus Et Successus” (Through Courage, Success) added by Murphy.

Long-range radio communications received a major boost with the issue of the AN/TRC-77 CW Radio to the Company in 1962. Civilian technicians from Sylvania trained LRRPs to use the new radios, which served both V & VII Corps LRRPs faithfully until mid-1968. Few LRRPs knew there were six “burst coders” for the TRC-77s locked up in the company EDP (Emergency Defence Plan) safe with other classified equipment.

The company moved to Edwards Kaserne outside of Frankfurt with Captain William Guinn assuming command from Major Edward Porter in January 1963. The shoulder patch was changed from 7th Army to V Corps with blue and white airborne tab.

The company moved yet again on 9 MAY 63 to Gibbs Kaserne in Frankfurt and became part of the V Corps Special Troops (Provisional) working directly for V Corps G-2.

General Creighton Abrams assumed command of V Corps in 1963 and revoked the company’s maroon berets when he found out they had not been authorized by Department of the Army.

1964 saw the issue of AN/PRC-25s FM voice radios to replace the AN/PRC-10s with their infamously poor German-made batteries. Those batteries were so weak that it was often necessary to keep the radios in sleeping bags to keep them from going dead in cold weather. The change to PRC-25s was a major improvement and made it possible to communicate properly with both Army and Air Force aircraft for the first time.

The company also traded in its M-14 rifles for the new “XM16E1” 5.56mm rifle in the autumn of 1964 (Yes, they had a high malfunction rate even when new in Europe, as well as RVN).

The company was often assigned to Honor Guard duties in garrison during this period. It was chosen as an Honor Guard to represent the US Army Airborne at the 20th anniversary of the Normandy Invasion in France on 6 JUN 64, which it did with 122 enlisted men and four officers. C.O. Capt Norm Carlton even paid for the non-issue white gloves for the Honor Guard out of his own pocket on that occasion.

Under Captains Guinn and Carlton, the V Corps LRRP’s developed and perfected aspects of Long Range Patrol operations that resulted in the issue of the first LRRP TO&E (Table of Organization & Equipment) 7-157E and the publication of the first Long Range Reconnaissance Company Field Manual, FM 31-16.

The issue of the TO&E in 1965 saw the end of Provisional status for V and VII Corps LRRPs and the re-designation of both companies.

The company name was officially changed to Company D, (LRP), 17th Infantry on 15 MAY 65 with the issue of the new TO&E. The company continued with the same personnel, mission, barracks, and continued to wear its unique crest.

But the TO&E did result in an increase of authorized strength to 208 men, 24 five man patrols (formerly four man), and a new transportation section (the company formerly used 2.5 ton trucks from the 35th Transportation Company located in the same barracks at Gibbs Kaserne. Who could forget “Romeo” the bespectacled truck driver who fell hopelessly in love with everything in a skirt and once got hypnotized by the windshield wipers on his own truck and had to be brought to by the LRRP riding shotgun as he started to run off the road?).

The TO&E also formalized the trend towards Ranger status with a requirement for 24 Patrol Leaders, three “Killer” Platoon Leaders, the Ops Officer, Exec Officer, C.O. and 1st Sergeant to be Ranger qualified. All 208 LRRPs had to be parachute qualified.

The company continued its constant training cycles of Soviet Order of Battle, camouflage, CW radio operator training, and frequent FTXs, most of them in winter but big changes were happening in the Army as the Vietnam war escalated.

In 1967 popular C.O. Charlie Wertenberger announced a “levy” of the company for Vietnam. Carl Mancini recalls, “When Khe Sanh got hit (Marines and 173rd) they had a levy come down for airborne personnel. The C.O. got the entire unit down to the theater and told us what was going on. He made the married personnel and the people who were short leave. That left about 60 guys and they need 50 so he asked for volunteers. He got killed after about three weeks in country but to me he was a great guy. I looked him up at the wall.”

In 1968, the Army began a massive pullout from Europe as part of a mutual reduction of forces with the Warsaw Pact. It was code named ” OPERATION REFORGER “. (Redeployment of Forces Germany) and the company relocated from Frankfurt, Germany to Fort Benning Georgia in July, with Captain Harry W. Nieubar as the company commander.

The Ft Benning barracks was on Kelley Hill and the company was the only active duty Airborne unit on the post. They still wore the V Corps patch with airborne tab and were used as Aggressors at all three Ranger Training sites. “Our patrols used to make life miserable for the students”, Terry Roderick recalls. “And we had legg outfits all around us on Kelley Hill and we thought we owned the place.” Commanding Officers there included Thomas P Meyer and Dennis Foley. About half of the company consisted of Vietnam combat veterans at that time, most of them from the 101st and the 173rd.

The company also ran the RVN Orientation at Ft Benning. Walter Buchanan says the Orientation gave the troops opportunities to run obstacle courses including a rope bridge built by another LRRP, Daniel Pope. Half of the troops would fall off the bridge and the Captain would say, “Congratulations. You’ve just passed the Orientation”, and tell them to always remain on their toes in ‘Nam and expect the unexpected, never drop their guard. Then they would all get in the back of their trucks and head for the barracks. “We used to ambush them on the way home in the back of the deuce and a halfs”, Walter says. “We used a LOT of det cord and artillery simulators on them.” Walter and Daniel later did a ‘Nam tour together in C/75.

The company also assisted Indiana National Guard LRP Company D/151 to get ready for Vietnam in 1968. Calvin Everhart remembers about a dozen who were short timers or otherwise ineligible to go who stayed in D/17 when D/151 left for ‘Nam.

The company had left its long range AN/TRC-77 Morse Code radios behind in Germany and carried only AN/PRC-25s in the field. CW capability rapidly atrophied until 10 LRRPs were sent to Ft Jackson for CW training at the end of 1968.

By that time, D/17 was training for both European and RVN operations and then the Army added Riot Training. The latter caused some spectacular events which made the Army re-think LRRP suitability for crowd control and that task was dropped.

FTXs supported the RVN mission and in 1969 the company began sending trained LRPs to other LRP Companies in Vietnam weekly. By this time the company was fielding six man teams as had become standard practice in RVN.

Co D, LRP, 17th Inf underwent a name change to A/75 Rangers on 1 FEB 69 with Captain Thomas P. Meyer as Commanding Officer. There was no ceremony according to several people who were there. Ranger unit crests were issued and the company was required to adopt a 197th Infantry Brigade shoulder patch with Airborne tab and a new jump wings background.

Despite those changes, the company retained its REFORGER mission as V Corps LRRP and that is the main reason why it was never deployed to Vietnam.

A/75 was now a Ranger company but it had very few tabbed Rangers and it stayed that way. “It was a sore spot, but the company just could not get the training slots”, Terry Roderick remembers. “Here we were, the big Ranger Company at Ft Benning, but we weren’t Rangers, we were LRPs. It was a crock and we knew it.”

One benefit of being at Ft Benning was proximity to the jump and Pathfinder schools and many A/75 people made “recreational jumps” at the schools.

But most of the guys who had served in Vietnam had not jumped in more than a year. Many had never even made their cherry jump. Richard McClung was assigned to the company after his Vietnam tour and recalls that when he reported in July 1970; he was pencilled in for a jump on Rapido DZ. He asked when his refresher course was and 1st Sgt Vick replied, “When make your jump, Stud.”

A/75 transferred from Ft Benning to Ft Hood early in 1970, arriving on February 3 under the Command of Captain Johnathan Henkel and was assigned to the 1st Armored Division. The primary mission until June 1972 was to support MASSTAR (Mobile Army Sensor Systems Test, Evaluation, and Review ). The program dealt with surveillance, target acquisition, seismic intrusion detector and night observation equipment which paved the way and benefited the Army in its performance in the Gulf War twenty years later. The job wasn’t as dull as it sounds because the company was mostly used in an Aggressor capacity against troops using the test devices.

The mission changed again in July 1972, to provide Long Range Reconnaissance capability for the First Cavalry Division. The secondary mission was to stay in a high state of training for the original mission of V Corps LRRP. A/75 did, in fact, deploy to Germany on an annual Reforger exercise in 1973 to do exactly the same work as their predecessors did in the early and mid 60s. By that time more than 80 percent of A/75 personnel were Vietnam Veterans.

1974 was the beginning of the end for A/75 with the new Ranger battalions forming around a nucleus of key people, many of them former A/75 members. The 1st Ranger Battalion sent former A/75 CO Captain Clark and former A/75 1st Sergeant Romo to the company and they recruited a lot of company personnel who left in mid-1974.

Second Battalion CO LTC A.J. Baker also came to Ft Hood with his CSM and recruited another 2 or 3 dozen guys.

The company was deactivated and its guideon cased for the last time at a fixed bayonet parade on 19 DEC 74.

The last A/75 Commanding Officer was Captain James P. Fitter and last 1st Sergeant was Gary Carpenter (later to become the first Regimental Sergeant-Major of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Alan Campbell who was in A/75 at its deactivation and then went to 2nd Ranger Battalion sums up: “A/75 was a great unit. Times were wild. I still can’t believe some of the stuff we did. I’m amazed that no one went to jail. Even some of the officers would have qualified as brigands. Still, we did our jobs better than anyone on Ft Hood.

B/75 RGR & C/58 LRP & VII CORPS LRRP HISTORY

LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL COMPANY, VII CORPS

The VII Corps LRRP Co. (ABN) was one of the first two Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Companies authorized at Army level. The other was attached to V Corps. It was activated at 7th Army in W. Germany on 09 June 1961, and was formed at Nellingen, W. Germany. The first Company Commander was Maj. Edward V. Maltese and the first First Sergeant was 1SGT Winston “Patty” Flynn.

The company was initially designated the U.S. Army (3780) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company, and came under Headquarters VII Corps Special Troops in Stuttgart, Germany for Administration and court martial jurisdiction, and worked directly for VII Corps G-2. The company was never an interim, provisional or TD unit. It was the first full-fledged LRRP Company. It had the largest area of responsibility for the deepest penetration, up to 150 Km behind enemy lines. Known informally as the JayHawk LRRPs, the company motto on its crest was “Eyes Behind the Lines.” The company had the largest number of personnel of the LRRP outfits in Europe. It was also fully contained. Other than the personnel sent off to train on SADM emplacement, it had the facilities to train all its personnel in CW and all the field requirements of LRRP operations. Under the Command of its second CO, Maj. Edward M. Hunt, the VII Corps LRRP perfected many aspects of Long Range Reconnaissance Operations that are still in use today. Many of these techniques were incorporated into the first Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Field Manual (FM 31-16).

The Mission of the company was Battlefield Surveillance and Target Acquisition in the area under the influence of VII Corps. The company would also be used for special missions of infiltration that included Team placement of T-4 Atomic Demolition munitions and locating enemy Targets for Tactical Nuclear Delivery Systems.

In 1963, Major Hendrick succeeded Major Hunt. After him, the Company Commanders were Major Yoder, Major Miller (who unfortunately died on Christmas Eve 1965, after suffering a concussion during a parachute accident), Major Garbers, who was the former XO under Hunt, and Captain Disney.

Also in 1963, the company was given the mission to provide foot patrols along the Czech Border, along with the 2nd ACR. These patrols were able to get closer to the border than the vehicle bound 2nd ACR, and were able to provide valuable intelligence to the VII Corp G-2.

B/75 RGR & C/58 LRP & VII CORPS LRRP HISTORY

On 15 May 1965, the VII Corps LRRP Co. (ABN) was re-designated, Company C (LRP) 58th Inf. (ABN), and continued the same mission and remained at Nellingen Barracks, Nellingen, W. Germany.

B COMPANY (RANGER), 75TH INFANTRY (AIRBORNE), VII CORPS

In 1968 the Army began a massive pullout from Europe code named Operation Reforger (Redeployment of Forces Germany), and Company C (LRP) 58th Inf. (ABN) was relocated to Ft. Riley, Kansas. While at Ft. Riley, the Company was re-designated Company B (Rangers) 75th Infantry (ABN), and was then relocated to Ft. Carson, Colorado. The company was administratively assigned to the 4th Inf. Div, 2nd Squadron 17th Cav. for all administrative support. While there, under the command of Capt. Mike Hess, the company still maintained its mission for VII Corp G-2 and VII Corp remained the unit’s parent Headquarters. The unit maintained its mission proficiency by making parachute jumps onto Ft. Carson from both Air Force and Army aircraft and by practicing patrol techniques in the Pike National Forest.

In 1972, under the command of Capt. Kenneth Kubasik, the unit was ordered to take part in Operation REFORGER II, during which the unit deployed to Germany. After a short briefing to the VII Corp Command and Staff as to the unit’s capabilities, the unit was sent into the field where it performed every mission superbly.

In June 1974, under the command of Capt. Tom Harris the company was relocated to Ft. Lewis, Washington. Shortly after arriving there, the unit was used as the nucleus for the 2nd Bn. 75th Rangers on 1 Nov 1974.

Today, the modern Rangers of the 75th Ranger Regiment still hold to the standards and traditions that the LRRP companies established during their existence. In true LRRP fashion, they continue the tradition of being a premier combat element of the active Army.

E COMPANY (LRP) 20TH INFANTRY (A) &
C COMPANY (RGR) 75TH INFANTRY (A) IFFV

This history deals with the activities, personnel, and accomplishments of Company C (Ranger), 75th infantry during the period 1 February 1969 through October 1971, and Company E (Long Range Patrol) 20th Infantry (Airborne) from 25 September 1967 through 1 February 1969 which preceeded the designation of Company C (Ranger), 75th Infantry.

Throughout history the need for a small, highly trained, far ranging unit to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and special type combat missions has been readily apparent.

In Vietnam, this need was met by instituting a Long Range Patrol program to provide each major combat unit with this special capability.

Rather than create an entirely new unit designation for such an elite force, the Department of the Army looked to its rich and varied heritage and on 1 February 1969 designated the 75th Infantry Regiment, the present successor to the famous 5307th composite Unit (Merrill’s Marauders) as the parent organization for all Department of the Army designated Long Range Patrol (LRP) units. The parenthetical designation

(Ranger) In lieu of (LRP) was given and the units were identified by letters. As a result, Company E (LRP), 20th Infantry (Abn), assigned to First Field Force Vietnam became Company C (Ranger), 75th Infantry. The 5307th was organized on 3 October 1943, and trained for deep penetration missions behind enemy lines in Japanese-held Burma. On 10 August 1944, the 5307th was consolidated with the 475th and the combined unit was designated the 475th Infantry Regiment and was designated as a long range penetrating force. The 475th was inactivated on 1 July 1945 in China. On 21 June 1954, the 475th was redesignated the 75th Infantry Regiment and activated in Okinawa on 20 November 1954 and remained active until 21 March 1956.

Corps-level reconnaissance for the First and Second Field Force Vietnam was performed by Special Forces-led indigenous warriors organized into “unconventional warfare projects” to cover remote areas.  The Special Forces Detachment B-50 Project Omega at Ban Me Thout served First Field Force Vietnam and used Sedang, Jeb, and Rhade Montagnard tribal volunteers as well as Cham and Chinese ethnic minorities.  Special Forces Detachment B-56 Project Sigma supported Second Field Force Vietnam.  MACV Commander General Westmoreland decided that the highly proficient Special Forces recon experts and their native irregulars would be better utilized in a strategic reconnaissance role, serving MACV Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG) on clandestine missions across the border into Laos and Cambodia.

On 22 June 1967, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Gen. Earle G. Wheeler authorized two regular infantry long-range patrol companies for the field forces.  He informed General Westmoreland that the Army planned to activate both units in November, but that neither company would be ready for Vietnam service until at least September 1968.  Westmoreland expressed strong dissatisfaction with this arrangement, because the field force reconnaissance units would arrive too late to immediately substitute for Projects Omega and Sigma –scheduled for November 1967 absorption into MACV-SOG.

General Westmoreland requested to form both patrol companies in Vietnam, where they could be organized much quicker by using available personnel and equipment.  On 12 September 1967, Army chief of staff Gen. Harold K. Johnson approved Westmoreland’s suggestion.  Following this decision the U.S. Army Pacific issued activation orders for the companies, but restricted their formation assets to “locally available resources” within the Vietnam Theater.

On 25 September 1967, Company E (Long Range Patrol), 20th Infantry (Airborne) was activated and assigned to First Field Force Vietnam, commanded by Lieutenant General William B. Rosson. The unit was originally formed in Phan Rang by procuring combat veterans from the 1st Brigade (LRRP), 101st Airborne Division, along with personnel who

were scheduled to join the Military Police Brigade. Additional assets were also drawn from the replacement detachments.  The Military Police soldiers were originally assigned because they were dog handlers and had some limited training in patrolling; however, once the company began its training the commander realized our type of missions would not use any dogs.  So they decided that anyone who was an MP who made it through the training and was selected they would change their job to Infantry.

Company E was originally commanded by Major Danridge M. Malone.   The unit was to provide long range reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and special type missions on a corp level basis. In addition, the company had the capacity to operate as a platoon size force and conduct regular recon-in-force missions. They were known as Typhoon Patrollers, taken from the codeword Typhoon, favored by First Field Force headquarters.

On 15 October 1967, Company E was placed under operational control of the 4th Infantry Division, and was relocated to the Division’s base camp at Camp Enari in the western Pleiku Province. The company trained through December and phased its four platoons through ten day preparatory courses, followed by sequential attendance at the MACV

Recondo School in Nha Trang, which was run by Special Forces cadre, at two week intervals. Each platoon concluded their training with a one

week field training exercise outside the Special Forces camp at Plei Do Mi in the Central Highlands. The first platoon completed its program on 1 December and the entire company was declared combat operational on 23 December 1967.

Company E was organized for 230 men, broken down into four platoons of seven six-man teams each.  A headquarters section handled all the administration and logistics and a communications platoon was responsible for the vital radio contact with the teams.

Although the company was designed to field two active platoons while the other two platoons trained and prepared for further missions on a rotating basis, it wasn’t long before every platoon was tasked with their own mission at the same time.

Each platoon consisted of a platoon leader (1LT), a platoon sergeant (SFC), the seven teams and communications support as required.  Active platoons were deployed to mission support sites, such as Special Forces camps and forward fire bases.

Each team was structured for a team leader (SSG, SGT), an assistant team leader (SGT, SPC), a radio operator (SPC, PFC), and three scouts (SPC, PFC) and were designated by platoon and team number within the platoon. Second platoon, team 1 would be team 21. As time went by and personnel were rotated out, for a variety of reasons, it was not

uncommon for a team to consist of five men or less and to be led by a specialist (E-4). Also due to limited available resources it was not uncommon for a platoon to deploy with only three six-man recon teams.  This did not keep the teams from completing any assigned mission, and after training together as a team the men were capable of handling each other’s duties and positions regardless of their rank. On some occasions two or more teams would be combined (two-teamer) for specific missions such as a reaction force, prisoner snatch, or downed aircraft search/recovery (SAR).

In January 1969 the Army reorganized the 75th Infantry under the combat arms regimental system as the parent regiment for the various infantry patrol companies. On 1 February, Company C (Ranger), 75^th Infantry, was officially activated by incorporating the Company E “Typhoon Patrollers· into the new outfit. The rangers were known as “Charlie Rangers” in conformity with C in the ICAO phonetic alphabet.  Company C continued to operate under control of First Field Force and was based at Ahn Khe.

From 4 to 22 February 1969, three platoons rendered reconnaissance support for the Republic of Korea 9th Division in the Ha Roi region and two platoons supported the Phu Bon province advisory campaign along the northern provincial boundary from 26 February to 8 March. Company C then concentrated its teams in support of the 4th Infantry Division by reconning major infiltration routes in the southwestern HINES area of operations until 28 March.  During the first part of the year, teams also pulled recon-security duty along the ambush prone section of Highway 19 between Ahn Khe and the Mang Yang pass.

During March 1969, Lt. Gen. Charles A. Corcoran assumed command of First Field Force and an enhancement of ranger capability was begun.  Company C constructed a basic and refresher training facility at Ahn Khe and conducted a three-week course for all non-recondo-graduate individuals during April. The company then used the course for new volunteers before going to the MACV Recondo school. In late April Company C shifted support to the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s Operation WASHINGTON GREEN in northern Binh Dinh Province.  Company C assisted Company N by conducting surveillance of enemy infiltration routes that passed through the western mountains of the province toward the heavily populated coastline.

Most Company C assets remained in Binh Dinh Province in a screening role, but at the end of April one platoon was dispatched for one week in the Ia Drang Valley near the Cambodian border. This was followed by two platoons being kept with the ROK Capital Division on diversionary and surveillance operations thru mid July.

On 21 July the company received an entirely new assignment.  Company C was attached to Task Force South in the southernmost First Field Force territory operating against Viet Cong strongholds along the boundary of II and III Corp Tactical Zones. The company, now under the command of Maj. Bill V. Holt, served as the combat patrol arm of Task Force South until 25 March 1970.

The Rangers operated in an ideal reconnaissance setting that contained vast wilderness operational areas, largely without population or allied troop density. Flexible patrol arrangements were combined with imaginative methods of team insertion, radio deception, and nocturnal employment. Numerous ambush situations led Company C to anticipate an opportunity to use stay-behind infiltration techniques.  As one team was being extracted, another team already on the chopper would infiltrate at the same time on a stay behind mission. The tactic was to be very successful. The company operated in eight day operational cycles and used every ninth day for “recurring refresher training.” The teams rehearsed basic patrolling techniques varying from night ambush to boat infiltration. Ranger proficiency flourished under these conditions, and MACV expressed extreme satisfaction with Company C’s results.

The Viet Cong had taken advantage of the “no man’s land” of Binh Thuan and Binh Tuy provinces straddling the allied II and III corp tactical zones to reinforce their Military Region six headquarters.  Company C performed a monthly average of twenty-seven patrols despite inclement weather in this region and amassed a wealth of military intelligence.

On 1 February 1970 the company was split when two platoons moved into Tuyen Duc Province and then rejoined on 6 March. Numerous team sightings in the Binh Thuan area led to operation HANCOCK MACE

Company C was moved to Pleiku city on 29 March 1970, and placed under operational control of the aerial 7th Squadron of the 7th Cavalry where they conducted thirty-two patrols in the far western border areas of the Central Highlands.

On 19 April the company was attached to the separate 3^rd Battalion, 506th Infantry and relocated to Ahn Khe, where it was targeted against the 95th NVA Regiment in the Mang Yang Pass area of Binh Dinh Province.

The rapid deployments into Pleiku and Ahn Khe provided insufficient time for teams to gain sufficient information about new terrain and enemy situations prior to insertion and they sometimes lacked current charts and aerial photographs. Company C effectiveness was hindered by poor logistical response, supply and equipment shortages, and transient relations with multiple commands. These difficulties were worsened by commanders who were unfamiliar with ranger employment. Thus, the rangers performed routine pathfinder work and guarded unit flanks as well as performing recon missions.

On 4 May 1970 the company was opconned to the 4th Infantry Division. The following day Operation BINH TAY I, the invasion of Cambodia’s Ratanaktri Province, was initiated. Although ranger fighting episodes in the BINH TAY I operation were often fierce and sometimes adverse, the operation left Company C with thirty patrol observations of enemy personnel, five NVA killed, and fifteen weapons captured.  On 24 May 1970 Company C was pulled out of Cambodia and released from 4^th Infantry Division control.

Four days later they were rushed to Dalat to recon an NVA thrust toward the city. Their recon produced only seven sightings but an enemy cache was discovered containing 2,350 pounds of hospital supplies, and 50 pounds of equipment. They remained in Dalat less than a month before being sent back to rejoin Task Force South at Phan Thiet.

May, June and July of 1970 were described by the new commander of Company C, Maj. Donald L. Hudson, as involving a dizzying pattern of operations. The company operated in Binh Thuan, Lam Dong, Tuyen Duc, Pleiku, and Binh Dinh provinces during this time. Twenty-seven days were devoted to company movements with sixty-five days of tactical operations each move necessitating adjustment with novel terrain, unfamiliar aviation resources, and fresh superior commands.

On 26 July 1970 Company C was transported by cargo aircraft to Landing Zone English outside Bong Son and was returned to the jurisdiction of the 173rd Airborne. The company supported operation WASHINGTON GREEN in coastal Binh Dinh province with small unit ambushes, limited raids, and pathfinder assistance for heliborne operations.

During August the “Charlie Rangers” attempted to locate and destroy the troublesome Viet Cong, Khan Hoa provincial battalion, but were deterred by Korean Army jurisdictional claims. The mission became secondary when the 173rd discovered a large communist headquarters complex at secret base 226 in the Central Highlands and on 17 August the 2nd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division moved into the region and Company C was attached for reconnaissance.

In mid November 1970 Company C was attached to the 17th Aviation Group, and it remained under either aviation or 173rd Airborne Brigade control for most of the remaining duration of its Vietnam service.

Following the inactivation of First Field Force at the end of April 1971, Company C was reassigned to the Second Regional Assistance Command, and on 15 August was reduced to a brigade strength ranger company of three officers and sixty-nine enlisted men.

The First Field Force rangers were notified of pending disbandment as part of Increment IX (Keystone Oriole-Charlie) of the Army redeployment from Vietnam. Company C (Airborne Ranger), 75th Infantry commenced final stand-down on 15 October 1971 and was reduced to zero strength by 24 October. On 25 October 1971 Company C was officially inactivated.

Redesignated 31 January 1974 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1^st Battalion, 75^th Infantry, and activated at Fort Stewart, Georgia (organize elements concurrently constituted and activated)

Headquarters and Headquarters Company consolidated 3 February 1986 with former Company A, 1^st Ranger Infantry Battalion (see ANNEX); 1^st Battalion, 75^th Infantry concurrently redesignated as the 1^st Battalion, 75^th Ranger Regiment.

Company C (Airborne Ranger), 75th Infantry are entitled to the following:

Campaign Streamers:

Vietnam:  Counteroffensive phase VI

Tet 1969 Counteroffensive

Summer-Fall 1969

Sanctuary Counteroffensive

Counteroffensive Phase VII

Consolidation I

Consolidation II

Cease Fire

Decorations:

Vietnam:  Valorous Unit Award (One award)

Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross w/palm (Two awards)

Republic of Vietnam Civil Actions Medal/First Class (One award)

Traditional Designation: Charlie Rangers

Motto: Sua Sponte (“Of their own accord”)

Distinctive Insignia: The shield of the coat of arms.

Symbolism of the coat of arms: The colors; blue, white, red and green represent four of the original six combat teams of the 5307^th Composite Unit (Provisional), which were identified by a color code word. The unit’s close cooperation with the Chinese forces in the china-Burma-India Theater is represented by the Sun symbol from the Chinese Nationalist Flag. The white star represents the Star of Burma. The lightning bolt is symbolic of the strike characteristics of the behind-the-line activities.

RANGER Designation:

Rationale – The rationale for selecting the 75th Infantry as the parent unit for all DA authorized Ranger Units is as follows:

(1) Similarity of missions between those missions performed by Merrill’s Marauders and those currently assigned to and envisioned by the new Ranger Companies’ operations deep in enemy territory.

(2) It returns to the rolls of the active Army Regiment having a distinguished combat record and a unique place in the annals of the United States Army.

(3) It provides the Ranger Companies and the United States Army with a common regimental designation indentifying an uncommon skill.

 

D/75 RGR HISTORY

D COMPANY (RANGER), 75TH INFANTRY (AIRBORNE), 2ND FIELD FORCE

Company D (Ranger) 75th Infantry was formed on 20, November 1969, with a cadre of regular army personnel from Company D (Ranger) 151st Infantry, many of whom were veterans of other tours of duty in country. Major Richard W. Drisko was appointed as the Commander.

The rangers referred to themselves as the “Delta Rangers” in conformity with the letter “D” of the ICAO phonetic alphabet adopted by the U.S. military in 1956. On 1 December, the new ranger company was placed under the operational control of the aerial 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry.

Intensive ranger training was conducted to prepare the new unit for combat reconnaissance operations. Each of the field platoons completed a seven-day preparatory program that included instruction on communications, map reading, tracking, prisoner snatches, demolitions, ambush techniques, sensor emplacement, and familiarization with repelling, rope ladders, and McGuire rigs. Four rangers were sent to the sniper school and graduated on 28 January 1970, giving the company sharpshooter capability for special countermeasure patrols. Ranger Company D was given the mission of providing corps-level ranger support to II Field Force Vietnam by collecting intelligence, interdicting supply routes, locating and destroying encampments, and uncovering cache sites. The ranger surveillance zone was expanded to encompass the former Indiana Ranger area of operations, as well as the Northeastern portion of the Catcher’s Mitt western War Zone D in Bien Hoa and Long Khanh provinces. The Delta Rangers concentrated on ambush patrols but also performed point, area, and route reconnaissance with elements as small as three men.

On 2 December 1969, a Delta Ranger ambush killed a transportation executive officer of the communist Subregion 5 who was carrying the enemy payroll, capturing 30,500 Vietnamese plasters. In early January 1970, a nine-man combined ambush group, composed of ranger teams 14 and 15, killed eleven North Vietnamese soldiers from the 274th Regiment of the 5th VC Division and fixed its location for higher headquarters analysis.

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong instituted increased precautions against Ranger tactics by assigning more trail-watchers to landing fields, mining or booby-trapping routes that they no longer intended to use, and forming counter-raider teams. These enemy teams consisted of four soldiers who were highly killed in tracking patrols and heavily armed with light machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.

On 8 February 1970, Ranger Company D was released from 3d Squadron, 17th Calvary, and placed under the operational control of the 199th Infantry Brigade. The Delta Rangers continued operating in southwestern War Zone D and the eastern Catcher’s Mitt area. On 18 March, Ranger Company D returned to direct II Field Force Vietnam control; it was employed to sweep the Nhon Trach district and train recon members of the South Vietnamese 18th Division.

At the end of March 1970, the Delta Rangers ceased operations and commenced stand-down procedures. Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry, was reduced to zero strength by the afternoon of 4 April and was officially inactivated on 10 April 1970. During the unit’s Vietnam service, the Delta Rangers performed 458 patrols that reported seventy separate sightings of enemy activity and clashed with NVA/VC forces on sixty-five occasions. The rangers killed eighty-eight enemy soldiers by direct fire and captured three, while suffering two killed and twenty-four wounded rangers in exchange. Of supreme importance, the Ranger company unmasked changing enemy unit displacements and supply channels aimed against the main allied bases outside Saigon.

Today, the modern Rangers of the 75th Ranger Regiment continue the traditions left behind by the Vietnam era Rangers.

E/75 RGR & E/50 LRP & 9TH ID LRRP & 9TH ID LRS HISTORY

LONG RANGE PATROL PLATOON, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

In the fall of 1966, the 9th Infantry Division formed a division Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Platoon after division commander, Maj. Gen. George S. Eckhardt flew to Vietnam on an orientation tour of the combat theater. Major General Eckhardt noted that each division contained a long-range patrol unit. He arrived back at Fort Riley, Kansas, where the Division was completing preparations for its scheduled December deployment to Vietnam, and ordered the immediate organization of a reconnaissance platoon for his own division. Capt. James Tedrick, Lt. Winslow Stetson, and Lt. Edwin Garrison were chosen as the officers for the LRRP Platoon. They interviewed and screened the records of 130 volunteer soldiers and selected the best 40. The provisional unit was known as the “War Eagle Platoon”. In November of 1966, the LRRP Platoon completed the Jungle Warfare School in Panama. Captain Tedrick conducted an extra week of tropical training following the regular two-week course. Platoon members were shipped to Vietnam in January 1967.

At the Special Forces MACV Recondo School at Nha Trang, the entire 9th Infantry Division LRRPS became recondo-qualified, Meanwhile, the unit adjusted to its combat operating area. The division operated primarily in the lowlands south of Saigon, the Rung Sat Special Zone, and the Mekong Delta. Torrential rains and year-round water exposed patrollers to high rates of disabling skin disease. Reconnaissance troops often suffered extensive inflammatory lesions and rampant skin infections. And by the fourth month of tropical service, nearly three-fourths of all infantryman had recognizable infections. The Bear Cat – Long Thanh area east of Saigon was where the division was initially concentrated. The new base, Dong Tam, was constructed by dredging the My Tho river to produce enough fill to build a major installation in the Mekong Delta. It was located five miles west of My Tho in Dinh Tuong Province.

E COMPANY (AIRBORNE), 50TH INFANTRY (LONG RANGE PATROL), 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

On 8 July 1967, the 9th Long Range Patrol Detachment (LRPD) was formalized. Borrowing General Marshall’s World War II phrase, the Division LRPD was “well brought up.” During June and July, the LRPD completed forty-three patrols and clashed eighteen times with enemy forces. Through August and September, the LRPD continued to fill. By October it had reached full authorized strength of 119 personnel and was rated fully operational. Each platoon contained a command section and eight, six-man teams.

Some teams of the division LRPD rendered reconnaissance for 2nd Brigade in Operation CORONADO and entered the Viet Cong Cam Son secret base area while other teams supported the 1st Brigade in Operation AKRON and uncovered a massive underground system of enemy tunnels and bunkers. The LRPD also conducted important military intelligence tasks for the Mobile Riverine Force within the Mekong Delta.

Major General George C. O’Connor activated Company E (Long Range Patrol), 50th Infantry, to give the 9th Infantry Division specialized ground reconnaissance support on 20 December 1967. The long-range patrol company absorbed the LRPD and was designated as “Reliable Reconnaissance” after the division nickname of “Old Reliable’s.”

During January 1968, the Navy SEAL teams began joint operations with Reliable Reconnaissance. LRP’s did this to gain training and experience in the Delta environment The missions designated as SEAL-ECHO were the highly selective patrols. They were inserted by Navy patrol boats, plastic assault boats, helicopters, and Boston whalers. The SEAL-ECHO troops used supporting artillery and airstrikes to destroy larger targets.

Maj. Gen. Julian J. Ewell assumed command of the 9th Infantry Division in February 1968. He authorized the Reliable Reconnaissance company to acquire a similar capacity to the 3rd Brigade Combined reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon as a result of the Tet-68 battles. Company E received permission to employ available Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) personnel from the Central Intelligence Agency’s Project Phoenix program. The PRU troops were hardened anticommunist troops dedicated to destroying the Viet Cong infrastructure. The PRU troops generally possessed very high esprit and great knowledge of Viet Cong operating methods. From November 1968 through January 1969, the last three months of Company E’s existence, the Reliable Reconnaissance teams conducted 217 patrols, and engaged the enemy in 102 separate actions. The company was credited with capturi

E COMPANY (RANGER), 75TH INFANTRY (AIRBORNE), 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

On 1 February 1969, the department of the Army reorganized the 75th Infantry as the parent regiment for long-range patrol companies under the combat arms regimental system. Maj. Gen. Ewell activated Company E (Ranger), 75th Infantry, from Company E, 50th Infantry. The rangers were known as “Echo Rangers” or “Riverine Rangers,” because they mostly dealt with riverine and canal reconnaissance – even though the company was only partially assigned to the Mobile Riverine Force. Ranger Company E took advantage of dry season conditions to harass suspected Viet Cong supply lines from activation until the end of April. The Riverine Rangers conducted 244 patrols and reported 134 observations of enemy activity. They clashed with the Viet Cong during 111 patrols and were credited with capturing five prisoners and killing 169 Viet Cong. When the 9th Infantry Division began phasing out of Vietnam in July 1969, the rangers renamed themselves “Kudzu Rangers” after the operational code word for the close-in defense of Dong Tam. The ranger company phased its teams out of the Kudzu business by 3 August.

On 23 August 1969, the Army formally inactivated Company E (Ranger), 75th Infantry. The provisional ‘Go-Devil” Ranger company, also known as the separate 3rd Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division, formally established as an independent unit on 26 July 1969, was unaffected by this paper ruse. On 24 September, the U.S. Army Pacific reactivated Company E by General Order 705 and the U.S. Army Vietnam headquarters published orders reassigning Company E to the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry was again activated on 1 October 1969 and the original Company E was discontinued and became the new Company E. The only difference was what they called themselves, They dropped “Riverine Rangers” and continued on with their newly acquired name, “Go-Devil” Rangers.”

No other combat recon units waged reconnaissance and intelligence – gathering operations under circumstances more difficult than those with the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam. Despite this, the Reliable Reconnaissance Patrollers, Riverine Rangers, and Go-Devil Rangers manifested sound tactical doctrine and imaginative techniques in adjusting to the alien Mekong Delta environment and applied undeviating pressure against the Viet Cong havens and their supply lanes throughout the division term of service in Vietnam.

Campaigns-

Decorations: Vietnam-

Traditional Designation: Echo Rangers

Motto: Sua Sponte (“Of their own accord”)

Distinctive Insignia: The shield of the coat of arms RANGER Designation:

Rationale – – The rationale for selecting the 75th Infantry as the parent unit for all Department of the Army authorized Ranger units is/was as follows:

(1) Similarity of missions between those missions performed by Merrill’s Marauders and the 75th Infantry, Ranger Companies in the republic of Vietnam and those of the 75th Ranger Regiment – – Operations deep in enemy territory.

(2) It returns to the rolls of the active Army Regiment having a distinguished combat record and a unique place in the annals of the United States Army.

(3) It provides the 75th Ranger Regiment and the United States Army with a common regimental designation identifying an uncommon skill.

25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

THE INTRODUCTION OF THE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION INTO VIETNAM

The 25th Infantry Division arrived in Vietnam from Hawaii in two major groups. The 3rd Brigade deployed as a task force arriving in Pleiku, II Corps region of Vietnam on 28 December 1965. The 3rd Brigade would later have its own LRRP contingent and also be traded to the 4th Infantry Division for a brigade in August 1967. The remaining brigades and headquarters arrived at Cu Chi in III Corps area from 20 January 1966 through 4 April 1966.

It quickly became apparent to Major General Fred C. Weyand that a reconnaissance/specialty unit was needed to supplement 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry who were mounted troops and had the mission of providing road security and were ill equipped or trained to perform dismounted reconnaissance missions. General Weyand authorized the formation of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol detachment and forty-one officers and enlisted personnel were selected for duty with the unit.

The unit was known as “Mackenzie’s Lerps” because it was assigned to the 4th Cavalry known as Mackenzie’s Raiders after Colonel Slidell Mackenzie who had commanded the unit from 1870 to 1882 with proficiency.

Training for the new LRRPs was accomplished at the Special Forces MACV Recondo School at Nha Trang. The unit started patrolling at increasing distances from the Division and fire support bases. Missions included waterborne operations and were primarily oriented to finding the enemy so U.S. firepower could be staged and brought to bear on the enemy. Other types of missions including prisoner snatch, ambush, etc. were ordered for the normal five man teams.

On the job experience added Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for later volunteers to the unit. The only way into the unit was to volunteer and the members could be reassigned by unvolunteering themselves for less hazardous duty in a rifle unit. Allocations to Nha Trang and length of training time encouraged the formation of a 25th Division Recondo School which quickly brought volunteers to a workable patrol knowledge level.

LRRP was given a TO&E personnel strength of 60 plus, but, its real strength was closer to half that while its address was D Troop (LRRP), 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry. A remarkable amount of useful patrol knowledge was passed on in these classes always bearing the indelible stamp of the original Nha Trang training by the Special Forces.

The word “Reconnaissance” is somewhat misleading because missions were often combat in nature stemming from the desire of patrollers and commanders to do more than just look. Missions often were ended with an ambush or were interrupted by targets of opportunity. This was a prevailing attitude in the field and base commanders. While the 25th Division was in Cu Chi, its 3rd Brigade was still in Pleiku with its LRRPs referred to as “Bronco LRRP’s”. The Brigade LRRP teams existed from mid-1966 to August 1967, participating in 7 major operations from the border west to the South China Sea east including Duc Pho and Qui Nhon.

The Department of the Army officially authorized the formation of Company F, 50th Infantry Detachment (LRP) on 20 December, 1967. LRP stood for Long Range Patrol which more closely represented the missions. This unit was formed with the personnel and equipment from the LRRP detachment. The combat nature of the unit was borne out when General Weyand said in March 1967 that LRRP was the “fightingest unit under his command”.

The 50th Infantry continued to operate in III Corp region of Vietnam which included War Zones C and D which contained the floating enemy command for all of Vietnam (COSVN). The 50th Infantry was now known as the Cobra Lightning Patrollers and continued to operate in areas such as Tay Ninh, Fish Hook, Parrots Beak, and Angels Wing along the Cambodian border. Actions initiated on 28 January 1968 by the LRPs resulted in the KIA of 64 Viet-Cong reconnaissance troops.

Credit needs to be given to the personnel of the LRRP platoon and the 50th Infantry Detachment (LRP) for establishing the doctrine that would become SOP for Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry. The 75th Infantry absorbed the personnel and equipment of the 50th Infantry detachment (LRP) on 1 February 1969. They were now known as “Fox Rangers” from the phonetic “F” and “Tropical Rangers” from the Division’s name “Tropic Lightening”. Rangers included one sniper qualified trooper on each team. Ranger training started in the U.S. and was more refined than ever based on intelligence and experience gathered by Vietnam Ranger parent units (LRRP & LRP). This produced extremely qualified personnel well able and motivated to do the dangerous missions of the Rangers.

On 2 April 1970, two ranger teams made contact with entrenched forces of the crack 271st VC Regiment that required 2 American Battalions to deal with (one was mechanized). Rangers mission continued to operate in Hobo & Bo Loi Woods, Nui Ba Den mountain (the only mountain in the area), the Iron Triangle and into Cambodia as the historical predecessors had done since 1966.

The “F” Company Rangers were now authorized 123 troopers. In spring 1970, the Rangers participated in the process of Vietnamization which was to allow the South Vietnam more latitude in fighting the war in their country. From August to October 1970 Rangers from “F” Company conducted 85 patrols. In 1971 operations worked to disrupt enemy supplies and Tet 1971 was remarkably free from enemy activity. “F” Company, 75th Rangers was deactivated 15 March 1971.

Rangers were hated, feared and respected so much by the enemy that bounties were offered from $1,000 to $2,500.00 by a country whose citizens were glad to do labor for $.85 a day. The VC and NVA veterans now say the Rangers were the most deadly American unit in Vietnam because they were always showing up where they were not supposed to be and when the enemy knew, it was too late.

F Company Rangers earned a valorous unit award during 1 to 22 February 1969 upholding the highest elite unit standards. Today, the modern Rangers of the 75th Ranger Regiment continue the traditions of being a premier fighting element of the active army.

The traditions and dedication to their fellow RANGERS continues!!

LRRP TEAM MEMBERS RETURNED AFTER 30 YEARS

On May 31, 1967, PFC Brian K. McGar, PFC Joseph E. Fitzgerald, riflemen; SGT John A. Jakovac, ammo bearer; CPL Charles G. Rogerson, and SP4 Carl D. Flower were members of a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) deployed in Quang Ngai Province, South Vietnam. Radio contact with the patrol was lost, as the patrol failed to made a scheduled report at 2145 hours. On the morning of June 1, the bodies of Rogerson and Flower were discovered in fresh graves, while Jakovac, Fitzgerald and McGar were to be declared MIA for over 30 years.

Like many of us, after Basic (Ft. Bragg) and Infantry AIT (Ft. Polk), I ended up at the NCO Academy at Benning and then to Jump School and Ranger School. I was with Golf Company attached to the 23rd ID (Americal) and worked in both the Chu Lai and DaNang areas. After VN, I went to Ft. Hood and was with Alpha Company Rangers until I got out. I have attended several Ranger Reunions with the Regiment Association and a fair number of E51st/G75th reunions over the years.

G/75 RGR & E/51 LRP & 196th LRRP HISTORY

Long Range Patrol Detachment, 196th Light Infantry Brigade

The 196th Light Infantry Brigade was raised at Fort Devens, MA in September 1965. The Brigade had initially been formed with the objective of eventually replacing the 82nd Airborne on its mission in the Dominican Republic. Mission orders changed however. And after extensive training to recognize the revised mission, the Brigade was deployed in the summer of August 1966 to combat duty in Vietnam. This move was a permanent change of station (PCS). The new duty station was Tay Ninh, III Corps, Republic of Vietnam. The brigade commander was Brigadier General Edward de Saussure, Jr., who replaced Col. Francis X. Conaty, who had guided the Brigade through its training.

It became apparent in the early months of the Brigade’s deployment that a far ranging ground reconnaissance element was needed to gather intelligence on the enemy. In November 1966, the Commander of F Troop, 17th Calvary was tasked to form a (Provisional) far ranging reconnaissance detachment “strictly from volunteers.” First Lieutenant (1LT) John Maxwell volunteered to command the detachment. 1LT Maxwell was Airborne and Pathfinder qualified. To fill out his staff, 1LT Maxwell chose several volunteers, among them Joseph A. Smith, who was Special Forces (SF) qualified, and Earl L. Toomey, a graduate of the Army’s Jungle Warfare School and who had spent time in the Army’s Guerilla Warfare Unit in Panama, with Toomey, in effect, acting as NCOIC.

The leadership started a procurement effort that lead to the interview of over 50 applicants. After exhausting interviews with all volunteers, only 13 were accepted for training and service. These handpicked men, who reported officially to the unit on 2 January 1967, would be the cornerstones of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade’s Provisional Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) (pronounced “Lurp”) Detachment and trainers for the units’ future patrollers. The detachment was authorized by army regulation as an (Airborne) unit. The detachment’s authorized strength started at 42 and shortly changed to 65 personnel. However, the detachment never quite achieved that number and stayed around the average of 42 volunteers. As the six (6) man teams filled, members of the unit were sent to 5th Special Forces MACV Recondo School at Nha Trang for training. The only other training at the detachment level was on-the-job-training “OJT” under the guiding hand of the detachment’s leadership.

Just as the detachment’s operational teams got themselves to the point of rotation in and out of the battlefield (with all the training requirements, trying to rest and returning to patrolling) the tum around time gave little to no sleep. 1LT Maxwell was promoted to Captain (CPT) and departed the detachment in July l967. 1LT Frank G. Pratt Jr. assumed command of the detachment. 1LT Pratt was a graduate of Airborne and Ranger School and was cadre at the Ranger Course.

When the unit was at its largest patrolling size, eight (8) full teams were operational. The need of equipment and uniforms was a nightmare through official channels due to the non-TO&E status of LRRPS. Therefore, procurement of equipment was derived from different sources. French tiger fatigues and Colt Commando AR15s were acquired from the canny efforts of Sergeant Victor Valeriano. As more equipment was needed, Specialist Garver became the unofficial Supply Specialist which lead to the temporary receipt of vehicles and other items of interest through his procurement efforts.

The Detachment participated in Operations Attleboro, Wheeler, Wallowa and Junction City penetrating and patrolling into War Zone C of I Corps. Teams were constantly looking for the Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops. By finding routes, camps, caches of food and equipment during their mission, the team would report real time intelligence information to the Brigade. Many of the patrol members either dressed in VC clothing or took the clothing with them on patrols. Dressing as VC gave advantage in performing enemy prisoner snatches or to avoid standing out as Americans in an all oriental environment. The problem with that, however, was if caught they could be shot for spying.

The detachment was credited with the identification of the 271st Peoples Liberation Front Regiment, “VC Guerrillas”, and the destruction of a platoon of the 271st Regiment. Teams of the detachment were further credited with numerous Long Range Recon Patrols within their operational sectors which encompassed Quang Tin and Tay Ninh Province, specifically Que Son and Son Re Valleys. The teams performed numerous wire tap, ambush, tunnel exploration, bomb damage assessment, artillery/air strikes, surveillance, stay-behind and combat patrol missions.

The unit gained entry into the battlefield by foot, vehicle, rubber boat, and aircraft. By air, they used false insertion techniques and rappelled in by mountaineering equipment. For extractions, they used the UH-1D Helicopter. The field rations available to the Lurps were freeze dried Long-range patrol rations, C-rations or the Vietnamese indigenous rations. On 12 August 1967 the 196th Infantry Brigade became a part of a unit consolidation and dubbed “Task Force Oregon”. On 25 September 1967, General William Westmoreland Jr. ordered Task Force Oregon be replaced by the 23th Infantry Division (Americal) and thereon the 196th Infantry Brigade was absorbed into the newly activated division. The 196th LRRP Detachment continued to operate as the Brigade’s reconnaissance force.

Under the command of Americal Division Commander, Major General Samuel W. Koster, the 196th LRRP Detachment was deactivated as a Brigade asset on 2 November 1967. The unit was consolidated with the assets and soldiers of the deactivated 11th Infantry Brigade’s 70th Infantry Long Range Patrol Detachment in December 1967, as Long Range Recon Patrol Detachment (Airborne) LRRP-D(A). The creation of LRRP-D(A) at this time was involved in refining their art of reconnaissance patrolling with the USMC I” Force Recon Company in Da Nang.

E Company (AIRBORNE), 51st Infantry (Long Range Patrol), Americal Division

On 20 December 1967 the Department of the Army (DA) ordered LRRP-D(A) absorbed and reconstituted as Company E (LRP) 51st Infantry (Airborne) as the “official” Long Range Patrol Company for the 23d Infantry Division (Americal). SSG Toomey was still the 1SG and was promoted to Sergeant First Class (SFC E-7) and shortly afterward moved to a staff position in Division G2.

When 1SG Allen Whitcomb reported in, 1SG Whitcomb became the new Company First Sergeant. Whitcomb was a Jungle Expert and attended Panama’s Jungle Operation Training Course (JOTC); he was also Airborne qualified and rated as a Master Parachutist. The new Company Commander was Captain Gary F. Bjork a graduate of both Airborne and Ranger Schools. Under the new Tactical Operations and Equipment (TO&E), the unit strength went from 65 to 118 personnel. The consolidation of the Division LRRP assets was to give better support to the three different Infantry Brigades spread out within the Division Area of Operations (DAO). E 51st LRP Company’s patrol area had also increased covering Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, and Quang Nam Provinces. This became the largest operating area for any LRP unit in Vietnam.

In addition to this large area of responsibility, the unit was short personnel due to rotations back to the Continental United States (CONUS), resulting in back-to-back patrols. With little sleep in between missions, as missions came, the patrols continued. Captain Bjork and 1SG Whitcomb instituted a fair rotation of teams to help teach training with the new Company Recondo School. Another team could pull a rear OP/LP surveillance mission close to the Division’s perimeter guards on the beach, thus getting rest. Another patrol would be at the forward base with the Brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC) as back up, and one patrol was out scouting the enemy’s backyard. This method would buy time to start a procurement effort for volunteers from the Division.

The black beret was another selling point. With verbal approval from the Division Commander, the Bancroft black beret became the headgear of distinction for the Lurps and an eye catcher for prospective LRP volunteers. In order to be an elite Lurp, one must volunteer and then pass the Company Recondo School. With recruiting fliers out to the remote outposts of the Infantry Brigades, Airborne qualified personnel could be attracted. Jump pay was authorized. For the soldiers wanting to be Lurps who were not airborne qualified, the first requirement was to have been on the battlefield at least two months before volunteering. They then had to take and pass the Airborne PT test , swim test; after which a records check was made to see if the soldier had a GT score of 100 or better. Finally, a check was performed to see if there was any disciplinary record.

If all looked good, the volunteer qualified for training. The instructors of the Company Recondo School were the patrol-hardened MACV Recondo qualified Veterans of 196th LRRP Detachment and LRRP-Det (A). On a special note, Special Forces and Ranger personnel arriving into the unit were not required to attend Recondo training; however, they were required to help with training. Non-airborne and airborne personnel were required to attend training.

During the school, physical training consisting of a seven mile “Recondo walk” with weapon, low bearing equipment (LBE) and 35 pound rucksack was performed. This was for a period of two weeks with classes on various duty related subjects, i.e. operations and techniques on waterborne, heliborne, mountaineering, intelligence reports, patrolling, special weapons, hand to hand fighting, communications, medical, quick reaction drill’s, tracking, ambush, POW handling, artillery/naval/air call for fire, and orientation and survival. This was a condensed eight week Ranger Course. The doctrinal patrolling techniques that were passed to the new Lurps were lessons learned from 196th LRRP and LRRP-D(A) which made the new men either want to be in the Lurps or have nothing to do with them. Wanted posters, circulated and posted by the VC in Chu Lai, Tam Ky, and Due Pho, also added to the mystic of the Lurps . Echo Company 51st was also accredited with training the Reconnaissance Element of the 2nd ARVN Division during 1968.

The Division’s AO was described as Military Region 5 of War Zone C, within I Corps Vietnam. To the North were DaNang and the DMZ with mountains, rolling hills and coastal waterways. To the south were Cam Ranh Bay, coastal water ways, rice fields and triple canopy jungles. To the east were lowlands and the South China Sea. To the west were woodland triple canopy jungles, foot hills and steep mountains all the way into Laos. To make it worse, the I Corps area was notorious for enemy booby traps. The enemy was the 2nd North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong Guerrillas of Communist Military/Political Region 5.

The reconnaissance requirements of the forward Infantry Brigades were three teams at their locations. Our teams were distributed thusly:

• Three teams were at LZ Bronco at Duc Pho in support of the 11th Infantry Brigade.
• Three teams stationed at LZ Baldy at Tam Ky with 196th Infantry Brigade.
• Three teams were at LZ Bayonet at Binh Son with the 198th Infantry Brigade.
• Three teams at Chu Lai Beach Company Recondo School “Instructors”.
• One team at MACV Recondo.
• One team on radio relay detail.
• Three teams at Chu Lai Beach Company E (LRP), 51st Infantry “at rest”.
• Two “on-call” Dog Trackers.
• Three Para Riggers.
• Twelve men on R&R or one leave out of country.
• Twelve men in Company Headquarters and non-TO&E Attachments.
• Twelve men in Company Headquarters and non-TO&E Attachments.

At the start, CPT Bjork, was informed that his Lurps would have to stand inspections and wear helmets in the field during LRP operations by Division Staff Officers above him. For awhile, the Lurps would wear helmets but removed them prior to insertion. Inspections, on the other hand, were performed in the company area. When the General had someone of importance show up at Headquarters, he would show off the spit and polish, camouflage fatigue clad, black beret wearing elite troops of his division, “The Lurps”. The Company Commander did not take long to have all that rescinded to allow the Lurps to do their jobs. In addition, he allowed his troops to carry any weapon that they were comfortable with in the battlefield.

CPT Bjork also had the largest rappelling tower in Vietnam built for their training – it was ninety feet high. It was said that when you reported to training on the first day, Bjork’s Recondo Instructors would inform the students “You are Pukes, and we are here to break you and make you quit!!” Class size varied according to the number of volunteers during that period.

E 51st LRP was involved in numerous long-range patrol (LRP) missions that required heavy hunter/killer combat teams in the field, and sniper missions were also performed as needed. The company survived the TET Counteroffensive 68 phases 111, IV, V, and VI with minor damage to some of the companies barracks, “tin huts”, as a result of the Division’s ammunition dump exploding from enemy artillery and mortar attack in January 1968.

Some of the unit’s LRP Teams participated as a blocking force during Operation Muscatine. Also during this month, 18 ARC Light strikes were directed, numerous bomb damage assessments (BDA) were performed, and 50 air strikes on caves and bunkers yielding with secondary explosions underground occurred as a result of the Division’s Lurp directed actions. During the following months, the unit lost several team members as a result of direct action battles. The unit was also at that stage of losing personnel from DEROS back to the United States and new volunteers were needed to fill the open slots.

Between 1968 and 1969, Team Winston managed to photograph a T55 Russian tank in the hedgerow northeast of Duc Pho close to the Laotian border. Another team, under the leadership of Sgt. Ben Dunham, reported the siting, in late 1968, of a 6-foot blonde-headed Caucasian male leading a VC patrol in the I Corps area. This same team captured a Chinese National with the rank of Colonel.

The use of name brand cigarettes was used to identify the teams such as: Team Old Gold, Winston, Salem, Lucky Strike, Camel, Marlboro, etc. In July, CPT Bjork departed the company and CPT Philip Clark became the new Company Commander.

Between January and September 1968, 15 LRPs were killed as a result of combat action.

G Company (RANGER), 75th Infantry (AIRBORNE), Americal Division

In December 1968, CPT James McWilliams took command of the company and 1SG Howard Slaughter took over the First Sergeant duties from 1SG Whitcomb as he departed. In January 1969, E Company, 51st Inf. (LRP) was absorbed into the 75th (RANGER) Infantry Regiment. CPT McWilliams was informed that all LRP soldiers and units were now a part of the 75th Ranger Infantry (Combined Arms Regimental System) and the company would be realigned per DA Message No. 893755. While in Vietnam, E Company earned the Meritorious Unit Commendation Streamer embroidered “Vietnam 18 June 68 – 20 January 69”. The Rangers were also told to remove the black beret until further notice.

On 13 January 69, Ranger teams combined with the Marines and Navy as security and cordon, labeled Operation Russell Beach, during operations at Bantangan Peninsula which was known as a VC stronghold approximately 15 miles from Quang Ngai City. On 1 February 1969, Company E (LRP) was realigned as Company G (RANGER), 75th Infantry (Airborne). Effective 2 February 1969, E 51st was deactivated. Team names were also changed to reflect states and cities. Cigarette names were no longer used.

Effective 2 February 69, the unit continued to operate. The mission was still Long Range Patrol. It was during this time that the Company received its first recipient of the Medal Of Honor from the exploits of Staff Sergeant Robert Pruden who gave his life to protect his team members during an operation in the Due Pho area.

Under G Company, the unit was also accredited with the location of more than 8,000 enemy soldiers, numerous enemy base camps, routes of infiltration and supply, caches and training sites. It conducted no less than 662 combat operations and was also accredited with 322 confirmed enemy kills, 106 enemy wounded in action, and 53 prisoners of war. The unit participated in the defense of Firebase Fat City, LZ Baldy, Chu Lai base and, indirectly, to the support of every battalion-sized combat unit in the Division. As the unit continued, other commanders were: CPTs Anthony Avgolis and Jon Hanson with 1SG Clifford Manning as the Company First Sergeant during 1970 – 1971.

On 13 May 69, LZ Baldy was attacked by a NVA Sapper Force. The 196th Infantry Brigade was pushed off the Landing Zone. During the initial fighting, most of the Rangers were wounded. Ranger teams Texas and Michigan combined their functional members into one team to carry the fight to the enemy, which yielded forty (40) NVA Troops killed by the composite Ranger team. They displayed outstanding bravery in retaking LZ Baldy from the NVA Force sent to destroy the “men with the bounties on their heads.” During interrogation, a captured NVA officer stated he was trained in China and ordered to destroy the Rangers due to the disruption of their routes of movement from North Vietnam into Laos and their re-entry into South Vietnam.

On 4 May 71, a Ranger (Provisional) Detachment, known as Ranger Command Group 11 of G Company, commanded by CPT Theodore C. Mataxis, Jr., was activated and sent to Da Nang to provide direct support to the 196th Infantry Brigade, with continued operations of surveillance and reconnaissance, until the unit was reconsolidated, 7 August 71, as 2nd Platoon G Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry in support of the 196th Infantry Brigade until deactivation. By 10 August 71, 2nd Platoon completed 47 missions against enemy forces and was credited with the destruction of the Headquarters of the 675th NVA Rocket Battalion Base Camp.

On 14 September 71, the unit was ordered to stand down under operation “Keystone Oriole Charlie” and in 10 days the unit was at zero strength. The unit also lost 11 more Rangers bringing the Company total of KIA to 26.

After four years and ten months, on 01 October 71, Golf Company was deactivated. Sixty missions were being performed on a monthly basis. At the close out, it was estimated that the unit performed over 1,000 missions beginning in January 1967 and ending 01 October 71. The unit was again awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation Streamer embroidered “Vietnam 21 January 69 – 31 August 69”. In addition, Company G received three (3)Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm as a valorous unit citation (VOC) and was also accredited with TET Counteroffensive 69, Counteroffensive VI, Counteroffensive Summer-Fall 1969, Sanctuary Counteroffensive, Counteroffensive Phase VII, Consolidation I, Consolidation II, and Cease Fire.

The motto of the Company was “Sua Sponte” meaning “of their own accord.” Modern Rangers of the 75th Ranger Regiment continue the tradition of being the premier fighting element of the active army. The tradition and dedication to their fellow Rangers continues.

Rangers Lead the Way!

H/75 RGR & E/52 LRP & 1st CAV LRRP HISTORY

Long Range Patrol Detachment, 1st Cavalry Division

In early July 1966, General Westmoreland sent a message to all “Infantry” Divisions that they would form a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company. Westmoreland’s message did not apply to the 1st Cavalry Division because of three things. The 1st Cavalry was not an Infantry Division, it was an Air Cavalry Division and second, the 9th Cavalry Squadron was the eyes and ears of the 1st Cav Division so it was generally felt that a LRRP capability wasn’t necessary. Third, each Cav Brigade had their own LRRPs under their control. However, the Brigades were not using LRRPs in the best possible way. Most times, the brigade LRRP teams were used as forward scouts for brigade assaults.

There were two men in the 1st Cav Division who strongly believed that a Division LRRP capability would be beneficial to the 1st Cav Div. They were the G2 and the G3, Lt Colonels Ray and Stotser.

However, without formal approval of a LRRP capability, Ray and Stotser’s beliefs were dead in the water, unless of course, the Pentagon would approve a LRRP concept for the Air Cavalry. Then, after much argument between the Cav and the Pentagon, the Pentagon gave their approval to form one experimental team and if successful, in every way, further consideration would be given. So….Captain Jim James, a company commander of the 1st of the 8th Cav was selected for the job of LRRP Detachment Commander. James was a Ranger with Special Forces qualifications. The time was early November 66.

SSG Ronald Christopher was also selected by the G2 and G3 to head up the first team of the Cavalry LRRPs. Christopher was a Ranger whose military occupation was, Reconnaissance Intelligence Specialist. Another plus was, he was assigned to A Troop, 9th Cav Squadron, which was the Division’s reconnaissance Squadron, the Eyes and Ears of the Division.

Christopher reported to the G2, was briefed and accepted the mission. Then he was briefed by Capt Jim James. Christopher suggested to James that the Rock Quarry might be a good place to put the LRRP detachment because it was away from the main elements of the Division. After a brief visit to the rock quarry by James and Christopher, James accepted and approved the rock quarry as the LRRP camp site. Just down below the rock quarry was the 191st Military Intelligence. For logistical purposes the LRRP unit was attached to the 191st but the G2 maintained operational control. Christopher’s team was also to conduct equipment experiments as assigned by the G3, Christopher’s former boss.

The LRRP unit was provided with another title, that was, provisional, which simply meant, provided. Provided meant, according to Capt Jim James, “provided SSG Christopher was successful and accomplished the first mission. If not, there would be no Cav division LRRPs.”

During the month of December 1966, Christopher erected the LRRP camp, which included his team tent, a command shed and the supply tent. Everything for this unit was scrounged by James and Christopher. James visited Special Forces units and collected “old debts” as described by James. Christopher visited most everyone else in the Central Highlands and begged for supplies or anything else he could scrounge.

The commander of the 191st borrowed and transferred equipment to the LRRP.

On January 1, 1967, four soldiers showed up at the rock quarry. They were the other four members of Christopher’s experimental team, team one of the 1st Cav Division’s experimental LRRP. After 4 days of extensive training provided by SSG Christopher, the team was formed and ready for the first mission. The patrol march was established by Christopher. It proceeded in this manner. Sp4 Douglas Fletcher was the senior scout. SSG Christopher was team leader. Sgt John Simones was the assistant team leader. Sp4 Geoffrey Koper was the medic and Sp4 Arthur Guerrero was the scout. On January 2, 1967 Captain James and Lt. Ronald Hall moved to the LRRP Camp Site. Hall was the Executive Officer. On Jan 3, 67, SFC Fred Kelly and SSG Tom Campbell arrived at the LRRP site. At the time, Kelly fulfilled the slot of supply sgt biding his time until the LRRP was approved by the Pentagon and upon approval, Kelly would become the LRRP’s first 1st Sgt. Campbell was the communication Sgt and later would become the operations sgt. So, the LRRP was ready to go. On January 3, 1967, nine men comprised the Cav Division’s LRRP.

After Christopher’s four days of map and compass reading, patrolling techniques and special emphasis on the six senses, the experimental team was ready. On January 7, 1967, Christopher was handed a coordinates and with that he established all the necessary requirements of a mission in his AO which included an overflight of the selected Landing Zone. Then at 1845 hours on Jan 7, 67, team one applied camouflage paste to their exposed skin and boarded their one and only chopper to head out into the An Lao Valley.

The mission was to recon the area of operations but more specifically, as directed by Capt James, “you have to stay in the AO for the duration of the mission.” With those instruction these followed. “There is no support, no back up, no nothing. You are entirely on your own. If you get caught, you will have to fend for yourselves.”

The duration of the mission was 7 days and 7 nights, as would be all missions following the first mission. Between missions the team only had one day off with one exception. Mission two and three were conducted back to back. In January 1967 Christopher’s LRRP team, the Cav Division’s only LRRP team at the time, conducted three missions of 7 days duration each. The term “Provisional” was dropped and the LRRPs became a Detachment instead of a Provisional Detachment. On Feb 2, 1967, Christopher’s LRRP Team conducted the 1st Cavalry Division’s first “official” Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol, again in the An Lao Valley.

In March 1967, the Cav Div’s LRRP was renamed, Headquarters and Headquarters 1st Cav Div LRRP Detachment. However, the 191st continued providing logistics such as mess hall privileges and other supplies.

Because of the successful missions of Christopher’s experimental team, another team was formed in Feb 67.

SSG James Burton was the team leader and later, SSG Patrick O’Brien became the team leader. In March 67, Lt. Hall began gathering a Montagnard Tribe, (Rhades) which he set up west of Ankhe in their own camp. The yards were going to be assigned to LRRP Teams, which finally took place in May 1967.

On December 20, 1967, the Cav Division’s HHC LRRP unit was redesignated, Co E, 52nd Infantry (LRP). On 1 Feb 1969, Co E was redesignated Co H, 75th Infantry (Ranger).

It became apparent in the early months of the Brigade’s deployment that a far ranging ground reconnaissance element was needed to gather intelligence on the enemy. In November 1966, the Commander of F Troop, 17th Calvary was tasked to form a (Provisional) far ranging reconnaissance detachment “strictly from volunteers.” First Lieutenant (1LT) John Maxwell volunteered to command the detachment. 1LT Maxwell was Airborne and Pathfinder qualified. To fill out his staff, 1LT Maxwell chose several volunteers, among them Joseph A. Smith, who was Special Forces (SF) qualified, and Earl L. Toomey, a graduate of the Army’s Jungle Warfare School and who had spent time in the Army’s Guerilla Warfare Unit in Panama, with Toomey, in effect, acting as NCOIC.

The leadership started a procurement effort that lead to the interview of over 50 applicants. After exhausting interviews with all volunteers, only 13 were accepted for training and service. These handpicked men, who reported officially to the unit on 2 January 1967, would be the cornerstones of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade’s Provisional Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) (pronounced “Lurp”) Detachment and trainers for the units’ future patrollers. The detachment was authorized by army regulation as an (Airborne) unit. The detachment’s authorized strength started at 42 and shortly changed to 65 personnel. However, the detachment never quite achieved that number and stayed around the average of 42 volunteers. As the six (6) man teams filled, members of the unit were sent to 5th Special Forces MACV Recondo School at Nha Trang for training. The only other training at the detachment level was on-the-job-training “OJT” under the guiding hand of the detachment’s leadership.

Just as the detachment’s operational teams got themselves to the point of rotation in and out of the battlefield (with all the training requirements, trying to rest and returning to patrolling) the tum around time gave little to no sleep. 1LT Maxwell was promoted to Captain (CPT) and departed the detachment in July l967. 1LT Frank G. Pratt Jr. assumed command of the detachment. 1LT Pratt was a graduate of Airborne and Ranger School and was cadre at the Ranger Course.

When the unit was at its largest patrolling size, eight (8) full teams were operational. The need of equipment and uniforms was a nightmare through official channels due to the non-TO&E status of LRRPS. Therefore, procurement of equipment was derived from different sources. French tiger fatigues and Colt Commando AR15s were acquired from the canny efforts of Sergeant Victor Valeriano. As more equipment was needed, Specialist Garver became the unofficial Supply Specialist which lead to the temporary receipt of vehicles and other items of interest through his procurement efforts.

The Detachment participated in Operations Attleboro, Wheeler, Wallowa and Junction City penetrating and patrolling into War Zone C of I Corps. Teams were constantly looking for the Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops. By finding routes, camps, caches of food and equipment during their mission, the team would report real time intelligence information to the Brigade. Many of the patrol members either dressed in VC clothing or took the clothing with them on patrols. Dressing as VC gave advantage in performing enemy prisoner snatches or to avoid standing out as Americans in an all oriental environment. The problem with that, however, was if caught they could be shot for spying.

The detachment was credited with the identification of the 271st Peoples Liberation Front Regiment, “VC Guerrillas”, and the destruction of a platoon of the 271st Regiment. Teams of the detachment were further credited with numerous Long Range Recon Patrols within their operational sectors which encompassed Quang Tin and Tay Ninh Province, specifically Que Son and Son Re Valleys. The teams performed numerous wire tap, ambush, tunnel exploration, bomb damage assessment, artillery/air strikes, surveillance, stay-behind and combat patrol missions.

The unit gained entry into the battlefield by foot, vehicle, rubber boat, and aircraft. By air, they used false insertion techniques and rappelled in by mountaineering equipment. For extractions, they used the UH-1D Helicopter. The field rations available to the Lurps were freeze dried Long-range patrol rations, C-rations or the Vietnamese indigenous rations. On 12 August 1967 the 196th Infantry Brigade became a part of a unit consolidation and dubbed “Task Force Oregon”. On 25 September 1967, General William Westmoreland Jr. ordered Task Force Oregon be replaced by the 23th Infantry Division (Americal) and thereon the 196th Infantry Brigade was absorbed into the newly activated division. The 196th LRRP Detachment continued to operate as the Brigade’s reconnaissance force.

Under the command of Americal Division Commander, Major General Samuel W. Koster, the 196th LRRP Detachment was deactivated as a Brigade asset on 2 November 1967. The unit was consolidated with the assets and soldiers of the deactivated 11th Infantry Brigade’s 70th Infantry Long Range Patrol Detachment in December 1967, as Long Range Recon Patrol Detachment (Airborne) LRRP-D(A). The creation of LRRP-D(A) at this time was involved in refining their art of reconnaissance patrolling with the USMC I” Force Recon Company in Da Nang.

E Company (AIRBORNE), 51st Infantry (Long Range Patrol), Americal Division

On 20 December 1967 the Department of the Army (DA) ordered LRRP-D(A) absorbed and reconstituted as Company E (LRP) 51st Infantry (Airborne) as the “official” Long Range Patrol Company for the 23d Infantry Division (Americal). SSG Toomey was still the 1SG and was promoted to Sergeant First Class (SFC E-7) and shortly afterward moved to a staff position in Division G2.

When 1SG Allen Whitcomb reported in, 1SG Whitcomb became the new Company First Sergeant. Whitcomb was a Jungle Expert and attended Panama’s Jungle Operation Training Course (JOTC); he was also Airborne qualified and rated as a Master Parachutist. The new Company Commander was Captain Gary F. Bjork a graduate of both Airborne and Ranger Schools. Under the new Tactical Operations and Equipment (TO&E), the unit strength went from 65 to 118 personnel. The consolidation of the Division LRRP assets was to give better support to the three different Infantry Brigades spread out within the Division Area of Operations (DAO). E 51st LRP Company’s patrol area had also increased covering Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, and Quang Nam Provinces. This became the largest operating area for any LRP unit in Vietnam.

In addition to this large area of responsibility, the unit was short personnel due to rotations back to the Continental United States (CONUS), resulting in back-to-back patrols. With little sleep in between missions, as missions came, the patrols continued. Captain Bjork and 1SG Whitcomb instituted a fair rotation of teams to help teach training with the new Company Recondo School. Another team could pull a rear OP/LP surveillance mission close to the Division’s perimeter guards on the beach, thus getting rest. Another patrol would be at the forward base with the Brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC) as back up, and one patrol was out scouting the enemy’s backyard. This method would buy time to start a procurement effort for volunteers from the Division.

The black beret was another selling point. With verbal approval from the Division Commander, the Bancroft black beret became the headgear of distinction for the Lurps and an eye catcher for prospective LRP volunteers. In order to be an elite Lurp, one must volunteer and then pass the Company Recondo School. With recruiting fliers out to the remote outposts of the Infantry Brigades, Airborne qualified personnel could be attracted. Jump pay was authorized. For the soldiers wanting to be Lurps who were not airborne qualified, the first requirement was to have been on the battlefield at least two months before volunteering. They then had to take and pass the Airborne PT test , swim test; after which a records check was made to see if the soldier had a GT score of 100 or better. Finally, a check was performed to see if there was any disciplinary record.

If all looked good, the volunteer qualified for training. The instructors of the Company Recondo School were the patrol-hardened MACV Recondo qualified Veterans of 196th LRRP Detachment and LRRP-Det (A). On a special note, Special Forces and Ranger personnel arriving into the unit were not required to attend Recondo training; however, they were required to help with training. Non-airborne and airborne personnel were required to attend training.

During the school, physical training consisting of a seven mile “Recondo walk” with weapon, low bearing equipment (LBE) and 35 pound rucksack was performed. This was for a period of two weeks with classes on various duty related subjects, i.e. operations and techniques on waterborne, heliborne, mountaineering, intelligence reports, patrolling, special weapons, hand to hand fighting, communications, medical, quick reaction drill’s, tracking, ambush, POW handling, artillery/naval/air call for fire, and orientation and survival. This was a condensed eight week Ranger Course. The doctrinal patrolling techniques that were passed to the new Lurps were lessons learned from 196th LRRP and LRRP-D(A) which made the new men either want to be in the Lurps or have nothing to do with them. Wanted posters, circulated and posted by the VC in Chu Lai, Tam Ky, and Due Pho, also added to the mystic of the Lurps . Echo Company 51st was also accredited with training the Reconnaissance Element of the 2nd ARVN Division during 1968.

The Division’s AO was described as Military Region 5 of War Zone C, within I Corps Vietnam. To the North were DaNang and the DMZ with mountains, rolling hills and coastal waterways. To the south were Cam Ranh Bay, coastal water ways, rice fields and triple canopy jungles. To the east were lowlands and the South China Sea. To the west were woodland triple canopy jungles, foot hills and steep mountains all the way into Laos. To make it worse, the I Corps area was notorious for enemy booby traps. The enemy was the 2nd North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong Guerrillas of Communist Military/Political Region 5.

The reconnaissance requirements of the forward Infantry Brigades were three teams at their locations. Our teams were distributed thusly:

• Three teams were at LZ Bronco at Duc Pho in support of the 11th Infantry Brigade.
• Three teams stationed at LZ Baldy at Tam Ky with 196th Infantry Brigade.
• Three teams were at LZ Bayonet at Binh Son with the 198th Infantry Brigade.
• Three teams at Chu Lai Beach Company Recondo School “Instructors”.
• One team at MACV Recondo.
• One team on radio relay detail.
• Three teams at Chu Lai Beach Company E (LRP), 51st Infantry “at rest”.
• Two “on-call” Dog Trackers.
• Three Para Riggers.
• Twelve men on R&R or one leave out of country.
• Twelve men in Company Headquarters and non-TO&E Attachments.
• Twelve men in Company Headquarters and non-TO&E Attachments.

At the start, CPT Bjork, was informed that his Lurps would have to stand inspections and wear helmets in the field during LRP operations by Division Staff Officers above him. For awhile, the Lurps would wear helmets but removed them prior to insertion. Inspections, on the other hand, were performed in the company area. When the General had someone of importance show up at Headquarters, he would show off the spit and polish, camouflage fatigue clad, black beret wearing elite troops of his division, “The Lurps”. The Company Commander did not take long to have all that rescinded to allow the Lurps to do their jobs. In addition, he allowed his troops to carry any weapon that they were comfortable with in the battlefield.

CPT Bjork also had the largest rappelling tower in Vietnam built for their training – it was ninety feet high. It was said that when you reported to training on the first day, Bjork’s Recondo Instructors would inform the students “You are Pukes, and we are here to break you and make you quit!!” Class size varied according to the number of volunteers during that period.

E 51st LRP was involved in numerous long-range patrol (LRP) missions that required heavy hunter/killer combat teams in the field, and sniper missions were also performed as needed. The company survived the TET Counteroffensive 68 phases 111, IV, V, and VI with minor damage to some of the companies barracks, “tin huts”, as a result of the Division’s ammunition dump exploding from enemy artillery and mortar attack in January 1968.

Some of the unit’s LRP Teams participated as a blocking force during Operation Muscatine. Also during this month, 18 ARC Light strikes were directed, numerous bomb damage assessments (BDA) were performed, and 50 air strikes on caves and bunkers yielding with secondary explosions underground occurred as a result of the Division’s Lurp directed actions. During the following months, the unit lost several team members as a result of direct action battles. The unit was also at that stage of losing personnel from DEROS back to the United States and new volunteers were needed to fill the open slots.

Between 1968 and 1969, Team Winston managed to photograph a T55 Russian tank in the hedgerow northeast of Duc Pho close to the Laotian border. Another team, under the leadership of Sgt. Ben Dunham, reported the siting, in late 1968, of a 6-foot blonde-headed Caucasian male leading a VC patrol in the I Corps area. This same team captured a Chinese National with the rank of Colonel.

The use of name brand cigarettes was used to identify the teams such as: Team Old Gold, Winston, Salem, Lucky Strike, Camel, Marlboro, etc. In July, CPT Bjork departed the company and CPT Philip Clark became the new Company Commander.

Between January and September 1968, 15 LRPs were killed as a result of combat action.

G Company (RANGER), 75th Infantry (AIRBORNE), Americal Division

In December 1968, CPT James McWilliams took command of the company and 1SG Howard Slaughter took over the First Sereant duties from 1SG Whitcomb as he departed. In January 1969, E Company, 51st Inf. (LRP) was absorbed into the 75th (RANGER) Infantry Regiment. CPT McWilliams was informed that all LRP soldiers and units were now a part of the 75th Ranger Infantry (Combined Arms Regimental System) and the company would be realigned per DA Message No. 893755. While in Vietnam, E Company earned the Meritorious Unit Commendation Streamer embroidered “Vietnam 18 June 68 – 20 January 69”. The Rangers were also told to remove the black beret until further notice.

On 13 January 69, Ranger teams combined with the Marines and Navy as security and cordon, labeled Operation Russell Beach, during operations at Bantangan Peninsula which was known as a VC stronghold approximately 15 miles from Quang Ngai City. On 1 February 1969, Company E (LRP) was realigned as Company G (RANGER), 75th Infantry (Airborne). Effective 2 February 1969, E 51st was deactivated. Team names were also changed to reflect states and cities. Cigarette names were no longer used.

Effective 2 February 69, the unit continued to operate. The mission was still Long Range Patrol. It was during this time that the Company received its first recipient of the Medal Of Honor from the exploits of Staff Sergeant Robert Pruden who gave his life to protect his team members during an operation in the Due Pho area.

Under G Company, the unit was also accredited with the location of more than 8,000 enemy soldiers, numerous enemy base camps, routes of inf1LTration and supply, caches and training sites. It conducted no less than 662 combat operations and was also accredited with 322 confirmed enemy kills, 106 enemy wounded in action, and 53 prisoners of war. The unit participated in the defense of Firebase Fat City, LZ Baldy, Chu Lai base and, indirectly, to the support of every battalion-sized combat unit in the Division. As the unit continued, other commanders were: CPTs Anthony Avgolis and Jon Hanson with 1SG Clifford Manning as the Company First Sergeant during 1970 – 1971.

On 13 May 69, LZ Baldy was attacked by a NVA Sapper Force. The 196th Infantry Brigade was pushed off the Landing Zone. During the initial fighting, most of the Rangers were wounded. Ranger teams Texas and Michigan combined their functional members into one team to carry the fight to the enemy, which yielded forty (40) NVA Troops killed by the composite Ranger team. They displayed outstanding bravery in retaking LZ Baldy from the NVA Force sent to destroy the “men with the bounties on their heads.” During interrogation, a captured NVA officer stated he was trained in China and ordered to destroy the Rangers due to the disruption of their routes of movement from North Vietnam into Laos and their re-entry into South Vietnam.

On 4 May 71, a Ranger (Provisional) Detachment, known as Ranger Command Group 11 of G Company, commanded by CPT Theodore C. Mataxis, Jr., was activated and sent to Da Nang to provide direct support to the 196th Infantry Brigade, with continued operations of surveillance and reconnaissance, until the unit was reconsolidated, 7 August 71, as 2nd Platoon G Company (Ranger), 75th Infantry in support of the 196th Infantry Brigade until deactivation. By 10 August 71, 2nd Platoon completed 47 missions against enemy forces and was credited with the destruction of the Headquarters of the 675th NVA Rocket Battalion Base Camp.

On 14 September 71, the unit was ordered to stand down under operation “Keystone Oriole Charlie” and in 10 days the unit was at zero strength. The unit also lost 11 more Rangers bringing the Company total of KIA to 26.

After four years and ten months, on 01 October 71, Golf Company was deactivated. Sixty missions were being performed on a monthly basis. At the close out, it was estimated that the unit performed over 1,000 missions beginning in January 1967 and ending 01 October 71. The unit was again awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation Streamer embroidered “Vietnam 21 January 69 – 31 August 69”. In addition, Company G received three (3)Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm as a valorous unit citation (VOC) and was also accredited with TET Counteroffensive 69, Counteroffensive VI, Counteroffensive Summer-Fall 1969, Sanctuary Counteroffensive, Counteroffensive Phase VII, Consolidation I, Consolidation II, and Cease Fire.

The motto of the Company was “Sua Sponte” meaning “of their own accord.” Modern Rangers of the 75th Ranger Regiment continue the tradition of being the premier fighting element of the active army. The tradition and dedication to their fellow Rangers continues.

Rangers Lead the Way!

I/75 RGR & F/52 LRP & 1st ID LRRP & 1st ID LRS HISTORY

IA conversation was held between the First Brigade Commander and the Third (Iron) Brigade Commander shortly before F Company 52nd Infantry (Long Range Patrol) was transformed into Company I (Ranger), 75th Infantry. The conversation concerned the Big Red One LRRP’s loss of SGT. Cohn’s team (the first team) and SGT Washington’s team (second team) at Quan Loi. At that time the Rangers numbered only 25-30 personnel. The First Brigade Commander complained that Ranger intelligence was not very reliable prior to the overrun of his perimeter. SGT Crabtree’s LRRP team had warned him in advance that the enemy was heavily infiltrating the area and that they were in danger, The third Brigade Commander replied: “What do you mean that these Rangers don’t have the proper attitude, appearance, and that they rejected your assessment. Don’t you know that their enemy KIA’s exceed any battalions in your Brigade”

” . . . the relative aggregate of Iron Rangers casualties was not exceeded by any other Ranger company [in Vietnam]., the only debate is whether this figure was attributable to “being in the thick of fighting” or being under an overzealous and aggressive division operations section. Whatever the reason, the Iron Rangers performed with valiant determination in reconnoitering some of the most persistently dangerous enemy strongholds in South Vietnam.”

In early 1969, Company I shifted from tactical employment of reconnaissance and ambush concepts, to hunter-killer tactics employed during the summer months and again to its reconnaissance role beginning in September, 1969. In Vietnam, where a well-defined front rarely existed, Ranger teams discerned the fragmented battlefield and detected guerilla activity. They operated deep in hostile territory to find the enemy, provided advance warning, and conducted small precision strikes The Iron Rangers monitored menacing NVA/VC formations in hazardous locations. The teams stressed area reconnaissance and night ambush tactics to identify and interdict enemy concentrations and worked extensively with the Iron Brigade Other Rig Red One Rangers were detailed to the Special Forces, the Black Virgin Mountain, outlook, and Recondo School.

Long-range detachment patrols were designed to infiltrate objective areas prior to division operations and obtain information on enemy locations and perform terrain analysis, lengthy ground searches were required, because many trails and streams were covered by thick jungle canopies and not observable from the air. Missions were normally three to four days 15 or more miles from the nearest friendly linen Contact was only by radio, if it worked. Most teams consisted of six men, although there were occasional 12-men hunter-killer teams who at times had body snatch missions. In the high number of hot pickup Zones (PZs), which were literal enemy territory jungle hell-holes with firing much brighter than Fourth-of-July fireworks, helicopters were frequently riddled with AK-47 fire. Huey helicopters inserted teams into targeted areas, often making false landings to fool the enemy as to whereabouts. Patrols scrambled to interior of the jungle cover to relocate to a designated place. After remaining quiet for extended Periods, moves would be made to monitoring sites where enemy activity had been suspected.

With painted faces, radios, and lightweight gear, the patrol carried heavy ammunition of magazines, frags, smoke grenades, claymores, and often weapons of the enemy, since the M-l 6 rifle had a distinguished signature. Everyone performed duties including the team leader, assistant team leader, Kit Carson, medic, radio telephone operator (RTO), and pointman. A security wheel of members with one staying awake at all times would be formed at the monitoring site off of enemy trails or underground tunnel homes. Claymore mines were spread in front – hopefully in the direction of the enemy. Few sensing gadgets were present and everything was examined personally. The numbers and style of tire shoe marks were noted. Morale of the enemy was sensed along with their weapons and luggage.

The three to four day mission did not permit talking, snoring, noise, smoking or excreting. Urination was permitted by twinkling dawn twigs to avoid noise Coughing was not allowed, a muffled cough could alert the enemy. Often the enemy would be within ten feet of the team. The quiet allowed the senses to notice so much: the sudden snap of bamboo growing pains a jet-like wines of mosquitoes, dive-bombing flies, and butterflies alighting on the guns; the darkness so black that the only visible light was the luminous glow of decaying leaves. Radio contact was frequently by code clicks rather than voice. The food was dry LRRP rations with the water carried. Most often the Rangers were not hungry and waited to eat when they returned to basecamp. There were long hours of tense waiting in the jungle, with feelings of doubt and fear, Rangers coped with many anxieties, including the possibility of mutilation by the enemy.

Operational control of Company I was initially under the 3rd (Iron) Brigade, and the unit was known for a while as the Iron Rangers. Its control then passed to Division G2; it remained until deactivation and was under the direction and guidance of the Commanding General to insure its proper utilization, until deactivation.

From 1 January 1969 until deactivation due to Phase II1 withdrawal on 7 March 1970, Company (Ranger) conducted 372 classified tactical operations (with 205 recorded sightings of the enemy). A designated strength of 118 volunteers was authorized. However, strength varied from approximately 30 to 100 members, and most often personnel strength was about 80 Rangers. They operated in areas that were primarily under night-control and often day-control of the enemy. Iron Rangers engaged the enemy 191 times. Much history of the First Infantry Division Rangers has never been recorded or released due to its classified nature. Probably it will never be released, although those events will never be forgotten by those who participated.

Robert D. Law, Company I (Ranger), was the first member of the 75th Infantry Rangers to receive the Medal of Honor. Only three Rangers LRRPs received the Nation’s highest medal while assigned to these type units. Company I’s Ranger Peter Lemon, a member of the Ranger Hall of Fame, also received the Medal of Honor for a mission with the First Air Cavalry that included other former Company members, days following his redeployment from the First Infantry. Company I members also received awards for the Distinguished service Cross and Distinguished Flying Cross. Ten members of the command received the award of the Silver Star for Valor and 91 received the Bronze Star awards for service or achievement Members of Company I earned sixty three awards for valor; 191 awards for service or achievement; 111 Air Medals; and twenty-eight Purple Hearts.

Unit members did not request award of medals. Rangers were actively involved in warfare and unable to write of their comrades’ achievements This responsibility for writing documentation for medals was left to the Division G2 for their attached unit. As a result, the unit was presented for only the Vietnam Civil Actions Honor Citation years after their departure. By contrast, ARVN Ranger units, often trained by 75th Rangers, were bestowed the U.S. presidential Unit Citation approximately thirty-four times while no 75th Ranger unit was considered for this citation. Members are well aware of achievements which would certainly have qualified for this citation.

The several commanders of the Rangers barely had time to know their unit and its men before being reassigned. Nevertheless these leaders as a whole were extremely dedicated to their men and were highly respected. The six commanders of Company I (Ranger), during its approximate one year of existence, were CPT Allen A. Lindman, lLT Jerry M. Davis, CPT Reese M. Patrick, MAJ Hamor R Hanson, MAJ James J. McDevitt, and CPT Robert D. Wright First Sergeants were Carl J. Cook and Jack D. Franks. On 14 May 1969, Captain Reese Patrick, Company Commander, was killed on his first patrol while re-entering the Quan Loi Perimeter.

The lst Infantry Division, to which Company I (Ranger) was attached, lived by its motto, “No mission too difficult no sacrifice too great, duty first.” Organized in 1917 by Major General John J. Pershing, the Big Red One was the first division to see action in Europe during World War 1. Again in World War II, the Big Red One was the first to reach Britain and land in North Africa, Sicily, and France. It was also the first US. Army Infantry Division to reach Vietnam.

Faced with aggression from communist North Vietnam and widespread terrorist and guerrilla activities of the Viet Cong, the government of South Vietnam asked the Free World for assistance. By 1965 the situation had reached the point where US. units had to be summoned, if South Vietnam was not to be overrun by the communists. The bulk of the 1st Infantry Division reached Vietnam in October 1965 after the 2nd Brigade’s advance party had arrived in July. The division was established in III Corps basecamps with its headquarters at Di An. Later, headquarters was moved to Lai Khe. Major General Jonathan O. Seaman, Commander, had the entire division operational by 1 November 1965. He was to be succeeded by Major Generals William E. Depuy, John H. Hay, Keith L. Ware (KIA), Orwin C. Talbot, Albert E. Milloy, and last by Brigadier General John Q. Herrion who ordered the Rangers to cease operations and stand down effective 7 March 1970.

The Viet Cong was generally a well trained, well equipped and well-organized military force which attacked when tactical situations were favorable but disbanded into small groups and retreated into the jungle when superior forces pursued them. They were experts at tunneling and field fortifications. The enemy army consisted of three different types of troops: Local Forces, Main Forces and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). Operations against the enemy were begun immediately with division reconnaissance principally mounted from bases in the Binh Duong Province at Di An, Phu Loi, Lai Khe, and Phuoc Vinh (Phuoc Long Providence).

The lst Infantry Division began OPERATION TOAN THANG, (“Complete Victory”) with the objective of clearing and pacifying the Binh Duong Province Patrols were conducted throughout the predominantly jungle- and marsh-covered regions of War Zones C and D, the Iron Triangle, the Easter Egg, the Mushroom, the Heart-Shaped Woods, the Trapezoid, the Michelin Rubber Plantation, the Long Nguyen Secret Zone, the Song Be Corridor, and the Vietnamese frontier with Cambodia. At times division reconnaissance was launched farther afield to cover other operational areas, such as the Rung Sat Special zone.

Most of Company I’s (the Division’s) Area of Operations was densely populated, especially near Saigon and the Saigon River, The population density gradually decreased towards the north, going towards the central highlands inhabited by the Montagnard tribesmen. The Saigon River was one of the major waterways that served as a means of transportation for the inhabitants of the Saigon area and the many hamlets and villages along the river’s course. While the terrain in the south was generally division it became rolling and hilly at the northern edge near the Cambodian border, Temperature averaged 79.5 F” in the summer and 86.5 F” in the winter, with Monsoon rains during the May to October season, followed by unrelieved dryness from December through April. One of the world’s largest rubber plantations, the Michelin Plantation, was located in the area of operations 14 miles northwest of Lai Khe. The area was noted for its agriculture of tobacco, sugar cane, bananas, pineapples, rice and an assortment of other fruits and vegetables.

Division reconnaissance initially from October 1965 had relied on the armored 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. The squadron’s aerial unit, “Darkhorse” Troop D, contained an aero rifle platoon, under the command of CPT Richard Murphy, that rapidly responded to scout helicopter sightings and downed aircraft but was precluded from longer ground patrols. During April 1966, Maj. Gen. William E. DePuy formed a provisional division Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) contingent (The “Wildcat” Lerps) that was attached to D (Air) Troop, 1-4 Cavalry but which specialized in ground searches that stretched over several days inside hostile territory. In August 1967, the unit became The LRP Detachment, HHC, 1st Infantry Division, Under the command of Major General John H. Hay, Jr., and moved from Phu Loi to Lai Khe. General Hay took measures to upgrade ranger-style warfare within the division by expanding the first patrols into a long-range detachment authorized 118 reconnaissance personnel. Officially on 20 December 1967 (but actually in late January 1968) the LRP Detachment became F Company, 52nd Infantry (LRP) with CPT Jack Price remaining as Commander.

The Big Red One Rangers kept essentially to themselves but were good friends of the medical unit. At times they picked an antagonist unit, such as MP neighbors, on which to bestow derogatory cadence songs or mischievous trick. As one of the few units that regularly participated in organized physical training (PT), the unit was cohesive and synergistic. The unit had its own club until it moved and joined its friends, the medics’ club. When the medics left, Company I inherited the medic’s monkey, George, who often kept company with the Ranger’s openly gay dog, Zulu.

Each of Company I’s 372 missions was important Missions resulted in the lose of life for both the enemy and Rangers. It also saved lives of many U.S. servicemen through their intelligence gathering. Based on their findings, larger U.S. forces knew where to, and where not to, pursue the enemy. For most missions, guidance to the Rangers was to observe but not engage the enemy. Close proximity to the enemy made it difficult to observe without engaging the enemy with contact occurring more often than not Successful intelligence missions were achieved when no shots were fired. During February 1969, the first month of Company I, fifty-two missions were conducted beginning with six missions on the first day of operation. In the later months, fewer missions were conducted. Following is an excerpt from three of the many missions:

On 22 February 1969, SP4 Robert D. Law threw himself on a hand grenade that landed in the middle of his team and saved three Rangers. He was the recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor for this bravery, beyond the call of duty.

Five days later three Rangers were killed and three wounded when they were ambushed by the NVA. An NVA force of 4,000 enemy troops surrounded their Ranger team for eighteen hours before the Rangers were able to be extracted from a hot PZ. Nevertheless, U.S. forces were able to rescue the three surviving Rangers.

The Rangers moved their unit in December 1969 because their site was chosen for the Bob Hope Show that would be attended by about 12,000 troops. Three days before Christmas on the morning of the Bob Hope Show, three Ranger teams were inserted South of the Saigon River; there they discovered the enemy and their rocket cache. During this truce, while the rest of the world was wondering if Christmas would bring peace, the Rangers discovered enemy insurgents moving rapidly carrying heavy packs. it was believed that they intended to hit the Bob Hope Show. Another patrol engaged the enemy with claymore mines and used evasion tactics before being extracted from a hot PZ. Here the enemy was staging transient personnel and supply close to the Hope Show.

Fellow soldiers did not mess with Rangers who were easily distinguishable by their black beret and red and dark blue 75th Airborne Ranger Infantry Company scroll which rested above the Big Red One patch. Their pocket unit patch featured their colorful Coat of Arms inherited from the 5307th Composite Forces.

The unit was awarded a Rest and Relaxation (R&R) week off following heavy action, and while there, the Big Red One Rangers lost the freedom to wear the unofficial Ranger black beret. At the R&R Bar, a fight erupted between the Rangers and Marines, A Marine removed a Ranger beret from a dancing girl. Immediately, a brawl broke out and the club was damaged. The Rangers were sent home not wearing their berets and wore regular infantry headgear for most of the rest of the war. Notwithstanding this action, most Big Red One Rangers kept their berets and wore them around camp. No one challenged the Rangers to remove their berets. As the unit neared deactivation, word was received that the beret could be put back on officially “unofficially.” The coveted black beret of the Big Red One Rangers was not won, bought, awarded as a school diploma, or even officially recognized; but it signified respect among fellow Rangers who shared the experience of enemy combat beyond friendly lines. As the unit withdrew from Vietnam, the men left wearing their berets with pride. Later, the respected black beret would become official Ranger headgear.

The unit guideon, citations, and memorial plaques were sent to the 75th Infantry’s headquarter at the Ranger Training Command, Ft. Benning, Georgia, to be placed in a museum. In previous phased drawdowns servicemen were sent home if they had less than four months remaining in country; Big Red One Rangers were sent for action with other units in Vietnam.

Still today, the Rangers don’t forget nothing.

THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND ACTIVITIES OF K COMPANY(RANGER), 75TH

INFANTRY (AIRBORNE), 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION, REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

During the Vietnam War K Company (RANGER), 75TH Infantry (Airborne) was on the active roles of the United States Army from 1 February 1969 to 10 December1970. The Ranger Companies of the Viet Nam War were in continuous combat longer than organized companies of Rangers in any other war, then or since.

With them, a proud and unique military heritage was resurrected from the pages of American history and a new chapter was added. Ranger units had been raised and deployed in an ad hoc fashion in every one of our nation’s wars, but they were quickly disbanded after each war. Not so after Vietnam, where they proved themselves henceforth indispensable. The nature of warfare had changed. These Rangers helped write the new rules.

The guns, the uniform, and the method of travel had evolved, but the Ranger mission in Viet Nam was essentially the same as it had been since the 1600’s, when American colonists “ranged” far and wide to defend the frontiers:

Small groups of highly skilled and courageous men armed and equipped with the latest weapons and technology, went out to confront an enemy and defeat him against all odds.

The units of the 75th Infantry (Airborne) Regiment of Rangers were so successful in their operations that they were singled out for special recognition by the Secretary of the Army. They were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, the Valorous Unit Award, the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, and the Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal.

After the Vietnam War, remnants of the 13 companies of the 75th Ranger Infantry Regiment formed the nucleus of the first permanent Ranger unit in American History:

1st Battalion (RANGER), 75th Infantry (Airborne); Colors pass in review at activation ceremony and parade, 1 July 1974, at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

There are now three Airborne Ranger Battalions.

Today, in the first decade of the 21st Century, US Army Rangers are a force that can be anywhere in the world in 18 hours. Rangers can reconnoiter and assault any target, on any terrain, in any climate, at any time, day or night. Their training is arduous and specialized. Ranger Officers train and fight alongside the men.

Rangers differ from Special Forces. The Green Berets were created for – but not limited to – counterinsurgency warfare. They are trained to work with the indigenous populations where they are deployed. Most Green Berets are Ranger qualified.

VIETNAM: WAR AGAINST COMMUNISM

Like the Korean War which preceded it by about a decade, Vietnam was a shooting war against communist aggression. “Hot” wars in the midst of the longest of the three world wars of the 20th Century, Korea and Vietnam were the unfinished business of WW II and remain the legacy of America’s “Greatest Generation.”

Communism is the most deadly force the world has ever known. It is a conspiracy to rule the world by a so-called “dictatorship of the proletariat” which is really nothing more than abject tyranny over a fearful populace. It is estimated that between 180 million and 200 million lives have been taken by that conspiracy. By contrast, the other “ism,”- Nazism – took 20 million lives during WW II.

According to the US Congress, the “Cold War,” officially lasted between September 2, 1945 and December 26, 1991. Historians in future generations may argue who actually won the “Cold War…”

Cold War Medal*

*Approved, Section 1084 of Public Law 105-85, November 18, 198, for any member of the US Armed Forces who served on active duty during this period.

By terror, war, or subversion – whichever worked for them at any given moment to complete their world revolution, communist forces sought to impose total dominion over the world, one nation at a time. With other American soldiers of this period, K Company Rangers fought a war against that Communist International conspiracy.

The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 launched in Russia absolute control by communist commissars and mass genocide such as the world had never seen. Horror and terror on an unprecedented scale was set loose upon the land and it is the model and template used by other totalitarian dictatorships, including those in Nazi Germany, Communist China, North Korea, Cuba, and finally, Viet Nam.

Communist genocide remains covered up in the West….it is barely mentioned by the press and nearly unknown in academic circles and other settings where ‘serious’ literature is shaped. Nor has there been a cinematic treatment of or documentary about nearly 8 decades communist terror and genocide, either directly or in passing.

Unlike National Socialism (Nazism) which passed away with the Third Reich, “egalitarian socialism” (the soft word for the brand of communism achieved by a more gradual approach) maintains its presence in various forms in all Western nations and carries influence among opinionmakers that defies logic.

In this venue, the American soldier in Viet Nam stood between darkness and light but outflanked by the American fourth estate and fifth column which decidedly and demonstrably remain at cross-purposes to him.

He was asked to transform himself over and again through more than a decade of campaigns, often the victim of opportunists, shortsighted commanders, and those individuals of an entirely different character who were intent on fighting no war at all, only to give victory to the future ghosts of an unseen hand.

But there were those who refused to be manipulated, and they took the battle beyond its intended purpose…and fought to win.

LANDSCAPE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: TAKE THE WORLD

The Comintern or Third International, was founded in Moscow in 1919 to coordinate world communist aggression. Ho Chi Minh was a founding member of this body.

Officially (?) disbanded in 1943, the Comintern was replaced by the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau,1947 to 1954), in which only the Russian Soviet, the ruling East European communist parties (Yugoslavia was expelled in 1948), and the French and the Italian communist parties were represented. Ho Chi Minh was a founding member of the French Communist Party.

The Cominform was officially ‘dissolved’ in 1956, around the time Fidel Castro and Ho Chi Minh were making war plans – with the help of the Soviet Union – to expand communism by force in Asia, Africa, and in Latin America.

The strategy of choice for Communist aggression everywhere – intimidation, terror, and atrocity against the civilian population – was the North Vietnamese Army mission for conquest of free South Vietnam.

By murdering tens of thousands of civilians – village officials, schoolteachers, and health workers as standard procedure, the communists terrorized potential leaders into flight, inactivity, or submission. This is what Pol Pot accomplished so efficiently in Cambodia in 1975 – 1978. When the Khmer Rouge (Red Cambodians) were finished with ‘the revolution,’ no one in Cambodia was left alive but communists, survivors, and orphans.

Example: In 1946, after Ho Chi Minh established his troops in Hanoi, there were two indigenous Vietnamese sects in Viet Nam which, because they were also fervently anti-Communist, represented a threat to Ho’s plans. He had them exterminated.

Routine murder would not have had the desired terror impact on others. He opted to bury members of the two sects alive in fields, so that only their heads were above ground. He then had harrows driven back and forth across the fields, as one report later described it, to “scratch and tear and chop those living heads like so many small tree stumps as the harrows went over them.”

Newsweek magazine for May 15, 1967 reported that “over the past decade the Viet Cong have murdered, mutilated and otherwise brutalized tens of thousands of Vietnamese civilians. And far from attempting to conceal their atrocities, the guerrillas have performed them in the most ostentatious fashion possible.”

Readers who acquaint themselves with the historical record of this period would do well to examine the volumes of literature which do not exist on the level of atrocity and crime committed by Ho Chi Minh (and every other communist regime, for that matter) and his comrades.

The Viet Nam War would escalate from ‘counterinsurgency’ into a conventional war with both sides using full infantry maneuver divisions with armored support and heavy artillery. Only one side, however, was vulnerable to the ravaging poison of treason, but few dared call it that.

TERROR IN THE HIGHLANDS: WHY WE FOUGHT.

In 1969, while future President Clinton evaded the draft and audited his Rhodes Scholar classes at Oxford, he was sponsored by the KGB-controlled British Peace Council to speak against American involvement in Vietnam and to promote the pro-Hanoi view in Europe.

The following events took place in the Highlands of South Viet Nam over the course of that one year: these are examples of Viet Cong revolutionary STRATEGY – not isolated incidents – during 1969:

o March 13th: “Kon Sitiu and Kon Bobanh, two Montagnard villages in Kontum province, are raided by terrorists; 15 persons killed; 23 kidnapped, two of whom are later executed; three longhouses, a church and a school burned. A hamlet chief is beaten to death in front of the villagers. Survivors say the communists’ explanation is: ‘We are teaching you not to cooperate with the government.’

o August 13th: “Officials in Saigon report a total of 17 communist terror attacks on refugee centers and small villages in Quang Nam and Thua Thien provinces, leaving 23 persons dead, 75 injured and a large number of homes destroyed or damaged.”

o August 26th: “A nine-month-old baby in his mother’s arms is executed, shot in the head by terrorists outside Hoa Phat, Quang Nam province; also found dead are three children between ages six and ten, an elderly man, a middle-aged man and a middle-aged woman, a total of seven, all shot at least once in the back of the head…as a warning.”

o October 27th: “Communists booby trap the body of a People’s Self-Defense Force member whom they have killed. When relatives come to retrieve the body the subsequent explosion kills four of them.”(From:Douglas Pike, The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror, 1970).

Notwithstanding the deadly farce which played out in America’s streets, coffee houses, on the stage and screen, in the open courts and especially in the halls of government, the Vietnam War remained a lethal war of communist aggression from beginning to ignominious end. The Battlefield in Vietnam was abandoned, not lost.

The NVA has never cast off its preferred tactic of terror against a defenseless population.

THE 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION:

In WW I, the 4th Infantry (“Ivy”) Division saw proud service in Europe during the campaigns of Aisne – Marine, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. A generation later, the 4th Division was back on French soil as the D-Day assault force at Utah Beach. After the Normandy breakout, Ivymen fought their war across Europe, first in the drive on Cherbourg, then the liberation of Paris, and in critical action during the battle of the Bulge where they fought with distinction in the Hurtgen Forest and rallied for the last phase of Allied operations against the Werhmacht.

In 1966, the 4th Infantry Division deployed to the Republic of Vietnam and established its base camp in Pleiku Province. Tasked to cut major exit points of the Ho Chi Minh trail that hemorrhaged NVA soldiers and war materiel into the Central Highlands, the 4th Infantry Division fought one of the bloodiest battles of the war in October 1967, at the Battle of Dak To, where Ivymen killed approximately 1,600 NVA soldiers.

Throughout most of 1968, the Division conducted offensive operations against NVA control points around Kontum and Dak To in the Western Highlands. By spring, 1970, the 4th relocated its headquarters to Camp Radcliff, near An Khe, and again went on the offensive during the Cambodian cross-border incursion in May and June of 1970.

In 63 days of fighting in Cambodia, American and ARVN forces, spearheaded by US Special Forces and Army Rangers, left 10,000 dead NVA on this battlefield. Hanoi lost any hope of mounting a major offensive for nearly two years after this appropriate and long awaited attack on their sanctuaries.

The 4th Infantry Division redeployed to CONUS on Dec. 12, 1970, to Fort Carson, Colo.

RANGERS IN THE HIGHLANDS

The K / 75th Ranger Area of Operations – II Corps Tactical Zone – was the largest of any Ranger or LRP/LRRP unit in the Viet Nam War – it covered nearly 30,000 square miles of some of the most forbidding terrain on earth upon which to wage war. Two thirds of this area was mountain jungle.

Map by Shelby Stanton, indicating the Coastal Plains, Mountains, and High Plateau Regions. Circles Indicate Locations of US Army Special Forces Camps

Under the operational control if the 4th Infantry Division, II CTZ stretched from the coastal plains of the South China Sea West to the mountainous, tri-border region that melded jungle forest and high plateau into three countries: Laos, Cambodia, and South Viet Nam.

The operational area of II CTZ:

200 miles (West) along the borders with Cambodia and Laos; 300 miles of mountain slope and coastal plain along the South China Sea in the East, about 150 miles between II CTZ and III CTZ (South), and about 150 miles between II CTZ and I CTZ in the North, I CTZ forming part of the DMZ which separated North and South Vietnam.

With an authorized strength of just over 200 Rangers to cover 30,000 square miles, much was expected of K Company. As forward scouts and in the attack role that defined the term, ‘Ranger,’ they would perform their mission in exemplary fashion.

THE LONG RANGE PATROL: PENETRATE DEEPER, STAY IN LONGER…

Upon deactivation of it’s predecessor LRP company, “E” Company, 58th Infantry (which inherited the Division level Long Range mission from the LRRP (Provisional) company authorized by MG Peers) and activation of the K /75th Rangers, the lineage, duties, honors, and remaining personnel of E/58th and the Brigade LRP and LRRP companies came under operational control of the 4th ID and K Company Rangers.

This unit change was the end result of a process following the first Long Range Patrol missions in support of 4th ID operations in September, 1966, when Major General Arthur S. Collins ordered the establishment of reconnaissance/commando (RECONDO) teams at Battalion and Brigade level.

Although limited in size and scope, the early RECONDO teams proved their worth. In January, 1967, the new 4th Division Commander, MG William R. Peers, expanded the LRP program and organized the RECONDO teams at Division Level as the 4th Division LRRP (Provisional), which remained in service until 20 December 1967.

Having no organic command section, however, 4th Division LRRP (Provisional) – with eight RECONDO and three Hawkeye teams, did not become fully operational until June, 1967. From December ’66 to June, 1967, the detachment was commanded and staffed as part of the S-2 (intelligence section), 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, which rendered Helicopter and ready-reaction assets to the LRRP’s from the 10th Cavalry’s Troop D, ‘Aero-Rifle Platoon.’

At the same time, each of the 4th Division’s three maneuver Brigades (1st, 2nd, and 3rd) were authorized a 62 member Reconnaissance Platoon (LRRP). Each Platoon was authorized a Headquarters Section consisting of a CO, XO, Operations Sgt., 6 dedicated radio operators, eight RECONDO teams, and three ‘Hawkeye,” or Hunter/Killer teams.

The Brigade elements became operational during the first week in April, 1967, and participated in the 4th Division operation, “Francis Marion.” The Brigade LRP’s infiltrated NVA controlled areas to conduct observation and commando missions.

The Long Range mission as it fit the war in Vietnam’s Highlands was evolving. Initially, the RECONDO (later “LRRP”) teams needed to pre-plot suitable landing zones for the helicopters that would carry them into battle and back out again. This posed a variety of challenges, as the most suitable locations were eventually watched and in some instances, booby trapped by the NVA who were developing countermeasures against the new American tactics.

In addition, potential ambush sites were screened as the teams ranged ahead of regular line units. During Operation Sam Houston, the Division Reconnaissance element was strengthened as the G-2 section saw an opportunity to eliminate or capture NVA couriers, officers, political cadre, and the trail watchers and sentries as US forces entered enemy base areas and sanctuaries.

It was at this time that plans for the 4th Division Sniper School were established. The LRRP’s were going to pick them off at long range and engage them at close quarters by direct fire. Morale was high, and volunteers for the LRRP’s were not hard to find.

THE HUNTERS

“Hawkeye” Teams were raised by MG Peers to hunt down and kill an elusive enemy wherever he could be found. These ‘Hunter Killer’ teams required men of singular courage and skill. Each team included at least two Rhade Montagnard tribal members and two Americans. The Montagnard knew the rugged terrain and possessed natural hunting and tracking abilities and jungle expertise. They also had a natural aptitude for hating communists who made the usual depredations against the Montagnard, their families, and their way of life, for decades.

Each Hawkeye team went through a rigorous ten day course for mutual familiarization on a personal/cultural level, and to learn communication, signaling, and survival skills necessary to the mission profile.

Initially, there was a doctrinal separation between RECONDO and Hawkeye deployment, but that difference became blurred in practice and in the fluid battlefield environment of the Highlands. As time went on, teams in the field began to respond to targets of opportunity and increasingly employed hit and run tactics – the ‘hasty ambush’ – to great effect. The LRRP’s were getting good at what they did.

EARLY RECONDO TEAMS

RECONDO teams were trained and tasked for three primary missions: As Scout/Observers along the trail systems, these teams reported on enemy movements and remained unobserved themselves. As Pathfinders, they reconnoitered suitable landing zones for their lifeline Helicopter Support elements and made suggestions for routes of escape and evasion from and to these locations in event of catastrophe or disaster on the deep penetration missions. Finally, the RECONDO teams were used as screening forces to the front and flanks of 4th Division regular infantry line formations to ensure these main units were not themselves ambushed. LRRP’s were well received by Infantry commanders and their legend grew among rank and file infantrymen.

Both types of teams became skilled at all these tasks, and as opportunities presented, they became adept at exploiting every battlefield opportunity that arose, often changing the mission to respond to a new opportunity or discovery. The size of each patrol varied according to the mission, and teams of as few as two and as many as eight were sent out. As their capabilities increased, so did the complexity and duration of the LRRP / RECONDO mission.

By June of 1967, 4th Division LRRP assets were being used throughout II CTZ, but extra mission emphasis was placed on Pleiku, Kontum, and Darlac provinces, where there were major exit points of the Ho Chi Minh trail system, where NVA activity was on the rise.

In reality, Hanoi was preparing its forces for the Tet offensive of 1968…

LRRP teams found the enemy in his burrows and dens, and attacked them with direct fire air and artillery strikes. They learned his technique for movement and deployment along his main supply lines, routes of travel, and in staging areas in remote mountain locations and on the high plateaus. Battlefield intelligence was analyzed, exploited, and more missions were planned accordingly.

These Highland mountains (which at their highest elevation just north of the DMZ) reach 6,ooo feet – have extensive ridgelines and are cut with deep ravines, saddles, draws, and smaller hills overlooking the valleys that separate them. They are covered with tropical, canopied jungle.

Beneath the tallest trees, which can grow to 150 feet , are smaller trees maybe half that size, and beneath them, still smaller trees, and nearer to the jungle floor, saw-toothed elephant grass, thick stands of bamboo, brush, and vines that inhibit movement for anything but creatures that slither, hop, or crawl or jump.

This was an area long occupied by the NVA who excavated caves and fortified these regions with bunkers, spider holes, tunnels, trenches, and underground shelters. They also built aid stations, hospitals, mess facilities, Command Posts, and storage depots out of what material they found in the jungle. Everything was well camouflaged. The LRRP’s found them anyway.

The extended nature of 4th Infantry Division Operations required LRRP teams to maneuver at far greater distances from supporting units than most other LRRP units in Vietnam. Weather in the mountains was a significant determinant on the deployment, length, resource allocation, and sometimes the success of a mission.

Division LRRP teams were on occasion sent into areas beyond normal radio range, either because of the distance ranged from points of origin, or because of terrain features that inhibited radio communication or made it impossible.

In such situations, the teams were either pulled out, Radio Relay aircraft were employed, or ground teams were pressed into service to keep contact between lost teams and higher headquarters. Eventually, dedicated radio relay teams would be raised within the LRRP and Ranger Companies.

Radio Relay aircraft, however, could not remain on station indefinitely, and their presence over an area for any appreciable length of time was certain to draw attention. Brigade level LRRP teams encountered similar operational impediments, but they had more trouble securing radio relay aircraft due to their status on unit priority ranking.

The battlefield in these highlands was, just by its very nature, unpredictable and fluid, and team leaders on the ground had to make very important decisions without much time for analysis or deliberation to continue their mission.

Between April 6 and October 11, in Operation Francis Marion, the LRRP teams proved the viability and practicality of their mission: During this period, with an average of forty-four operational teams, Division-level Hawkeye and LRRP elements completed 555 missions, produced 366 detailed observations of NVA troop movements, and initiated 82 direct contacts with the enemy, resulting in 90 NVA soldiers killed by direct team fire. During this period, only one American was KIA.

The 4th Infantry Division LRRP (Provisional) had earned its reputation as one of the finest units of its type in Vietnam.

EVOLUTION, PHASE II.

As US Forces gained more experience on the Field of Battle in Vietnam, the Department of the Army and MACV realized the necessity of formalizing the LRRP structure. On 20 December 1967 – on the eve of the Tet offensive of 1968 – the 4th Infantry Division LRRP (Provisional) was reorganized as Company E, 58th Infantry (Long Range Patrol).

In one his final acts as Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division, Major General Peers, the prime mover of the LRRP concept for the Central Highlands, elevated his provisional RECONDO/Hawkeye forces to an official status as a Long Range Patrol company. The General saw what his men could do, and he knew that, given the proper support and good missions, they could do even more.

SIDETRACKED, BUT NOT SIDELINED:

In January, 1968, Major General Charles Stone took command of the 4th Division. He put his stamp on the LRRP mission by introducing ARVN personnel into the LRP teams of E/58th Inf. It was not a well thought out plan and it was not successful. From 23 April to 21 June, 1968, thirty ARVN personnel were trained and integrated into E/58th LRP teams.

No matter what the actual underlying causes, what was perceived as indifference to the mission, personal conflict among the ARVN themselves and between them and the Montagnard, as well as other troubles, the experiment was over by November, 1968. The ARVN, at least those personnel selected for this program, were unable to equal the earlier success achieved by integrating Rhade tribesmen into the LRRP Hawkeye teams.

THE MISSION CONTINUES

As it wrote its own chapter of the book on jungle mountain warfare in Vietnam, E/58th Infantry (LRP) conducted numerous harrowing but successful Long Range Patrol missions during1968 against a determined foe, who paid tribute to the unit by developing specific countermeasures against the LRP teams deployed in the Highlands. As could be expected, operational deficiencies surfaced on some of the missions, but these were dealt with.

Like all US Forces in Vietnam, the one-year combat rotation policy also affected the LRP’s. In addition, the shortage of MACV Recondo School and Ranger School graduates was acutely felt in E/58th, as well as in the Brigade LRP companies, which all needed personnel possessed of the specialized training and proven ability produced by these training programs.

In some instances, LRP teams were led by accomplished Privates First Class, who accepted the responsibility, took control of their teams, performed well, and received promotions. Never underestimate the capabilities of American enlisted men…

On 30 November 1968, Major General Donn R. Pepke assumed command of the 4th Division. Building on past success, a renewed emphasis was placed on the importance of E/58th operations.

Seasoned Army noncommissioned officers were recruited for the LRP Company. Rhade Tribesman, who had once before proved their mettle as loyal allies, were again put on the roles of E/58th Inf. Their native expertise in the mountains, on the trails, and in the ways of the Jungle, plus their experience fighting the NVA – a skill previously demonstrated under MG Peer’s command, was again employed to good effect.

E/58th Infantry (LRP) continued to perform valuable LRP support for the 4th Division until it was reorganized under the colors of K Company (RANGER), 75th Infantry (Airborne), on 1 February 1969.

THE AMERICAN RANGER IS BACK…

Under a service-wide reorganization of the combat elements raised, trained, equipped, and deployed by the United States Army, the Department of the Army instituted the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS), which took effect in February, 1969.

As a part of this new system, the creation of a Regiment of Rangers was organized, dedicated, and activated. While there would be no Regimental Headquarters for the Rangers at that time, the Regimental Colors were placed at Fort Benning, Georgia.

The CARS Order as it would impact the Rangers:

(Items have been extracted from original documents dated 6 Feb 1970)

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Ranger Companies LTC Sutton/72736 6 February 1970

PURPOSE. To provide information on the change in designation of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Companies to Ranger Companies and the Activation of the 75th Infantry.

FACTS

1. The Army Chief of Staff directed that Ranger replace the term Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) when referring to units of this type. The term Ranger traces its origin to the French and Indian War (Seven Years War) when natives of New Hampshire were recruited by Robert Rogers into nine companies. These Rangers, later to be known as Rogers Rangers, were used as “the chief scouting arm of the British” to procure Intelligence by scouting enemy forces and positions and taking prisoners. It was not until later when the Rangers were used in more offensive roles that the term Ranger took on another meaning. Ranger, therefore, has been returned to the role it was initially intended to signify intelligence gathering.

2. In order to provide a parent regiment for the redesigned Ranger Companies of the Active Army the 75th Infantry (Merrill’s Marauders) was activated on 1 January 1969. The 75th Infantry which traces its origin to the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) was considered the most appropriate regiment with which to identify the Ranger Companies.

3. In approving the re-designation of the LRRP units to Ranger units and the activation of the 75th Infantry, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army stipulated the following:

a. Only personnel who have been awarded the Ranger Tab through successful completion of the USAIS Ranger Course will be authorized the Tab.

b. Personnel of the 75th Infantry will wear the patch of the Corps/ Field Force or Field Army to which they are assigned. In the case of separate companies in Vietnam attached to divisions and separate brigades, the division or brigade patch will be worn.

c. There will be no change in the unit designation of National Guard units other than to change LRRP to Ranger.

d. The Ranger Department, USAIS, Fort Benning, Georgia will be designated the custodian of the regimental colors and trophies of the 75th Infantry.

4. The following significant actions have taken place since the redesignation.

a. TOE 7157E and G changed to reflect that all personnel will be parachute and ranger qualified.

b. Approval of a new coat of arms, distinctive insignia and traditional designation for the 75th Infantry.

c. Approval of Special Qualifications Identifier “V” to identify parachute/ranger qualified personnel and the placement of SQI “V” in second priority behind SQI “S” (Special Forces).

d. Approval of a Ranger Enlistment Option whereby qualified applicants may enlist specifically for the 75th Infantry and be assured of training as “an Infantryman or Radio Operator, a parachutist and a Ranger and initial assignment to a Ranger Company upon successful completion of training.”

8 Incl.

1. Ranger Companies, U.S. Army
2. Rationale for the Selection of the 75th Infantry
3. Present/Past Unit Designations
4. Official Statement of Lineage and Honors
5. Short History of 75th Infantry
6. Coat of Arms, 75th Infantry
7. Distinctive Insignia, 75th Infantry
8. C4, AR 601210 Enlistment Options

RATIONALE FOR THE SELECTION OF THE 75th INFANTRY “MERRILL’S MARAUDERS”

AS THE PARENT UNIT FOR ALL DA AUTHORIZED LAP/RANGER UNITS

1. In selecting a regiment which would become the parent unit for all DA authorized LRP/Ranger units the following criteria was used:

b. The regiment should be unique in that it was made up of volunteers, who operated behind enemy lines and were successful in all their operations.

c. That the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) would be accommodated.

2. In World War II and Korea the following organizations were considered to be “special mission” units: The Ranger Battalions (lst6th Battalions); and 1st Special Service Force; the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) and the Ranger Companies (lst_5th, 8th and the 8th Army Ranger Company). The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), more commonly referred to as “Merrill’s Marauders”, was selected as the parent unit for the LRP/Ranger units since the heraldry of the Ranger Battalions, the 1st Special Service Force and the Korean War Ranger Companies has been absorbed by the 1st Special Forces.

3. The 5307th Composite Regiment (Provisional) was organized on 3 October 1943 in the China-Burma-India Theater. On 10 August 1944 the 5307th Composite Unit was consolidated with the 475th Infantry and designated the 475th Infantry (Merrill’s Marauders). On 21 June 1954 the 475th Infantry Regiment was redesigned the 75th Infantry (Merrill’s Marauders). For World War II.

3. 75th Infantry was awarded two campaign streamers and the Distinguished Unit Citation. Those members of “Merrill’s Marauders” who were awarded the Combat Infantry Badge were authorized the Ranger Tab, the only unit other than the Ranger Battalions of World War II authorized the Ranger Tab.*

*[Author’s note: the issue of awarding the Ranger tab to the Marauders and Ranger Battalions of WW II in this fashion, and to any person who was awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge while serving during the Korean Conflict with the 8th Army Ranger Company (11 October 1950 to 27 March 1951), but not to the Rangers of the Viet Nam War is historically inconsistent and must be corrected…]

4. An excerpt from American Forces in Action Series, entitles “Merrill’s Marauders” illustrates, somewhat, the similarity of missions between the 5307th Composite Unit and the present day LRP/Rangers.

“The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) of the Army of the United States was organized and trained for long range penetration behind enemy lines in Japanese held Burma. Commanded by Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, its 2,997 officers and men became popularly known as “Merrillls Marauders.” From February to May 1944, the operations of the Marauders were closely coordinated with those of the Chinese 22d and 34th divisions, in a drive to recover northern Burma and clear the way for the constructions of the Ledo Road, which was to link the Indian railhead at Ledo with the old Burma Road to China. The Marauders were foot soldiers who marched and fought through jungles and over mountains from the Hukawng Valley in northwestern Burma to Myitkyina on the Irrawaddy River. In 5 major add 30 minor engagements they met and defeated the veteran soldiers of the Japanese 18th Division. Operating in the rear of the main forces of the Japanese, they prepared the way for the southward advance of the Chinese by disorganizing supply lines and communications. The climax of the Marauders operations was the capture of Myttkyina airfield, the only allweather strip in northern Burma.”

1. The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional was the first U.S. ground combat force to meet the enemy on the continent of Asia during World War II.

2. On 7 January 1944 the designation “regiment” was changed to “unit”.

Major difference between the present day LRP/Ranger companies and the 5307th Composite Unit is that the LRP/Rangers mission is primarily that of intelligence gathering, i.e., Seek-Find-Report, whereas the Marauders had a typical Infantry mission, i.e., Find-Fix-Finish.*

*

5. The activation of the 75th Infantry in no way disrupts the CARS. However, the following were considered disadvantages which warrant mention:

a. The 75th Infantry has a history which dates back to only 1943. Previous to the activation of the 75th Infantry the LRP units were members of regiments which had a somewhat longer history:

17th Infantry 1861
20th Infantry 1861
50th Infantry 1917
51st Infantry 1917
52d Infantry 1917
58th Infantry 1917

b. The above regiments had a broad mix of infantry battalions, mechanized infantry battalions, infantry rifle companies and LRP companies. The variety of these Infantry units served to enrich the heritage, history and battle honors of the particular regiments they served.

c. Any honors accrued in Vietnam by the LRP companies would have been retained by the parent regiment and would not be carried over to the 75th Infantry. The exception to this rule is the case of the Infantry detachments whose honors and decorations were transferred to the 75th Infantry.

6. The following are the advantages in selecting the 75th Infantry as the parent unit for all DA authorized LRP/Ranger units:

a. Provides the members of LRP/Ranger units with a regiment having a unique place in the annals of the U.S. Army.

b. Provides the members of LRP/Ranger units and the rest of the Army with a common regiment identifying an uncommon skill.

c. Returns to the rolls of the Active Army a regiment having a distinguished combat record which earned it a Distinguished Unit Citation for World War II.

d. Provides the members of the LRP/Ranger units a unit having an active association (Merrill’s Marauders Association) which will provide the soldiers a past: history on which to build.

e. Will provide a strong appeal to recruit more soldiers into the Ranger Training Program.

Present and Past Designations 75th INF, and Merrill’s Marauders

Rangers in Vietnam conducted long range, covert reconnaissance into denied areas; they collected intelligence on reconnaissance missions; planned and directed air strikes on previously unidentified targets; acted as force multipliers to conventional operations; conducted BDA in enemy controlled areas; executed hunter-killer missions at night or in daylight either by set ambush or by hasty ambush and surprise, and with specially trained and equipped snipers;

In addition, Rangers attempted recovery of friendly POW’s; captured enemy personnel for search and interrogation; employed wire tap on the many communication lines used by the enemy in his established base areas and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail Network; and they mined enemy transportation routes.

While the Rangers were all Airborne designated and authorized jump pay, most missions were executed following a helicopter insertion. Only one company, C Co. (RANGER)/75th. Inf. (Airborne) was on active Jump Status, but some Brigade LRP’s actually received jump pay.

Notwithstanding, the “Airborne” designation (Ranger assigned personnel carried the “P” for Parachute codicil at the end of their Duty MOS.) would lead to confusion, mostly by non-Rangers and anyone unfamiliar with the Ranger Companies of the Vietnam Era, when the Ranger was not actually parachute qualified. If the Company was ordered to participate in a combat jump, it was expected that everybody would go.

In the 4th Infantry Division, K/75th Rangers conducted Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP’s) using 4 and 6 man teams. Occasionally, 8 -12 man heavy teams were inserted for special missions. Ranger teams could stay behind enemy lines for long periods, conducting raids and ambushes whenever possible. Most missions however were of shorter duration, 3 to 9 days, extended as tactical or weather conditions – especially in the Highlands, dictated.

Optimally, Ranger teams were inserted by staging a phony insertion or two along with the real one. With the insertion teams on the slicks, a flight of Hueys with their “Hog” (Huey model Slicks converted to Gunships armed with rocket pods, mini guns and .30 or .50 caliber door gunner machine guns) and Cobra escorts made low passes in several locations to keep enemy spotters guessing where we actually dropped.

Depending on what they saw and how soon they were discovered, Ranger teams could be on the ground from several minutes to a number of days. Ranger missions often ended with “hot” extractions, which meant that the team had been either been discovered or had initiated contact on the way out and was under fire.

Operations personnel, however, could not always plan successfully for these dangerous missions, which were inherently dangerous and to some extent, unpredictable. On occasion, the manner and circumstance of Ranger team deployments exposed the teams to what some team leaders would describe as unnecessary risk. Such is the Soldier’s lot.

Ranger units were deployed by helicopter far ahead of American forces. How this was done, and the clandestine nature of the mission, called for special tactics developed over the years by valiant helicopter pilots who had become highly skilled in this type of operation, which was unlike normal airlift operations. This description by a pilot who flew for Special Forces in their long range mission profile is informative:

“For insertions we normally flew a light fire team comprised of two gun ships. For extraction’s we flew a heavy fire team of two gun ships and a hog frog. When inserting a team, the decreased firepower was traded for increased speed. The idea on an insertion was that we were in and out before the bad guys had a chance to react. When flying an extraction the NVA often knew what was happening because the team had been compromised, so we needed the aerial artillery that the hog frog added to the fire team…” (from: http://www.281stahc.org/pictures/galer/GalerRR103.html; ROADRUNNER 103; by Rick Geller)

K Company (RANGER), 75TH Infantry (AIRBORNE)

With the new Regiment of Rangers finally activated under CARS, the K Company detachment absorbed the assets and personnel of E/58th Infantry (LRP), and it was placed under the Command of Captain Reuben H. Silverling.

The mission, however, changed little: Like the other Ranger detachments serving in Vietnam, expertise in long range special operations at the tactical level was raised to a new intensity. K/75th Rangers would provide the Division with a long range capability unmatched, at the time, in modern warfare.

In the early days after CARS, K/75th was attached to 1st /10th Cavalry for logistical support (supplies, weapons, etc.) and administration. Operational control remained with Division G-2 (Intelligence) and G-3 (Operations).

With particular emphasis on the Western Highlands in 1969 – from the northern An Lao Valley of Kontum Province, across Pleiku and Darlac Provinces, to Bu Krak in Western Quang Duc Province, K Company Rangers escalated operations against NVA forces that were pouring down the Ho Chi Minh Trail at rates approaching 20,000 soldiers per month.

However, K Company did not operate at full efficiency until the Brigade LRP platoons were finally and fully integrated with the Ranger Company. These three added platoons allowed K Company to reach its authorized strength of 220 members and infused the unit with field-experienced teams, creating a capable, powerful Ranger force.

This much needed consolidation was completed on 6 October 1969, under the Command of Captain Kim H. Olmstead. Now, K Company could field three patrol platoons consisting of a Headquarters section, five five-man Ranger teams and five six-man Hawkeye Teams, the 6th man being a Rhade Scout. Before long, K Company would adopt the 4 man team as standard.

Each team was given an Alpha-numeric designation, such as R-4, R-2, R-12, and so on.

Each Headquarters section created the structure for the platoon, cleared missions for the teams, briefed and debriefed Team Leaders before and after missions (sometimes at Division HQ, when timely information was deemed critical), and staffed an extensive communications element that included dedicated radio relay teams to support teams in the extremely remote and isolated mountain areas. However, in the fluid environment that is a battlefield, regular Ranger teams were frequently pressed into service for radio relay.

The importance of competency in the performance of radio relay missions should not be undervalued. Without a means of contacting “Zero,” (the Ranger company HQ section) or of being able to reach the Artillery net, FAC birds, gunships or TAC Air, or to call for extraction, the mission could be compromised and the team could be lost.

Radio relay teams were frequently called on to provide support for several teams operating in conjunction with each other. In such cases, a significant amount of information had to be passed rapidly and accurately. For instance, several fire missions might have to be worked simultaneously, with the relay specialist in communication with both the Artillery and the team(s) needing it.

Team locations needed to be plotted and updated with Defensive Target registrations, and coordination was needed to alert the teams for extraction, requiring the relay teams to be on the radio with the focus team, the extraction choppers and any gun platforms that might be essential in a hot extraction. Throw in all of that, multiply it by several teams, and one can see that radio relay missions were critical assets in the rugged Highland terrain.

Radio Relay teams were often deployed to mountain tops or along ridgelines facing valleys so they could pick up signals from the teams operating below. Although it was desirable to move locations to keep from being discovered by an enemy that was constantly looking for them, radio relay teams couldn’t lose communication with the teams that depended on them for their lives. Therefore, they remained on station until the mission was terminated.

Constant personnel turnover plagued K/75th Rangers as much as it had E/58th (LRP) and all the other units in Viet Nam…but the Ranger mission was so specialized and multi-tasked (communications skills, proficiency at map reading, proficiency at directing air strikes, proficiency at using artillery…and so on) that when a teammate or team leader rotated out of the unit, the loss was acutely felt.

An influx of Ranger School graduates in late 1969 improved overall operations but actual school-trained Rangers and RECONDO’s remained scarce. However, volunteers from line units, Artillery units, Combat Engineers and even cooks and clerks who wanted to fight were encouraged to train with the company. If they made it past a rigorous training and screening process, they might be asked to become Rangers. Many did so and turned in sterling performances.

In November, 1969, Major General Glenn D. Walker assumed command of the 4th Infantry Division. General Walker decided to turn his Rangers loose on the NVA and he authorized a series of retaliatory raids against them, specifically tasked to K Company Rangers.

For K Company, whose anxious members reveled in any opportunity to strike the enemy, the emphasis on offensive missions raised company morale, aided recruiting, and infused the company with new spirit.

Attention to other details also raised morale in the unit. Always scarce, except for Air Force desk jockeys and mechanics for whom cammies were standard issue, camouflage fatigues were requisitioned for the Company in sufficient supply that the Rangers – who really needed camouflaged uniforms – no longer had to buy them on the black market.

Significantly, at this juncture, the Ranger Black Beret replaced the Australian-style cowboy hat as the Regiment’s headgear. For the next 32 years – until 2001 – Rangers were known by their distinctive Black Beret.

In 2001, COS Army, General Shinsheki, in a bizarre series of directives, took the trademark Black Beret from the Rangers and made it the standard headgear for the entire US Army, National Guard, and Army Reserves. Then, he proceeded to purchase several million dollars worth of Berets from Communist China – in violation of US law…

As the emphasis on combat missions increased, the reconnaissance mission was not abandoned by any means. However, the deployment of teams to initiate contacts, set ambushes, and conduct Sniper operations was amplified.

During mid February, 1970, K/75TH Rangers participated in a POW rescue mission called, “Operation Wayne Stab II.” Ranger Headquarters pulled all the teams in, refitted, resupplied, and redeployed the whole company as a unit for the first and only time, in a concerted attempt to rescue some American Prisoners of War.

Acting on information that the area contained an NVA base camp that held a POW compound, possibly with the presence of American POW’s, the entire company deployed to the field in a one-ship ‘Hover LZ’ and dug in for the night. No POW’s were found.

As time progressed, K/75th Rangers took up what became for them ‘routine’ 4 and 6 man long range reconnaissance patrols and ambush missions. Occasionally, personnel from several teams would be combined for a ‘heavy team’ of 8 to 12 men for a special operation. The Company regularly sent out interdiction patrols along enemy infiltration routes, which for some of the Rangers had become familiar territory.

Using state of the art, scoped weapons, Ranger Snipers picked off individual NVA with rifle shots that came out of nowhere, leaving shaken survivors to tell the tale.

The Rangers honed their skills as marksmen at the 4th Division Sniper School (which also trained snipers from other Divisions). In a setting that combined classroom instruction in the science of ballistics, shooting, camouflage and stealth, and with an abundance of live fire range time, Rangers were trained to engage individual targets at long range at night and in daylight. 4th Division Snipers also had to be proficient with iron sights out to 900 meters.

M-21 Rifle System used by US Forces in Vietnam

The Viet Nam Era Sniper weapon, the ‘M-21 rifle system,’ used a 3×9 power Adjustable Ranging Telescope for day missions and Starlight scopes for night fire Sniper missions. The scopes were ballistically matched to the Match-grade, 7.62mm semi-automatic rifle and ammunition.

M-21 Sniper Rifle configured for night fire with AN/PVS-2 starlight scope

These and many other types of operations were performed with honor and excellence by the men and brought great credit to this unique breed of soldier, to K Company, and to the United Stated Army.

Respect for the Rangers was high in the Division. Chopper pilots and air crew, forward-based artillerymen, truck drivers, the Commanding General, FAC pilots, medical personnel (including Army nurses), grunts in regular infantry line units and just about everybody else spoke with mysterious awe of the “LRRP’s.”

The declaration, “LRRP’s in contact” would send ripples through Artillery FADAC bunkers and batteries of big guns with names like, “Bad News,” “Cold Sweat” and “Canned Heat” would elevate their tubes, pack powder, and shove ‘Joe’s’ into their breeches, awaiting the pull of the lanyard that would start a Ranger fire mission. Life and death was on the line.

Air assets would muster – the pilots flight checked their ships and the gunners their weapons. Jet turbines whined and Huey slicks with the doors removed lifted into the sky on the leading edge of wings that chopped at the air. Night or day alike, in bad weather and clear, another impossible feat of airmanship would be performed by crews that earned undying admiration from men whose lives they saved every day simply by doing what they were trained to do.

(Photo at Left: Black Jack ‘7,’ 4th Aviation Bn., 4th Inf. Division, flew in Support of 4th Division LRRP’s and K Co. Rangers; Photo at right: Call sign, ‘Gator 834,’ 4th Aviation Bn., 4th Inf. Division, extracting K Co. Ranger team in the Highlands.)

Every Ranger, however, believed that these were not ordinary pilots… Helicopter Crews that flew Ranger missions in the Central Highlands without doubt ate at God’s mess Hall.

As has been said, K Company and the Brigade LRRP and LRP teams that served in the Central Highlands performed Herculean service over an extremely large area of difficult terrain. They served at distances that often precluded artillery, aerial, and communication support that was routinely available to most other Ranger units in Vietnam.

By 1970 – the Year of the Dog – North Vietnam was sending 22,000 troops per month down the Ho Chi Minh Trail…a significant number of them were on their way to the Central Highlands. Many would not reach their intended destinations. Testimony to this fact is the NVA name given to a major spur of the Ho Chi Minh trail that emptied into the Highlands at the northwestern end of the Plei Trap Valley, the “Valley of Tears.”

NVA truck movement in the Highlands began shortly after nightfall and normally trailed off about 3:00 a.m. to allow time for the unloading, dispersal, and concealment of supplies and vehicles before daylight. On high alert in the night darkness, the eyes of men with painted faces watched and waited for any miscalculation or laxity in secure movement by the NVA…and make them pay. It was very common for Recon teams to adjust fire on ‘lights in the distance’ and report secondary explosions from the target area.

The Ranger mission in Viet Nam was to reconnoiter, report on, and engage by direct fire or by other means North Vietnamese Army regulars. By 1968, most Main Force Viet Cong Battalions were comprised mainly of NVA.

Army Rangers and their MACV/SOG counterparts ensured that the NVA commander never felt safe from their prying eyes or from the rain of hot steel that they could cause to descend upon his forces in an instant, at anytime, in anyplace.

Special Forces and Ranger teams complimented each other in their respective, murky missions. The enemy was never quite sure who was on his trail. For communist soldiers who walked into a K Company ambush or fell victim to a Ranger directed air strike or artillery fire mission, the last thing on their minds might be trying to guess what went wrong as they disintegrated from the world in the firestorm of war.

Thus the blueprint for future American military operations was taken from the realm of theory and set into practical application. The concept was sound, and it was proven on the battlefield in Viet Nam:

Small groups of highly skilled and courageous men armed and equipped with the latest weapons and technology, went out to confront an enemy and defeat him against all odds.

They changed the very nature of war…again.

“STAND-DOWN”

Company K and its predecessor LRP units rendered significant service to the 4th Infantry Division in the II Corps Tactical Zone. K/75th Rangers continued field operations in Vietnam until 22 November 1970.

As part of Increment V (Keystone Robin-Bravo) of the US Army redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam, Company K (RANGER), 75TH Infantry (Airborne), was ordered to stand-down.

On the morning of 26 November 1970, Major General William A. Burke, who had assumed command of the 4th Division in July of 1970, mustered his Rangers for their final roll call in Vietnam, and for Command review and decorations ceremony. Captain L. E. Penley, K Company’s 2nd and last Company commander, presided as the Rangers were officially reduced to zero strength and deactivated.

Although some of the K/75th Rangers immediately returned home to the USA, others were reassigned to Ranger units still operating in Vietnam “to continue the Mission.”

THE END OF THE MISSION IN VIET NAM:

Sadly, the battlefield in Viet Nam was abandoned to the darkness, but not by those who fought and died there for freedom, for Viet Nam, and for each other.

Final Salute at the Tomb of the Unknowns, Arlington National Cemetery, Washington, D.C.

Appendix:

Company K (RANGER), 75TH Infantry (Airborne), is entitled to the following:

Campaign Streamers:

Vietnam

Counteroffensive, Phase VI Tet 69 Counteroffensive

Summer-Fall 1969 Winter- Spring 1970

Sanctuary Counteroffensive Counteroffensive Phase VII

Unit Decorations:

Vietnam:

RVN Cross of Gallantry with Palm; RVN Civil Actions Medal

Traditional Designation: “K” Ranger; Motto: “Sua Sponte”(“Of their own Accord”)

L/75 RGR & F/58 LRP & 1/101 LRRP & 3/506 LRRP & 101 LRS HISTORY

101st Airborne DIVISION

The introduction of the 101st Airborne Division,
1st BDE Long Ranger Reconnaissance Platoon 1966-67 into Vietnam

The platoon’s mission is that of penetrating enemy territory for route, point, and area surveillance. The concept of operation is to employ small reconnaissance teams within the battalion’s area of operations or a future area of operation being contemplated by the Brigade. A team is usually employed for a period of 5 days, but will vary according to the current tactical situation.

The platoon was originally organized by 2/Lt Joel S. Stevenson and Platoon Sergeant Philip R. Chassion in August 1965, under the MTOE 57-42F. At this time the person ell were recruited and outfitted with both weapons and material. September 1965 saw a training program initiated and the first team was tactically employed in October, 1965. Since October 1965, the platoon has been employed in all the Brigade’s tactical operations. The original LRRP personnel were Lt. Stevenson, PSgt Chassion, SFC Guy Tomlinson, Sgt Donovan Pruit, Sgt David Skau, and SFD Larry Forest as Platoon Leader, Platoon Sergeant, and Team Leaders respectively. May 1966 saw 1/Lt Robert Deason assume command until July.

On 14 August 1/Lt Robert L. Friedrich OF100676 accepted the command. The platoon sergeants for 1966 were SFO Billy C. Eury, RA24989581, SSG Tommy R. Russell, RA18376513, and MSG Fransisco Acevedo, RA50101448. The platoon’s organization consisted of 1 officer and 34 enlisted men, which was further organized into a platoon headquarters section and four reconnaissance teams. The headquarters section consisted of platoon leader, Platoon Sergeant, Operation Sergeant and assistant, communication chief and assistant, plus a light truck driver.

The reconnaissance team’s organization consisted of a team leader, 2 reconnaissance scouts, 2 scouts with additional communication duties, and 2 scouts also doubling as the team’s medics. The communications system was composted of 1 each AN/GRC 46 and 2 each PRC/25 radios in the headquarters sections. Each team was equipped with an AN/PRC-74 and 2 each AN/PRC-25 radios. These radios gave the platoon internal communications among the teams while one or all of the teams were employed in the field. Each team was also able to maintain communications with the platoon headquarters. Throughout the year the teams were inserted into their area of operation by either heliborne assault, ground infiltration, or amphibious means.

The teams were also qualified and capable of executing an airborne insertion. To increase the effectiveness of this platoon a new concept has been formulated by Captain Friedrich (promoted 17 November 1966), and is planned to become operational the first quarter of 1967. Basically, the teams would be reorganized into a section concept of organization and will have two scouts who will be sniper trained and equipped. These 2 scouts will be added to present team organization. Two RTO’s will also be an addition to each team. Thus, the present six-man teams will become a ten-man section. This section would still be employed under the same tactical concept as the present team. A more significant change will occur in the headquarters section which will consist of the addition of an operation officer, communication repairman, 2 each of RTO’s and 1 armorer. One RTO would also be assigned the additional duty as the light truck driver.

The concept of operation and methods of insertion will remain the same. However, the platoon would increase its capabilities to patrol and recon a larder area and also to engage small enemy forces or targets of opportunity. The new concept will increase the platoon’s strength to two officers, and fifty-nine (59) enlisted men. As a result of enemy engagement throughout 1966, the platoon members received 1 Silver star, 29 Bronze stars for Valor, 4 Army Commendations for valor, 10 purple hearts, and 25 Air Medals. (The awards and decorations section contains the names of the individuals who received the Bronze Stars with “V” and the Silver Star). Key personnel of the original 1st BDE. LRRPs. Plt. Ldr. Lt Stephenson Plt. Sgt. SFC Chassion Team Ldrs. SSgt. Pruitt SSgt. Skau SFC. Tomlinson SSgt. Forrest Commo Sgt. SSgt. Bourne.

LONG RANGE PATROL

Company “F”, 58th Infantry was constituted on 15 May 1917 and organized on 5 June 1917 at Gettysburg National Park, Pennsylvania, as an element of the 4th Division. During the next 50 years the unit did not remain on continuous active duty but was inactivated and reactivated at its services were needed. Its service was notable. It was deeply involved in both World War I and World War II and it participated in six combat campaigns. The latest activation for the company was on 10 January 1968. The activation was in the Republic of Vietnam and the company is presently engaged in the military conflict there. This history covers the period from 10 January 1968 to 1 January 1969. The primary references used were the intsums of the combat operations during the year and notes written periodically throughout the year by the company’s commanders and other personnel involved in the company’s operations.

LINEAGE AND HONORS COMPANY “F”, 58th INFANTRY Constituted 15 May 1917 in the Regular Army as Company “F”, 58th Infantry Organized 5 June 1917 at Gettysburg National Park, Pennsylvania, as an element of the 4th Division Inactivated 21 June 1922 at Fort George Wright, Washington Demobilized 31 July 1922 (concurrently, 58th Infantry relieved from assignment to the 4th Division) Reconstituted 8 April 1942 in the Regular Army as Company “F”, 58th Infantry Activated 24 April 1942 at Fort Lewis, Washington Reorganized and redesignated 26 January 1944 as Company “B”, 204th Infantry Battalion Inactivated 8 March 1945 at Camp Shelby, Mississippi Redesignated 30 September 1948 as Company “B”, 43rd Armored Infantry Battalion Activated 28 January 1949 at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, as an element of the 2nd Armored Division Inactivated 1 July 1947 in Germany (concurrently, 43rd Armored Infantry Battalion relieved from assignment to the 2nd Armored Division) Redesignated 1 July 1959 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 5th Battle Group, 58th Infantry Redesignated 10 January 1968 as Company “F”, 58th Infantry; concurrently, activated in Vietnam. COMPANY “F”, 58TH INFANTRY CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT World War I Aisne-Marne St. Mihiel Meuse-Argonne Champagne 1918 Lorraine 1918 World War II-AP Aleutian Islands Vietnam To Be Determined 1968 SUPPLEMENT TO COMPANY “F”, 58TH INFANTRY UNIT HISTORY THE YEAR AT A GLANCE

The activation of company “F”, 58th Infantry occurred in the Republic of Vietnam on 10 January 1968. The personnel comprising the company were drawn largely from two sources-the cadre of Fort Campbell’s renowned RECONDO school who had arrived in-country during the two previous months, and personnel form the 101st Airborne Division’s First Brigade’s Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon (LRRP). Thus the personnel were well trained and suited to perform their assigned mission of conducting long range patrols. However, because the 101st Airborne Division had just recently arrived in-country and was facing the monumental job of establishing itself, both in a semi-permanent location and as a well functioning fighting team, Company “F”, 58th Infantry, better known as the Division LRRPs, was called on to perform numerous functions other than long range patrolling and it was not until 4 May 1968 that the first long range patrol was conducted.

Shortly after its official activation the LRRP Company moved from its headquarters at Bien Hoa Army Base to the city of Song Be to assist in securing that city. By 28 January 1968 the company was again at Bien Hoa, and two six-man teams were dispatched with General Clay, the Assistant Division Commander, to help locate and secure a new area for the division. The remainder of the company became involved in repelling the enemy’s TET offensive in the Bien Hoa area. Shortly after TET the company moved t join its two teams in securing what was to become the Division’s base camp, Camp Eagle, near the city of Hue. During the ensuing two months the company was primarily involved in assisting in providing security for the quickly developing base camp.

May 4, 1968, marked the beginning of long range patrol operations for the company. A six-man patrol, led the 1LT John W. Gay, Jr., was emploged into the mountainous jungles north-west of fire support base Birmingham. Two hours later, after killing one and possible three VC/NVA the team was extracted. This mission turned out to be a harbinger of the action the company was to see for the rest of the year. During the next eight months the company successfully completed 124 long rage patrol missions. The information obtained contributed immeasurably to the Division’s intelligence effort, and on these missions a total of 62 enemy were killed by body count, and a larger but undetermined number was killed by air strikes and artillery called in by the teams. Loss of company personnel due to enemy action was five killed and 14 wounded during the year.

Additionally, concurrent with the long range patrol missions the LRRP Company performed numerous close-in security type ambushes for the Division, provided reaction forces for the Division as needed for general security and for responding to the needs of high ranking officials should the occasion arise, and it trained Division personnel in repelling and in the use of the McGuire Rig.

In summation, Company “F”, 58th Infantry throughout 1968 was totally committed to the military effort in Vietnam, and its performance was commendable in every aspect.

BIEN HOA TO SONG BE TO CAMP EAGLE

Company “F”, 58th Infantry upon its activation on 10 January 1968 found itself located at the Bien Hoa Army Base in the Republic of Vietnam. Most of the personnel were the cadre of Fort Campbell’s RECONDO school who had flown by C141 to Bien Hoa only within the preceding two months, and members of the First Brigade’s Reconnaissance Platoon. The time prior to the activation was spent establishing the company as a working unit and in refresher training covering all areas needed to be known for the special mission of performing long range patrols – from repelling to immediate action drills. So the prospects for the year 1968 were bright. The men, although few had prier combat experience, were well trained and confident and moral was high.

Although the men were anxious to begin performing long range patrol missions the needs of the Division were such that this event would be postponed until 4 May. Shortly after the official activation the company boarded C-130s at the Bien Hoa airfield and headed for song Be to assist in securing that city. Soon after arrival the first ambush team was sent out and for the next two weeks the company provided the city security by sending out ambushes and close in reconnaissance missions. Helicopter support was limited at this time so all missions were conducted within easy walking distance of the perimeter. During this period the company received its first casualty when an enemy mortar round killed one and wounded two company members.

On 21 January the company began its move to return to Bien Hoa to rejoin the 101st Airborne Division which was formulating relocation plans. But shortly after the first half of the company departed Song Be the city came under enemy attack. This was the beginning of the communist TET offensive and it was seven days before the company was again reunited at Bien Hoa. During the TET offensive the company member at Song Be saw a considerable amount of action. They received rocket, mortar and RPG rounds, and at one point during the ground fighting assisted in repelling the enemy from a quad 50 position which they had overrun. By the 28th of January the enemy had retired and the half of the company at Song Be returned to Bien Hoa.

At Bien Hoa the company began to perform security missions for the Division and General Clay, the Assistant Division Commander, took two six-man teams with him to help locate and secure a new area for the Division. These teams accompanied General Clay in his C-130 to Quang Tri, DaNang, and finally Phu Bai. In the Phu Bai area they provided security at a temporary base established near Gia Le, and accompanied General Clay in his survey of the surrounding area.

The decision was made to move the 101st Airborne Division to the Hue area. During the Communist TET offensive Hue was occupied by the communists for 27 days and the enemy threat was strong in the area. Company “F”, 58th Infantry was one of the first units sent. The company joined the two teams already in the area and secured the area which was to become Camp Eagle. In doing so they killed four enemy who had approached their parameter.

For the next two months the company was deeply committed to providing security for the Division’s rapidly developing base camp. Its primary missions included providing close in ambushes and daily clearing of the road connecting Camp Eagle and Highway 1. On one occasion elements of the company responding to an enemy ambush of an American truck on this road killed one fleeing enemy.

During this period the men of the company found it does get cold in Vietnam. They had left Bien Hoa in such a hurry they took with them only what they would immediately need. The 1968 Monsoon season was unusually cold and the men found the damp cold air went right through their light jungle fatigues. The unquestioned conclusion was that reports that Vietnam is always hot were grossly in error.

In addition to learning that Vietnam is not all sweat the men learned that not just any bunker will survive the monsoon rains, and during a two week period the most respected man in the company was SSG Richard Burnell whose bunker remained sound and dry while all other bunkers, if they did not wash away entirely, were reduced to mudholes.

Good weather follows bad, however, and with the good weather came a change in the company’s operations. Helicopters were assigned to the company and on 4 May the company conducted its first long range patrol.

LONG RANGE PATROL OPERATIONS

The company finally had started to function in its intended capacity. That is, sending six-man teams deep within the jungles, far from friendly ground troops, with the assigned mission of reconnaissance primarily, but occasionally to attempt to snatch prisoners or to conduct ambushes. The helicopter was used for insertion and extraction. Five helicopters were used – the lift ship, a chase ship, two gun ships, and a Command and Control ship. The company was under the operational control of ACofS, G-2 and the five helicopters were assigned to the company whenever the company was engaged in missions. The pilots and crews were from the 160th Aviation Group, the “Black Widows” and the “Kingsmen” and they were truly both proficient and professional. They lived at the LRRP company when assigned and a rapport quickly developed. They became integral members of the “team” and were deeply respected and appreciated by every member of the company.

The company’s first long range patrol mission showed the company’s promise for the future, and set the pace for the rest of the year. The patrol was led by 1LT John W. Gay, Jr. into the mountainous area north-west of fire support base Birmingham in the vicinity of coordinates YD 677153. Their mission was to confirm sniffer readings in the area. The team was inserted at approximately 1300 hours. They were detected shortly after landing on the LZ and called in gunship strike at 1320 hours on three VC/NVA that they spotted overlooking the LZ. Since their presence had been detected they were extracted at 1450 hours. The result was one VC/NVA killed (by bodycount) and probably two others, but the bodies could not be spotted from the air. The team definitely confirmed the sniffer reading.

The following day two more teams were inserted out further to the west. Both teams were extracted under emergency conditions during the next two days with negative friendly casualties and two more VC/NVA killed.

In the following months many more missions were conducted with similar results. SSG James Johnson became known as “Contact Johnson” because on every mission he led he found the enemy. On two occasions he discovered enemy base camps, one was of battalion size, and called in airstrikes and artillery on them. Other teams were also finding the enemy, however, and the company became a prime source of intelligence for the Division G-2. The teams worked throughout the Division AO in the areas west of Hue and Camp Eagle all the way out to the A Shau Valley and south to the 85 east-west grid line and north to the 30 east-west grid line. Information of enemy movements, base camps, trail networks, bunker complexes, weapons and rocket firing positions were continuously reported. The company operated generally with three teams in the field at one time and it was found that normally a team could cover about two-thousand square meters in a three day period, and that became the average length of the missions.

On 25 June one platoon from the First ARVN Division’s Reconnaissance Company was made OPCON to the LRRP company. They moved into an area adjacent to the company area and a one week training program was immediately initiated. The ARVNs were quick to grasp the concepts used by the LRRPs and they proved themselves very capable soldiers. In the next two and a half weeks a total of six teams consisting of two ARVNs and four Americans were sent out, with the American Team Leaders in charge. The ARVN’s knowledge of the jungle proved a helpful contribution to the missions. On 19 July, however, the ARVN platoon was recalled to join its company.

The company 3 October was removed from the control of the G-2 and attached to the 2/17th Cavalry, and shortly thereafter moved to a new location on Camp Eagle. Construction of the new company area was accomplished in conjunction with LRRP missions and it was a busy time for all involved. Under the control of the 2/17th Cavalry the company’s commitments increased. Five and as many as eight teams were sent out on missions at one time. The company continued its exceptional performance with an increased number of enemy sightings and enemy kills.

On 19 November the company received its first casualty on a long range patrol mission. A twelve man team had sprung an ambush on ten VC/NVA and killed nine of them, one having escaped. After searching the bodies and confiscating the enemy’s weapons and documents they carried, the team moved a short distance away and began to prepare for extraction. As the point man began to move toward the LZ he was hit in four places with enemy automatic weapon’s fire. The team quickly returned suppressive fires and pulled the wounded man into the hastily established perimeter and became deeply engaged in a fire fight with the undetermined sized enemy force. During the battle an explosion, presumed to be a CHICOM claymere mine, killed four and wounded seven of the team members. A reaction force of two LRRP teams was immediately sent into assist the team in trouble, followed by the Aero rifle platoon of the 2/17th Cavalry. Before everyone was extracted and air strikes called in thirteen of the reaction force were wounded. Enemy casualties were twenty known dead, and many more presumed so.

Unit History of L Company 75th Ranger

On 5 December 1968, the Chief of Staff, United States Army, approved the activation of the 75th Infantry as the parent regiment for all Department of the Army Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) units and the parenthetical designation (Ranger) in lien of (LRRP) for these units. On 1 January 1969 the 75th Infantry (Merrill’s Marauders) was restored to the active roles of the US Army as a parent regiment under the Combat Army Regimental System serving in the Republic of Vietnam.

With this Department of the Army directive, the LRP Company of the 101st Airborne Division, Company F (LRP), 58th Infantry was deactivated and these individuals formed under the new designation as Company L (Ranger) 75th Infantry on 1 February 1969.

The year of 1969 saw the company rise in a degree of professionalism to make it one of the most efficient, accurate intelligence gathering sources in the Division. With the reorganization of the company from F Company (LRP) 58th Infantry to Company L (Ranger) 75th Infantry, the company’s mission became strictly that of intelligence gathering. Freed from duties of security type ambushes, providing security for downed helicopters, and reaction forces as needed by the Division for general security; the company concentrated 100 percent on reconnaissance.

During 1969 the company conducted 310 Long Range Patrols, almost twice the number as the previous year, accounting for 21 enemy killed, and a larger undetermined number killed and wounded from the supporting fires of gunships, artillery and TAC Air directed by the teams.

The enemy was visually encountered and observed by patrols in as many as 100 occasions. Teams directed the fires of gunships and artillery as many as 200 times throughout the year. In addition to the visual sightings the company’s teams continued to provide the Division with an immeasurable amount of information concerning enemy movements and concentrations, along with a vast amount of terrain information such as LZ locations, water sources and the like.

Loss of company personnel due to enemy action was 5 killed and 14 wounded. The company additionally conducted rappelling and McGuire Rig training for the Division. When inclement weather forced the closing of the outlying firebases due to re-supply problems, Co L found itself in a new role, that of working sometimes as far as 70 KM from Camp Eagle, depending on 175 Howitzers firing at maximum range for support and fair to poor or no communications. In summation, Co L (Ranger) 75th Infantry continued to be the eyes and ears of the Division, reporting enemy activities throughout the Division Area of Operations. The Company’s achievement and performance were admirable in every respect. Due to poor weather and a lack of cover, there were a limited amount of Long Range Patrol missions conducted during the first three months of the year. During this period the Company also conducted close in security type ambush missions and downed aircraft security.

On March 27, 1969, three Ranger teams led by SGT William L. Marcy combined to alert FSB Jack of an impending attack by a large enemy force. Under the direction of SGT Marcy, the team engaged the enemy with claymores, hand grenades and small arms, to disrupt their route of march. Using a C-47 gunship and Aerial Rocket Artillery, they further impeded the enemy’s progress. Shortly after daylight the enemy tried to withdraw and were pursued by fire that was directed by the teams. A sweep of the teams perimeter revealed three enemy casualties from small arms fire. The teams were cited for preventing a successful large scale attack on the firebase and SGT Marcy was awarded the Silver Star.

The company suffered it’s first causality of the year on April 27, 1969, when Julian D. Dedman was in a helicopter that was hit by ground fire, exploded and burned. Another helicopter incident took the life of Keith W. Hammond on May 5, 1969 during an extraction in the Ruong Ruong Valley. The month of May was to see two more Rangers loose their lives in performance of their duties. On May 8,1969, two teams led by SSG Zochak and SGT Reynolds, combined to discover a large Sapper Training Area. After photographing the area, the teams were in a halt waiting for an aerial relay, when they were engaged by an enemy force approximately five times their size. During the ensuing fight Sgt Reynolds was mortally wounded and several other Rangers suffered wounds of less serious nature. SSG Zochak took charge of the situation and directed the fires of the team and supporting aircraft while caring for the wounded himself. By the time the reaction force had arrived, Rangers had accounted for twelve enemy KIA, and possibly a greater number wounded. SGT William Marcy was killed by enemy small arms fire on May 20, 1969, in the late evening hours while exposing himself to call for artillery on enemy locations.

The month of June 1969 saw the arrival of the ARVN Division Recon Platoon to the Company. Joint operations were conducted during this month. Patrols led by SSGT Meiners and SGT Clossen resulted in 3 NVA KIA. In both incidents the ARVN’s performed well, but the language barrier proved to be quite a problem. A patrol led by SGT Anderson on 26 June 1969, discovered 31 122mm rockets along the Song Bo river. A reaction force was brought in to evacuate the items.

July saw the arrival of CPT Robert A. Guy and the concept of saturation patrolling. Ranger teams were in employed in clusters of 5 and 6 teams to completely saturate an area. During the ensuing months the patrols continued to report on enemy movements, concentrations, and sightings throughout the Division Area of Operations.

In August, 3 successive patrols led by SGT Gerald Dotson engaged the enemy with their organic weapons. In the same general area, the Tennessee Valley, a patrol led by SGT Anderson and SGT Peterson engaged 5 NVA across a river from them with gunships. An ARVN sweep of the area in the following days revealed 5 NVA KIA.

On 23 October 69, a patrol led by SGT Dennis Karalow and SGT Edward Drozd ambushed 3 NVA resulting in 1 enemy KIA and 2 wounded. A search of the KIA revealed a weapon and several important documents. On 26 October 1969, SGT David L Bennett engaged 1 NVA, and the team itself was engaged on 3 sides by and unknown size enemy force. While attempting to break contact, one team member, PFC Lytle, drowned while crossing a river.

On 3 November 1969, a heavy team led by SSG Bruce T. Black engaged 3 NVA, killing one and forcing the others to flee. Rucksacks picked up by the team contained a total of 22 60mm mortar rounds. The next day the team again engaged the enemy resulting in 1 NVA KIA by the detonation of a claymore mine.

December saw the Company patrols continue to operate far out in the Division’s recon zone, depending on 175 Howitzers for support. Because of the bad weather air support could not always be counted upon. SSGT Solko set a company record when his patrol spent a total of 10 days in the field before the weather cleared sufficiently for the team to be extracted.

On the 17th and 19th of December, SGT Luchow and SGT Braciszewski made contact with the enemy and because of low ceilings and visibility had to rely on 175’s to break contact.

The company entered the 70’s with the same determination to accomplish its mission and devotion to duty that characterized its 1969 performance.

Company L (Ranger) continued to show throughout 1970 the esprit and professionalism that have characterized its operations since its incipience. The year barely got under way when on the morning of 1 January 1970, heavy Ranger team Shelby, under the leadership of SGT “Mad Dog” Marchisio, found themselves surrounded by NVA/VC. The team initiated contact killing one NVA/VC, and fought its way to the LZ where it engaged and killed another NVA/VC. An Areo-rifle platoon of Delta Troop 2/17 Cav was inserted while team Shelby’s four WIA were extracted. A sweep of the area by the Delta platoon and the rest of team Shelby revealed several heavy blood trails.

This kind of close support with the air cavalry has been the key to success in many Ranger operations. On 24 January Range team Cortina, led by SGT “Bugs” Moran, utilized this support well. While working in the Khe Shan plains the team was taken under fire by a regular NVA unit. Although the teams small arms accounted for 2 NVA KIA, the NVA continued to maneuver against the team. The interdiction of a cobra gunship dampened the aggressiveness of the NVA. On the second pass screaming and yelling was heard from the enemy locations and soon thereafter movement stopped all together. The team was extracted without incident shortly thereafter. Another team working that area during the same time period also ran into well equipped and trained NVA elements. Ranger team Opel, led by SSG “Lobo” Bates monitored several dogs, flashlights and what sounded to be stationary internal combustion engines. The NVA began searching the area hoping to flush out the team when gunships were utilized to cover the area. The team engaged one NVA who had approached too near their location and received several frags on their perimeter resulting in 2 US WIA. The small arms continued until C Troop 2/17 Cav was inserted. Prior to extraction, team Opel was able to inflict at least three KIA on the enemy which was said to number anywhere from 15-20 NVA.

February of 1970 brought similar reconnaissance intelligence reports from Co L with but a few exceptions notable. One of these was heavy Ranger team Baboon, which had the primary mission objective of prisoner snatch. The team observed heavy enemy activity in the area and in the third day, by the direction of the team leader, SSGT Black, moved into an ambush for the PW snatch. Approximately 30 minutes after setting up the ambush 2 NVA were spotted moving toward the ambush zone. The Rangers sprung the ambush resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 NVA POW. A reaction unit from 2/17 Cav was called in to secure the team and its POW and the whole element was extracted five hours after the ambush had attained success.

March also brought a new aspect of Ranger operations to the forefront. Not only did Company L (Ranger) conduct 33 regular reconnaissance missions but also a raid to the Ashau Valley floor. Under the leadership of CPT Guy, company commander, and 1LT Ohle, 2nd Platoon Leader, two teams – Ranger Team North and Ranger Team Center, each comprised of 18 Rangers and 5 Engineers, CA’ed to strategic locations in the Ashau. The teams found signs of very recent activity to include tracks of earth moving equipment and sightings of NVA construction workers. One team destroyed one bridge and nearby protective bunker while the other team secured a downed 2/17 Cav aircraft and surveyed the road for possible interdiction points. The road showed signs of heavy of heavy foot and truck traffic within 24 hours but due to the element of surprise and the swiftness with which the raids were executed the enemy could not react.

April saw the introduction of several innovations to Ranger operations at Company L. The basic emphasis for the Ranger mission was change from reconnaissance to combat intelligence. Company L also integrated sensor monitoring with their teams with some very favorable results. The third change in Company L operations took the form of experimental US-ARVN recon patrols. A group from the 54th Recon Company, 2nd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division received training at Company L and joint operations were employed in the ARVN recon zone. The teams were out with a US Ranger team leader and were quite educational to all concerned. By the end of April on to May 1970 emphasis was place on heavy teams and on having these elements maintain 50% security during their ONH. One such heavy team, Ranger team Grasshopper headed by SSGT “El Cid” Sands was working the Khe Sahn plains region when it became locked in a fire fight with an NVA/VC element of undetermined size. The team broke contact at 1700 hours after having received 2 US WIA and was heading for the LZ when it again made contact resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA and 2 NVA/VC KIA. The team could not move so it stayed in position and was re-supplied hand grenades and white phosphorous grenades by LOH. Both the Pink team supporting the Grasshoppers and the Medevac attempting to extract the wounded received heavy automatic weapons fire. Finally at 0245 hours the following morning Ranger team Grasshopper was extracted by ladder under fire. Just prior to extraction 2 NVA/VC were killed when they attempted to turn around one of the teams claymore mines.

May of 1970 brought Company L’s first big tragedy. Ranger team Kansas, while working as a radio relay and reconnaissance team in the Roung Roung valley area observed only slight movement in their area of operations. At 0430 on the morning of day 4 the situation report sent to Ranger TOC was negative. This was the last communication anyone had with team Kansas. At 0800 a Pink team dispatched to the location spotted six bodies which were recovered by ground Cavalry forces. Investigation showed that one radio and all weapons had been taken from the bodies and claymore wires had been cut. No expended US brass was found in the ONH.

Rather than allow this setback to destroy the morale and aggressive spirit of the Ranger Company, the men in Company L took this bitter lesson learned and continued to “Lead the Way” for the 101st Airborne Division. During the month of July 1970 the company conducted 31 missions with emphasis again placed on reconnaissance intelligence. Due to the fact that major NVA units were infiltrating the 101st recon zone, the company concentrated its efforts on possible routes of march in the Khe Sahn plains. One such team was heavy team Ferrari led by SSGT “Zee” Zentner. As team Ferrari moved off the LZ they immediately received heavy fire from three sides. The team returned fire killing four NVA. In the ensuing battle the C&C, Cobras and Loch’s received heavy 12.7mm fire and .30 cal fire. In the immediate vicinity 45 bunkers were observed and an OD generator with wires leading in all directions was spotted. Two groups totaling 70 NVA were seen moving toward the contact. Aerial Rocket Artillery accounted for at least 9 NVA KIA. The team was finally extracted having suffered 6 US WIA.

In addition to running 31 regular reconnaissance missions during July, Company L (Ranger) graduated three classes of ARVN HAC BAO from specialized training which it conducted. At the conclusion of the course each class completed a 36 hour combat patrol accompanied by four Ranger advisors. Company L (Ranger) still enjoys a close camaraderie with the famed HAC BAO Company.

During the month of August Company L provided extensive intelligence reports to the 101st Airborne Division enabling it to pinpoint the missing Chi Thicu Sapper Battalion and to confirm the suspected infiltration the 5th NVA Regiment from Laos through Tennessee and Spear valleys. Often the cost of such intelligence was high – and might have been higher had not the Rangers had the full support of the 2/17 Cavalry.

Ranger team Kenya was very grateful for the Cavalry support it received. On their initial infiltration point, the helicopter received heavy small arms fire and crashed on the LZ. At this time SGT “Lazy Day” Hazelton, the Team Leader, requested a heavy Pink Team and Blues. The team continued to receive a heavy barrage of small arms and two mortar rounds went off on the LZ. Team Kenya suffered 2 US KIA and 2 US WIA but maintained tactical integrity for 45 minutes until the Aero-rifle platoon of Charlie Troop 2/17 Cav came to reinforce them. The C Trp ARP’s suffered 2 KIA and 1 WIA on the insertion but held their ground until D Troop 2/17 came to the assistance of the combined element.

Another team encountering stiff resistance to reconnaissance gathering patrols was Ranger team Buffalo headed by SSG “Paul Bunyon” Suomela. Ranger team Buffalo had been hearing and observing may indications of enemy activity in their area when on the evening of day 4 of the patrol they were approached by several large lights from the North and East. They were subsequently surrounded by a platoon – sized element which began firing on a Pink Team that had come to assist Buffalo. The team threw frag grenades and fired small arms on the NVA position. All ARA and gunships in the area received heavy 12.7mm fire. At 0230 hours the next morning the team heard an Air Force fast mover supporting their element take fire and crash. The next day Buffalo was extracted without incident after having conclusively determined the presence of a large enemy element in that area.

Company L (Ranger) continued to saturate the lower Ashau Valley and Sung Bo Rao Trang Valley with reconnaissance teams all through the early monsoon period. At times weather became so prohibitive that truck insertions were made. The company however remained effective and continued to provide valuable intelligence information to Division.

One such team, Ranger team Savannah, led by SSG “Termite” Vanning, while acting both as a reconnaissance element and radio relay for other Ranger teams, confirmed the presence of Phou Loc Finance and Economy Company in their area. Team Savannah, shortly after insertion saw one of their trip flares ignite and employed artillery resulting in 2 secondary explosions. On day two the team observed 9 NVA/VC in rain gear and engaged them with organic weapons resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 5 blood trails. The body revealed several documents which were the primary source of the intelligence data on the Finance Company. Later that evening the team observed 1 NVA crawling toward their position and dispatched his with small arms and grenades resulting in another NVA KIA. Savannah then observed a light shinning on the body of the previous KIA and engaged it with organic weapons with unknown results. Shortly thereafter the team was extracted with their intelligence items.

The month of Nov 1970 was a particularly hard one weather-wise and the Ranger Company was only able to field 13 missions. Those teams, shifted to the Roung Roung Valley due to flying conditions, still provided timely intelligence reports. One of these teams, Ranger team Bills, headed by SSG “Spear” Houser determined the location of the 1/803rd NVA Regiment. Unfortunately for this information, Company L (Ranger) was to pay heavily. On day 4 of their mission the Bills made chance contact resulting in 1 US WIA immediately. The NVA maneuvered to within 30 meters of the Bills hasty perimeter and continued to fire for approximately 10 minutes. At the end of this time the team leader stated he suspected he was being surrounded. Again the enemy initiated fire this time wounding another Ranger. The team began employing artillery in the area until gunships could get on station. The bird attempting to McGuire one of the wounded Rangers out took heavy fire wounding several inside the helicopter and the Ranger in the McGuire Rig fell out and hit the trees. At this time (three hours after contact) the 2/17 Cav Blues hit the ground and linked up with Ranger team Bills. The combined element searched the area for the fallen Ranger and shortly thereafter recovered his body. Before final extraction of the team could be completed another Ranger was killed by an RPG.

December’s weather proved to be no better than November but with occasional breaks the Ranger Company was able to complete 10 missions with emphasis on the Khe Sahn plains (Vietnamese Salient Area) and eastern Ashau Valley region.

The former location caused additional problems in communications and control. In order to alleviate these conditions Company L established a Forward Operations Base at Quang Tri with a radio relay team at Signal Mountain (950). These missions were run in conjunction with A Troop 2/17 Cav and personnel stayed with Papa Company (Ranger) 5th Mech who are also located at QT. In retrospect one can easily see that L Company (Ranger) has continued to provide timely and accurate intelligence data to the 101st Airborne Division by aggressive and professional Ranger operations and personnel. Company L has performed in the finest tradition of its progenitors – the Merrill’s Marauders and the pride of each man in knowing the precedence that has been set and the spirit of the 75th Infantry Regiment will insure its perpetuation.

1971 brought increased demands on Company L (Ranger) 75th Infantry as the company participated in Operations Lam Son 719, 720, and 810. Flexibility was the key as the Company was employed in 6 man teams, platoons, and as an entire company as the rapidly changing concepts of waging the war created new demands. The Company was to pay heavily for it’s successes in the Ashau Valley during Lam Son 720 but inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and his equipment.

Although poor weather conditions hampered Ranger operations during the month of January, the number of enemy sightings increased during this period. Sightings and contacts were made in the Bach Ma, Spear Valley, and Roung Roung regions. The use of “false extractions” by the company during this period proved to be highly successful. Ranger team Bass, led by SSG Vodden, (Fido), engaged an estimated enemy platoon in the Spear Valley area resulting in 1 NVA KIA and several more killed by ARA in close support. Ranger team Octopus, operating in the Spear Valley, engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 NVA WIA (confirmed) and several more NVA WIA (probable). The most significant accomplishment of the team was it’s success in locating and confirming the identity of elements of the 5th NVA Regiment.

During the month of February the Company deployed a total of 17 Ranger Teams. Poor weather conditions again hampered team deployment. On 9 February several Ranger Teams were inserted into the Roung Roung Valley region to replace a infantry battalion that had re-deployed to the Khe Sahn region. These teams placed special emphasis upon ambush techniques. During the remainder of the month other Ranger Teams were active in the abandoned Firebase Ripcord area. Here the emphasis was placed upon reconnaissance and surveillance of roads and trails through out the area. In the Ripcord area, Team Phoenix, led by SSG (Fido) Vodden, engaged an enemy rifle squad carrying a Soviet 7.62 MG. The team killed 1 NVA, SGT (Butch Cassidy) Sellner, captured the enemy machine gun, and the team was extracted. Ranger Team Nashville engaged an unknown size enemy force in the same area resulting in 1 NVA KIA. In a nearby area, Ranger Team Toronto killed 1 NVA in a engagement with an unknown size enemy force.

Company L (Ranger) deployed a total of 21 Ranger Teams during the month of March. Initially concentrating upon reconnaissance of the area surrounding FSB Ripcord, this unit now shifted to the mission of monitoring and ambushing along Rt 547 from FB Rendezvous to FB Blaze and along Rt 548 on the A Shau Valley floor. Six Ranger initiated contacts with enemy forces in these areas resulted in 8 NVA KIA and 2 NVA POW. Ranger Team Indianapolis led by SGT “Hannibal” Barr, observed heavy enemy truck movement along Rt 548. During their reconnaissance they engaged 5 NVA with organic weapons fire. The results were NVA KIA (confirmed) and 1 NVA KIA (probable) observed carrying an RPD machine gun at the time of contact. Ranger Team Hamilton, also operating in the A Shau Valley, engaged 2 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA (probable) and 1 US WIA. Ranger Team Medicine Hat IV, led by SGT (Apple Jack) Smith, had the most significant action during the month. The team engaged and trapped 3 NVA in a reinforced culvert on Rt 547 in the FB Veghel area. Results of the contact were one NVA KIA and 2 NVA POW. The team did suffer 1 US WIA in the engagement. The information that the 101st Abn Div received from the POW’s enabled the 1st Bde to counter a serious enemy threat to their fire support base in that area.

During the month of April, this unit deployed a total of 29 Ranger Teams. Teams were deployed in the Spear Valley area from 1 April to 10 April with emphasis on reconnaissance. From 10 April to the end of the month the unit’s mission was company size raids to include platoon size stay behind ambushes in the A Shau Valley. L Co along with Delta Troop 2/17 Cavalry, made a raid along Rt 548, a wire cut on an NVA communications line, and left a platoon size element, led by LT. (Gray Hog) Sawtelle, for an ambush. The platoon size ambush engaged a 6 man enemy force that was a communications repair team. By employing gunships and small arms fire the Rangers killed the enemy and engaged another platoon size enemy force. The Ranger Platoon was extracted with gunships for cover. The Rangers suffered 2 killed and 4 wounded. L Co (Ranger) still containing its well known initiative, staged another company size raid in the A Shau Valley along Rt 548. The unit, led by CPT “Rolly Olley” Ohle, was successful in conducting a wire tap, the destruction of an enemy bridge, and leaving a stay-behind ambush. Ranger Team Cubs, led by SGT “Georgia Peach” Duran, which was on radio relay for the platoon conducting the ambush on Rt 548, made contact with a large enemy force in reinforced bunkers. This engagement with the NVA resulted in a three day and two night contact with fierce fighting continuously. The team suffered 3 killed and 1 wounded before reinforcements arrived. The Bravo Troop Air Rifle Platoon, 2/17 Cav was the immediate reaction force. They were unable to reach the LZ because of the intense ground fire. Delta Troop 2/17 Cav was inserted next to relieve the pinned down Ranger Team. They engaged the enemy but were pinned down and suffered heavy losses. After two days of continuous air strikes, gunships, and artillery on the enemy positions, along with another US company committed to the battle, the enemy still refused to give ground. Finally a small volunteer Ranger Team led by CPT Ohle and SGT “Muldoon” Rothwell, combat assaulted into the area and drove the enemy force from their positions, rescued all wounded personnel, and recovered the US dead. The Rangers provided important information for the 101st Abn Div by locating elements of the 5th NVA Regiment and inflicting heavy casualties.

During the month of May, Company L (Ranger) deployed only a total of 12 Ranger Teams. 11 of these teams were deployed in the Roung Roung Valley region with the mission of reconnaissance. One Ranger Team was deployed as advisors to the HAC BAO. During an operation on the eastern ridge of the A Shau Valley, this team was instrumental to an ARVN victory over the enemy forces they engaged. Ranger Team Tigers had the only significant contact in May when they engaged a small enemy force. The team had 1 US wounded and the enemy results were unknown.

Late May and early June found the company conducting fewer missions but intensive training of new personnel. They also provided training for the 1st ARVN Division Reconnaissance Company.

During the month of June, this unit deployed a total of 23 Ranger Teams. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades all requested the employment of Rangers around FSB Maureen, Shock, Barnett, and Satan. The missions were reconnaissance for the 2nd and 3rd Bde. Several enemy sightings and small contacts were made in these areas of operations giving the brigades useful information. On 13 June Ranger Team Ohio, led by 1LT “Currahee” Grange, made a raid northeast of FSB Shock for the 1st Bde. The mission was reconnaissance in force looking for base camps, way stations, and cache sites. The team engaged an enemy outpost and a fire fight lasted several hours. The team employed air strikes and ARA on enemy positions and routes of escape, while they continued to use their organic small arms fire power. The Rangers suffered heavy losses of 5 US WIA and 2 US KIA during the contact. Enemy losses were also high with many killed and blood trails leading off in several directions. The 1st Brigade received needed enemy intelligence from this operation and reacted with larger units. On 29 June the entire company made a raid to locate an enemy aid station. The company was led by 1LT “Mountain Man” Montano. Teams were led by SFC (PSG) “Kamikaze” Kiama, and “Blackie” Batts, on a reconnaissance in force through the area. 1SG “Bull Moose” Gentry came into the area later with an emergency re-supply. The Rangers received automatic fire as they combat assaulted into the area. The unit employed artillery and ARA on all enemy positions and drove them from the area as they pushed on to their objective. The Rangers found the old enemy aid station, but were able to find only 3 NVA KIA. From this raid the 3rd Bde received important intelligence for future operations in the area. There were no Ranger losses form this operation making it a total success in company size operations.

In July, the emphasis on company size operations was decreased and the six man team again became the standard element of employment. The company began extensive operations in the Ba Long Valley area and operated a forward base at Dong Ha and later Quang Tri. The teams were deployed northwest of FSB Voghel with a mission of reconnaissance for the 1st Bde. Ranger Team Jane, led by SGT “Killoggs” King, engaged 2 NVA with the results of 2 NVA KIA (probable). The team employed ARA and artillery and were extracted only to be inserted onto a new LZ. The 3/5 Cav deployed six Ranger Teams east of FSB Hooker. Several enemy sightings, rocket and mortar firing sites, and suspected enemy camps were spotted. Rangers employed artillery on these sites. Six reconnaissance teams were employed for the 2nd Bde South and North of FSB Satan. One enemy sighting was made and artillery employed. Company L (Ranger) also employed one team with the HAC BAO in the southern portion of the A Shau Valley to act as advisors and interpreters. Action there resulted in several NVA KIA and light ARVN casualties.

Company L (Ranger) deployed 23 teams during the month of August. 16 teams reconned for the 3/5 Cav along the Song Thach Han River southwest of Quang Tri. These Ranger teams revealed some infiltration into the area by small NVA units. Ranger Team Rodgers made contact with a small enemy unit with unknown results. Two teams were deployed near FSB Veghel in support of the first Bde. Two other Ranger teams reconned around FSB Normandy and found recent enemy activity and rocket sites. The Rangers also worked for the 2d Bde, north of FSB Rifle. In this area three Ranger teams made contact with an estimated NVA reconnaissance platoon all on the same day. Ranger Team Cora, led by Sgt Ackley (Dagwood), made a point contact with the enemy while crossing a small stream. The team suffered one US KIA and broke contact with two enemy KIA (probable). Team Ann, led by Sgt Owens (Cobra), spotted the enemy preparing an ambush and fired up their flank. The team broke contact and linked up with Ranger Team Cora. Sgt King, (Killoggs), leading Team Stella, made a point contact with an enemy patrol and broke contact, linking up with Teams Cora and Anne. 1LT Grange (Currahee), organized the three teams as the enemy probed their positions. The Rangers repulsed the enemy with organic weapon fire and hand grenades. Later that day, CPT Robinson (Iron Ass), came into the area and extracted two injured Rangers in his command and control ship. C Company 1/501st Inf reinforced the Rangers during the contact. Artillery, ARA, and gunships were employed the remainder of the day. As night approached the Rangers led combined elements to a safe PZ. This reconnaissance resulted in locating the old (Chi Thua II) Sapper Battalion. The contacts were exploited by 2nd Bde. The 3rd Bde inserted Ranger Team Ridgeway, led by 1LT Montano (Mountain Man), along the Rao Trang River southeast of FSB Ripcord. The insertion ship received severe ground fire after inserting the team. The team later found evidence of at least 100 NVA moving through the area, but had no further contact. Another team of advisors was inserted with the Hac Pao northwest of FSB Pistol. The Rangers employed ARA and artillery as they moved into the enemy held areas.

At a ceremony at Camp Eagle, the Company was presented the Valorous Unit Citation for extraordinary heroism during the period 7 Dec 1969 to 16 Feb 1970.

During the month of September, 23 Ranger Teams were inserted for reconnaissance missions. 14 teams were employed on both sides of the Song Thach Han River, southwest of Quang Tri. Two enemy contacts were made and the Rangers providing a screen on the southern flank of operation Lam San 820 found evidence of foot and vehicular traffic between FSB Holcomb and FSB Hooker. Ranger Team Mosbey, led by Sgt Murphy (Duce), made contact with two to three NVA while on a point reconnaissance. Sgt. Broyles (Undertaker), killed one NVA (probable). That night the team had enemy movement and blew their claymores. The next day the team found two blood trails. Six reconnaissance teams were employed along the Rao Nong and Song Bo Rivers in support of 3rd Bde. The teams discovered recent signs of infiltration throughout the area. Ranger Team Bradley, led by Sgt Wyatt (Body Bag), made contact with an unknown size enemy force immediately after insertion. The Rangers broke contact and had an emergency extraction. The contact was exploited by the 3d Bde. Rangers teams were then deployed for the 2d Bde south of FSB Rifle. Ranger Team Gavin, led by Sgt Wyatt (Body Bag), made contact with an estimated enemy platoon in reinforced bunkers. The team broke contact and called in gunships on the enemy positions. The team was extracted and reinserted the following day. Again, immediately after insertion, the team made contact with an enemy squad. The team killed one NVA (probable), broke contact, and were extracted. The 2d Bde exploited the contact with gunships, artillery and a CS drop.

During the month of October, this unit deployed 22 Ranger Teams. From 2 Oct to 13 Oct, 12 Teams were employed in the Ra Long Valley, southwest of Quang Tri. One heavy contact was made by Ranger Team Forrest, led by Sgt Lambert (Gloves), when the rangers discovered an enemy base camp. The Rangers broke contact with one US WIA and the team had an emergency extraction by ladder. The results were two NVA killed (probable) and from the exploitation of the 3/5 Cav, a large cache site was found. Ranger teams throughout the area found bunkers, rocket launching sites, and enemy infiltration routes. On Oct 15 the Company was detached from the 2/17 Cavalry and attached to 3d Bde of the 101st Abn Div and moved from Camp Eagle to Camp Evans. 10 Teams were employed in support of 3d Bde from 15 to 30 Oct. The Ranger Teams worked around FSB Gladiator, Helen, and Firestone. The largest operation of the month was when 2d platoon walked into the mountains on a nine day operation. Enemy trails, signs, night locations and sightings were made by Rangers on this operation.

The month of November was the last operational month for L Co Rangers in Vietnam. During this month 18 Ranger Teams were deployed in support of the 2d and 3d Bde. Seven teams conducted area reconnaissance in support of the 2/506 Inf around the FSP Gladiator and Coc A Bo area. The Rangers called in artillery on several enemy sightings and suspected base camp areas. There was one NVA sighting where small arms fire was employed with unknown results. For the 1/506 Inf, six Ranger teams were employed in the flat and piedmont region south and west of FSB Jack. Two Ranger Teams were employed along the Song Bo River east of FSB Baker for surveillance and monitoring of enemy movement along the river. Several enemy indicators were noted in these areas. These Ranger missions were of great value to the Third Brigade, since they provided screening patrolling in the areas of operation of the battalions that were “standing down” at Camp Evans. During this same period 3 Ranger teams patrolled the piedmont area south of FBS Arsenal in support of 2d Bde. Several enemy campfires were spotted and these were engaged by artillery with unknown results. On 24 November, 1971, Co L (Ranger) 75th Infantry received orders to “stand down”. By 5 December, 1971, the unit was inactivated, bringing to a close the history of Co L (Ranger) 75th Infantry in Vietnam. The men of this unit accomplished what others only dream of and walked where others have not dared. Our minds and hearts are with those valiant Rangers who died in these battles.

“Whom shall I send and who will go for us? Here am I, send me.”

Key Personnel Serving with Company L (RANGER)

Company Commanders

CPT Kenneth R. Eklund 1 Feb 69- 13 Feb 69
CPT Lannie D. Cardona 13 Feb 69- 19 Jul 69
CPT Robert A. Guy 19 Jul 69- 20 May 70
CPT James D. Stowers 20 May 70- 15 Aug 70
CPT David H. Ohle 21 Aug 70- 1 Jul 71
CPT William L. Robinson 1 Jul 71- 5 Dec 71

First Sergeants

1SG James G. Farrington 1 Feb 69- 12 Mar 69
1SG Clarence J. Carden 12 Mar 69- 18 Mar 69
1SG Robert F. Gilbert 18 Mar 69- 20 June 70
1SG William J. Unzicker 16 May 70- 1 Mar 71
1SG Neal R. Gentry 17 Mar 71- 21 Nov 71
SFC Raymond T. Duffy 21 Nov 71- 5 Dec 71

Platoon Leaders

1LT David H. Ohle
1LT Robert Johnson
1LT Stephen Osborne
1LT Kevin Henry
1LT Michael Grim
1LT William Brownsberger
1LT Claude Alexander
1LT James Smith KIA
1LT Paul Sawtelle KIA
1LT James Montano
1LT David Grange
1LT William Prince
1LT Robert Snyder
1LT Robert Suchke Feb. to July 1971

Platoon Sergeants

PSG Donald Brickle
PSG Milton Lockett
PSG Konrad Taylor
PSG Troy Rocha
PSG Harold Kaiama
PSG Howard Dobbs
PSG Aubrey Batts
PSG Clarence Downs

Operations Sergeants

SFC James Johnson
SFC Jose Mendosa
SFC Gilbert Parker
SFC Andrew Smith
SFC Fred Zabitoski [CMOH]

M/75 RGR & 71st LRP & 199 LRRP HISTORY

71st Infantry Detachment (AIRBORNE, LRP)

199th Light Infantry Brigade

The 199th Infantry Brigade deployed to the Republic of Vietnam in December 1966. The Brigade’s primary objective to protect Saigon and the numerous complexes that provided direction and support for the country’s entire defense.

Despite the magnitude of the 199th Infantry Brigade’s security assignment the Brigade had been sent to Vietnam without any long-range patrol assets.

On 20 December 1967, the 71st Infantry Detachment (Long Range Patrol) was activated by sixty one troops chosen by General Forbes from the ranks of Company F, 51st Infantry (II Field Force Long Range Patrol) Within a month the unit was fully operational and acquainted with it’s Long Binh sector.

One hour before midnight 31 January 1968 a LRP patrol gave the brigade it’s initial warning that the Tet Offensive had began. This report propelled the Redcatchers of the 199th into maelstrom of continuous fighting and emergency reaction tasks throughout the eastern Saigon defensive zone. For six months the reconnaissance detachment performed important surveillance and ambush work in the Binh Hoa and Long Binh area of operation.

The Tet campaign was concluded by the end of May 1968, and the 199th Infantry Brigade was relocated southwest of Saigon, into the extensive marshlands commonly called the “pineapple” plantation. The flat swampy region offered an ideal Viet Cong approach corridor to Saigon and General Westmoreland believed that the brigade’s presence would hamper this well-known enemy route into the capital. The 71st (LRP) was based at “Horseshoe Bend” and conducted regular patrols into the bomb scarred rice paddies, elephant grass, and stretches of fruit thickets and nipa palm.

The 71st (LRP) highlighted the “LIGHT, SWIFT, and ACCURATE” trademark of the brigade. For over a year the LRRP’s of the 71st watched scores of footbridges, embankment pathways, and other guerrilla traveled avenues across the paddy landscape. The recon teams also operated effectively from Navy Patrol Boats that scoured the Song Vam Co Dong and landed ambush parties along the mud flats and reed-covered shores. During this time the brigade recon framework was enhanced and the 71st was expanded and transformed into a Ranger company.

M Company (RANGER), 75th Infantry (AIRBORNE), 199th Light Infantry Brigade

On 15 January 1969, Lt. Robert Eason Jr. took over the 71st with an assigned priority to reorganize it into a brigade-level ranger company by the end of the month. In conformity with this schedule on 1 February Brigade commander Brigadier Gen. Frederic Davis activated Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry. The Ranger structure gave the 199th a reinforced combat reconnaissance and surveillance capability. Rangers from Company M were know to patrol in two man teams, however the six man Ranger team was standard and a twelve man heavy team was used for combat patrols in most instances.

In June 1969 the 199th moved into a new operational area northeast of Saigon and resettled at Fire Support Base Blackhorse in Long Khanh Province. The region was geographically different from the old swampy terrain. The rangers found the change initially unsettling because they were on unfamiliar ground facing a more hardened professional soldier than they had faced before.

The majority of combat operations in Long Khanh Province invariably encountered elements of two large, well-trained, and highly disciplined organizations, the 274th VC Regiment and the 33rd NVA Regiment. For many soldiers, facing disciplined and aggressive enemy soldiers was an unpleasant task compared to fighting the guerrillas in the old Pineapple zone. Other soldiers liked the new area better, noting the relative absence of booby traps and mine contraptions that had caused such high casualties during plantation patrols.

The rangers were soon unleashed in an ambitious extended reconnaissance campaign to locate NVA and VC hiding places, resupply points, and infiltration routes. The Redcatcher Ranger Teams were sent into the gloomy rain forests northeast of Trang Bom, north of Dinh Quan, and along the heavily vegetated Lga Nga and Dong Nai rivers. The ranger scouts grappled with the enemy in a series of sharp clashes. From these opening skirmishes, the rangers learned that their opponents were highly elusive but willing to stand and fight when cornered or occupying good positions. However the Rangers gained confidence as its incessant raiding began to unbalance NVA and VC attempts to safeguard previously uncontested supply lines and caches.

The persistent Ranger reconnaissance campaign continued to relentlessly, as sustained pressure was applied on the network of supply lines used by the two enemy regiments. By 5 February 1969 the rangers had interdicted so many supply trails that he 274th VC Regiment was reduced to eating bananas and roots. The 33rd NVA regiment withdrew from Long Khanh province altogether, and ranger company patrols were ordered to continue tracking it into Binh Tuy province.

The expanded reconnaissance campaign forced the rangers to arrange long distance communications. For example, in late March 1970, one team was placed on a remote mountain top and set up a radio relay point for two weeks. This duty was extremely hazardous, because it involved transmitting signals from a static location. Mobil long range patrols also became more dangerous as scattered forays were launched deep into North Vietnamese strongholds.

In mid July 1970, the rangers were moved to fire support base Mace, near Gia Ray in Binh Tuy province. The ranger teams prepared to go deeper in pursuit of the elusive NVA. Instead they were informed that their exemplary reconnaissance pursuit campaign was about to end. The Brigade had received orders that it was scheduled for redeployment from Vietnam as part of the Army’s Keystone Robin Increment IV program.

On 9 September the Ranger company ceased active combat operations. And the last four ranger teams were extracted by helicopter from the field for consolidation at Fire Support Base Mace. The veteran Redcatcher Rangers were moved by truck convoy to Camp Frenzell Jones in Long Binh and started stand down procedures. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry. Was reduced to zero strength on 24 September and officially deactivated effective 12 October 1970.

The 71st (LRP) and Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry combat reconnaissance record was a model of effective scouting progression that produced one of the most successful ranger endeavors of the Vietnam War. The LRRP patrollers and rangers were adjusted from close in installation defense around Long Binh, to short range swamp patrols monitoring assignments in the Pineapple plantation, and finally to independent long range ranger patrols on a sustained reconnaissance campaign in enemy dominated territory. This proper ground work enabled Company M to achieve superior results during its relentless tracking of two formidable regiments.

Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment

173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate)

The 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate) deployed to the Republic of Vietnam on 5 May 1965 on Temporary Duty (TDY) status, the first army “combat” maneuver element to arrive in Vietnam. On 5 August 1965 the TDY status was changed to Permanent Change of Station (PCS). It quickly became apparent to Brigadier General Ellis W. Williamson that a reconnaissance element was needed to supplement Troop E, 17th Cavalry, who were mounted troops and had the mission of providing road security and were ill-equipped or trained to perform dismounted reconnaissance missions.

General Williamson tasked the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 503rd Infantry to ask for “Volunteers” to form the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) detachment. The volunteers would not be permanently assigned to the LRRP detachment, as there was no Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). The LRRP (Provisional) was formed from volunteers from the Infantry Battalions and placed on Special Duty status. Team makeup consisted of one lieutenant (team leader), one staff sergeant (asst. team leader), and two enlisted personnel (scouts). Training was given to the LRRP’s by the 1st Royal Australian Regiment, who were familiar with jungle operations and were veterans of combat operations in Malaysia. The LRRP detachment could not be maintained at full strength (4 teams / 16 personnel) due to combat losses of the infantry battalions, who requested that their (SD) personnel be returned.

The first Long Range Patrol operation was in support of operation NEW LIFE in the La Nga River valley north of Vo Dat on 21 November 1965. The teams had to twice swim rivers to get into their Area of Operations (AO). Many of the operational techniques learned during actual combat patrols became Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the personnel who became replacements for the troops who returned to stateside assignments after their one year tour of duty. Lieutenants were no longer assigned as team members and the patrol leaders were the experienced Noncommissioned Officers of the LRRP detachment. The LRRP detachment became a permanent part of Troop E, 17th Cavalry in June 1966.

Many of the original members of the LRRP platoon were trained at the 101st Airborne Division RECONDO school at Ft. Campbell, KY. Additional training of the volunteers was On the Job Training (OJT) and at the RECONDO school at Nha Trang. Many of these volunteers never had the chance to attend any formal training as the 173rd Airborne Brigade was constantly on operations throughout the III Corps and II Corps areas of the Republic of Vietnam, however, infiltration and extraction techniques were refined and were SOP for the duration of the LRRP’s operations in Vietnam. One misnomer that was in the mission statement for LRRP’s was the word “Reconnaissance”. Many of the missions given to the LRRP’s were of a combat nature. The major unit commander had a highly trained and motivated force on the ground which had located an enemy force of various sizes and had the opportunity to inflict casualties upon an elusive enemy. The commander frequently utilized this option. Teams were typically briefed that when their mission of surveillance was completed, they would ambush or capture a prisoner on the last day of their mission. Occasionally, the LRRP’s would receive an ambush or snatch mission as their primary mission.

74th Infantry Detachment (AIRBORNE, Long Range Patrol), 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate)

The Department of the Army officially authorized the formation of the 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP) on 20 December 1967 and all personnel of the LRRP platoon were absorbed in to the 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP). The 173rd Airborne Brigade had moved to Dak To in the II Corps area of Vietnam. The 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP) was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for its actions during the Dak To battles in November 1967, however this was in error as the 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP) did not exist at the time. The award should have been presented to the 173rd Airborne Brigade (LRRP) (Provisional).

The 74th Infantry (LRP) continued to perform missions as directed by the 173rd commander throughout the II Corp region of Vietnam and eventually established a base camp at An Khe. Team leaders and potential team leaders were now able to attend the Recondo school conducted by the Special Forces at Nha Trang on a rotating basis, while continuing to be the :”Eyes and Ears of the Commander”. Staff Sergeant Laszlo Rabel, 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP) was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions on 12 November 1968. He was the only LRP member to be awarded the medal during the Vietnam War. Much credit needs to be given to the personnel of the LRRP platoon and the 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP) for establishing the doctrine that would become SOP for Company N (Ranger), 75th Infantry which absorbed the personnel of the 74th Infantry Detachment (LRP) on 1 February 1969.

N Company (RANGER), 75th Infantry (AIRBORNE), 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate)

Company N (Ranger), 75th Infantry established a base camp at Landing Zone (LZ) English, Bong Son, RVN from which to launch their deep penetration missions behind or within enemy controlled areas. The173rd Abn Brigade had assumed the mission of “pacification” of the Bong Son plains Company N (Ranger), 75th Infantry would become a Ranger screen while the Brigade was on pacification. The TO&E specified that the November Rangers would consist of 3 officers and 72 enlisted personnel. The assigned officers served as the Commander, Executive Officer and Operations Officer. Twelve operational teams of six men each composed entirely of enlisted personnel. The remaining enlisted personnel had the duties of platoon sergeant, Tactical Operations Center (TOC), supply and administration.

Missions for the Ranger company were typically 3 -5 days with a 2 day break in between for debriefing, rest and preparation for the next mission. The Rangers were operating in the mountainous terrain of the An Lao , An Do, Suoi Ca, Crows Foot valleys; the Highland Fishhook; and Nui Ba and Tiger Mountains of northern Binh Dinh province which bordered the I Corps area. This area of responsibility was to remain the domain of N company for the remainder of the war. The brigade Tet-69 campaign lasted from 9 February to 26 March 1969 and marked the first independent employment of a Ranger company in screening operations of the Vietnam war. During this period which was typical of Ranger operations, N Company conducted over 100 Long Range Patrols that resulted in 134 sightings of enemy personnel and 63 enemy killed by direct action, 5 prisoners and a much larger number of enemy killed by Ranger-sponsored indirect fire and reaction elements. The Rangers casualties for this period was 1 KIA, 20 WIA and none captured or missing.

In November 1969 the brigade permanently increased the size of the company to full company strength of 128 Rangers. Acceptance into the Rangers was based upon factors of a GT score of 100 or higher, no physical or mental impairments and voluntary request for the Ranger company. All prospective personnel were interviewed prior to acceptance and full acceptance was not granted until the volunteer had completed a period of individual training conducted by the company and had participated in a few patrols to prove his abilities. Training was a combat mission for volunteers and a high speed approach to training. Company N, (Ranger), 75th Infantry received numerous experimental systems to maximize performance. Nine (9) millimeter pistols with silencers were sent to the company from civilian firms in the United States, they were used to take out the NVA/VC sentries that guarded base camps and weigh stations. An experimental system for firing electronically detonated claymores that were daisy chained (Widow Makers) became a staple of Ranger ambushes.

November company personnel were called upon to conduct special contingency missions such as the BRIGHT LIGHT mission of prisoner rescue and the destruction of the VC infrastructure throughout Binh Dinh province. During April 1971 the Brigade Commander finally put the unofficial black beret on a Ranger’s head during a ceremony that honored the men of the Ranger company for an earlier action. The beret had been denied the Rangers primarily because of senior officer opposition to further distinctions between unit paratroopers. On 25 August 1971, Company N (Ranger), 75th Infantry was solemnly deactivated. The Rangers of Company N (Ranger), 75th Infantry performed with exceptional courage and valor throughout their existence and service in Vietnam, two years and 6 months. Today, the modern Rangers of the 75th Ranger Regiment continue the traditions of being the premier fighting element of the active army. The traditions and dedication to their fellow RANGERS continues!!

O/75 RGR & 78th LRP & 82ID LRS HISTORY

78th Infantry Detachment (AIRBORNE, LRP),
82nd Airborne Division

Upon deployment to Southeast Asia, the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division (Separate) included no standard ground patrolling components, Col. Bolling authorized his three Battalion Commanders to form ad-hoc reconnaissance/security elements as they were required. The 1/508th Infantry Bu. formed a sixty man “‘Delta Company”, the 2/505th Infantry Bn. formed a forty man “Strike Force” and the 1/505th Infantry Bn. formed two “Combined Platoons” of its own. These units were the catalyst for the 78th Infantry Detachment (LRP) (ABN).

When the 82d Airborne Division’s 3d Brigade (Separate) was conducting patrols as the 78th Infantry Detachment (LRP) (ABN), after it was deployed from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, under the command of Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Alexander R. Bolling Jr., Company F (LR.P), 51th Infantry (Airborne) was still conducting missions under assigned area of operations. Company 0 (RANGER), 75th Infantry (Airborne) ranks were being filled with dedicated airborne qualified personnel from Company F (LRP), 51th Infantry (Airborne), who were experienced and had supremacy in Long Range Patrol tactics. Stability for Company F (LRP), 51th Infantry (Airborne) came from its original members who volunteered and had service with the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) and its replacement personnel who attended the MACV Recondo School at Nha Trang, RVN, and personnel who learned their ‘TRADE” without benefit of formal recon school training; this same stability was passed on into Company 0 (RANGER), 75th Infantry (Airborne).

O Company (RANGER), 75th Infantry (AIRBORNE), 82nd Airborne Division

Rather than create an entirely new unit designation for such an elite force, the Department of the Army looked to its rich and varied heritage and on I February 1969 designated the 75th Infantry Regiment, the present successor to the famous 5307th Composite Unit (Merrill’s Marauders), as the parent organization for an Department of the Army designated Long Range Patrol (LRP) units and the parenthetical designation (RANGER) in lieu of (LRP) for these units. As a result, the 78th Infantry Detachment (LRP), assigned to the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division (Separate), became Company 0 (RANGER), 75th Infantry (Airborne). Throughout history the need for a small, highly trained far ranging unit to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition and special type combat missions has been readily apparent. In Vietnam this need was met by instituting a Long Range Patrol program to provide each major combat unit with this special capability. – This history deals with the activities, personnel and accomplishments of Company 0 (RANGER), 75th Infantry (Airborne) during the periods, I February 1969 to 20 November 1969 (Vietnam) and 4 August 1970 to 29 September 1972 and makes reference to the units who proceeded the designation of Company 0 (RANGER), 75th Infantry (Airborne).

Less than a year after the original Company 0 was deactivated in Southeast Asia, Company 0 was activated at Ft. Richardson, Alaska an 4 August 1970 as Arctic Rangers under Gen. James F. Hollingsworth’s direction. On 12 November 1969, Ranger teams were extracted for the last time. Company 0 (RANGER)’s tactical operations, which had collected valuable intelligence an enemy activities and had accounted for twenty (20) VC KIA or captured, Company 0 (RANGER) was deactivated on 20 November, 1969 in the Republic of Vietnam, while under the command of CPT. Patrick Downing. Operating in the Nhi Binh area, from late February to the middle of May, the Rangers conducted numerous operations gathering valuable intelligence data an enemy activity in the area as wen as accounting for five (5) VC KIA. During April 1969, Company 0 (RANGER) suffered its first casualties, four (4), which were overcome by large superior forces. The latter part of May found the Rangers in the Hobo Woods area, although operating for only a short time in this area, Company 0 (RANGER) conducted some of its most successful operations which accounted for four (4) VC KIA. Continued success followed while operating in the Pineapple Plantation area from June to August, disrupting enemy activity throughout the area. No longer were the VC able to move freely, as his mysterious antagonist (whom he seldom, if ever, saw) seemed to be everywhere. Operation Yorktown Victor commenced with operations in the “Iron Triangle” in September, which proved that Company 0 (RANGER) could out guerrilla the VC guerrilla. In the southern Phu Hoa district, the Rangers were frequently employed as stay-behind forces. On one occasion, less than an hour after the line company was extracted from the area, the Rangers captured two (2) VC who provided valuable intelligence concerning VC operations in the area. – September also accounted for Company 0 (RANGER)’s fifth and final friendly KIA.

Late in October 1968, found the 3d Brigade in the Gia Dinh Province, a hot bed of rebel discontent and sympathetic to the Viet Cong. Forcing higher command interest in allocating proper reconnaissance assets. On the 15th of December 1968, the 78th Infantry Detachment (LRP) (ABN) Was activated under the command of Lt. William E. Jones and stationed at Camp Red Ban, northeast of Saigon. At this time, Company F (LR.P), 51st Infantry (Aijrborne) was still conducting patrol missions at a reduced rate and preparing and training Company D (LRP), 151st (Airborne) personnel, who were ‘taken with” Company F (LRP), 51st Infantry (Airborne) personnel on their first missions, prior to being entrusted to conduct missions on their own. The 78th Infantry Detachment (LRP) CABN) was relocated to Phu Loi, under the command of CPT. Donald A. Peter on I February 1969. Their mission given was to provide the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division (Separate) with long range reconnaissance and surveillance and if necessary engage and destroy the enemy. Every team leader and nearly every assistant team leader in the 78th infantry Detachment (LRP) (ABN) were either Recondo or Ranger qualified. On the 23d of February 1969, Company 0 (RANGER), 75th Infantry (Airborne) became operational and ready for the test.

O Company (ARTIC RANGER), 75th Infantry (AIRBORNE), U.S. Army, Alaska

On 25 March 1972, the Arctic Rangers proved their proficiency on the Polar Lee Cap again and in July by traversing Harding Lee Field, one of the largest ice fields in the world. On King Salmon, in August, saw the Arctic Rangers being menaced by a pesky brown bear by raiding their mess tent and avoiding the Ranger’s attempts of capture by negotiating all their trip wires, sights and demonstrated such tactical prowess in avoiding detection that it was designated an “‘Honorary Ranger Bear.” On 4 March 1971, 135 Arctic Rangers parachuted onto the seven foot thick ice sheet north-northeast of Point Barrow, Alaska. Their activities were of a covert nature which comprised of sixteen daily flights between Alaska and Europe. Press releases at that time were “to serve in search, rescue, first aid and recovery actions ‘at the top of the world’ in the event of much needed emergencies along trans-polar airline routes.”

After conducting an abbreviated Ranger course at Ft. Richardson, Company 0 (Arctic Ranger) was dispatched to St. Lawrence Island for anti-Soviet “combat” surveillance, only forty-seven (47) miles from Soviet territory. Supported by the 1st Scout Battalion, the 297th Infantry and the 38th Special Forces Group, but plagued by high winds, dense fogs and maintenance problems (which prevented systematic patrolling), the maneuver still stands as one of the few “combatant incidents” that occurred, outside and during the Vietnam War period.

During January 1971, Company 0 (Arctic Ranger) conducted the first basic airborne course in the history of the U.S. Army, Alaska and qualified fifty seven (57) paratroopers. On 18 February 1971 the Arctic Rangers demonstrated this parachute capability by executing a winter jump over frozen Lake Clunle at Ft. Richardson. This was a training prelude to the daring March Ranger para-drop over frozen Beaufort Sea, the first Military parachute operation on the polar ice cap. The mission: to provide long range reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition, patrol capability to USARAL” and under the command of Maj. George A. Ferguson Jr.; equipped with long range communications and over the snow terrain apparatuses (snow machines, cross country sleds, and snowshoes) the Arctic Rangers were known as the “eyes and ears of the north.” The Arctic Rangers watched for and provided early warning of enemy infiltration by patrolling vast stretches of the otherwise unprotected Alaskan coast, as well as the St. Lawrence and Little Diomede Islands. During the late 1960’s, Soviet military activity became more aggressive and observation missions increased. Aircraft over-flights and detections of surfaced submarines were reported frequently. These reports were underscored by sightings of suspicions persons (some wearing wet suits) and the recovery of rubber rafts and chemical masks on secluded beaches.

Participating with- Canadian forces in ACID TEST 111, December 1970, the Rangers deployed satisfactorily and succeeded in infiltrating the main “aggressor” camp; at the end of the test, Company 0 (Arctic Ranger) was declared operational for commitment anywhere within Alaska.

After his departure to Vietnam in January 1972, Gen. Hollingsworth was to assume command of the very region where the original Company 0 operated. Having lost their champion, Company 0 (Arctic Ranger) was slated for elimination in his absence, thus Company 0 (Arctic Ranger) was deactivated on 29 September 1972. The Arctic Rangers existed for just over two years, but during this interval they forged an indelible mark an the diverse record of U.S. Army Ranger history.

P/75 RGR & 79th LRP HISTORY, 79th Infantry Detachment

(Airborne, LRP), 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division

The 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division (MECH) arrived in northern South Vietnam in the I Corps area in July 1968 as part of the final Army deployment into the combat theater. The 5th Infantry Division, supported by Armored Personnel Carriers, tanks, and other assorted motorized equipment was based at Camp Red Devil in the Quang Tri Province i the northernmost area of I Corps. They were assigned a large sector of responsibility along the Demilitarized Zone, from the Gulf of Tonkin on the east, to the Laotian border on the west The “RED DEVIL BRIGADE” conducted cordon and search missions sound villages, performed search and clear expeditions on the Khe Sahn Plains, and secured roadways throughout its assigned area of operation. Other tasks included, but were not limited to, guarding the rice harvests and denying the enemy access to the agriculture rich coastline.

Extended foot reconnaissance was needed for many of these tasks, and the 79th Infantry Detachment (LRP) was activated on 15 December 1968. The detachment never reached operational status. Still in training, the detachment was supplemented by personnel transferred up north from F Co. (LRP) 51st Infantry of the II Field Force. The ‘HURRICANE PATROLLERS’ had been replaced by Co. D (RANGER), 151st Infantry, an Indiana National Guard unit activated during the Vietnam conflict and its assets were used to form Companies 0 and P of the 75th Infantry.

P Company (Airborne), 75th Infantry (RANGER), 1st Brigade, 5th Inf Division

On 1 February 1969, Co. P (RANGER) 75th Infantry was activated to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition for the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH). The personnel used to man PAPA Company were all volunteers and usually Airborne qualified, with a few exceptions. Team Leaders were usually graduates of & U. S. Army Ranger School at Fort Benning, Georgia or combat experienced non-commissioned officers. This was not always the case, as the most experienced and qualified men in the company were not always the ones with the highest rank. Team members had a wide variety of Military Occupational Specialties (MOS’s) and training was usually done on the job. Recondo training was at the 5th Special Forces RECONDO SCHOOL in Nha Trang and was available to selected personnel as training allocations became available. PAPA Company was also equipped with trained Snipers, but because of terrain and mission objectives, they were seldom used operationally. The process of getting the company combat ready was declared complete in March of 1969.

PAPA Company fielded on average, six combat ready 6 man Ranger ‘HUNTER-KILLER’ teams that consisted of a team leader (TL) an assistant team leader (ATL), a radio operator (RTO) and 3 scout observers. Each team member performed a variety of tasks as assigned by the team leader. Generally speaking, 2 Ranger teams would be out in the field, 2 teams would be on ‘READY ALERT’ to back up teams out on patrol or to become a “REACTIONARY FORCE” as needed, and 2 teams would be in a stand down mode to resupply and prepare for their next assigned mission.

Missions assigned by the lst Bde., 5th Inf. Div. (MECH) generally consisted of an assigned 4 to 6 square kilometer area known as a ‘BOX: The mission duration was normally 5 days and 4 nights unless the team was compromised or if contact was made with the enemy. In the northern I Corps area, to include the entire Demilitarized Zone, the enemy encountered was usually the hard-core NVA regulars, who were better equipped, better trained soldiers than their Viet Cong counterparts. A typical Ranger mission, if there is such a thing, would have the team recon and observe an area for enemy presence or movement for the first 4 days and attempt to ambush on the last night and day of the mission, prior to extraction. This was not always the case as some teams were authorized to ambush earlier in their mission, depending on circumstances.

PAPA Company Ranger teams were usually inserted and extracted by helicopter, but also used the assets of the 5th Infantry Division (MECH) which resulted in ‘stay-behind’ missions and direct insertions by tanks and armored personnel carriers.

Support for the PAPA Company teams was provided by ‘REDLEG’ artillery units at firebases A4 (known as Alpha 4) and C2 (known as Charlie 2) which were located just south of die Demilitarized Zone, a buffer zone that separated North and South Vietnam. Air support was provided by among others, the 158th Assault Helicopter Battalion of the 101st Infantry Division (AMBL) in Camp Evans, near Phu Bai, and the 17th Air Cavalry, stationed at Camp Red Devil in Quang Tri. Also at the disposal of the Rangers were naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin for fire missions, land and ship based attack and fighter aircraft, and bombers based in Thailand. Forward Air Controllers (FAC) and their aircraft were also available for spotting, radio relay, and for directing air strikes as needed. Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) missions were common for the Rangers in PAPA Company.

By late 1970, & PAPA Company Rangers found their missions to be centered more in the Khe Sahn Plain. Much of the intelligence gathered during this period, through the early part of 1971, was instrumental in the success achieved by friendly forces during LAM SON 719 in April of 1971. The PAPA Company Rangers continued patrolling the DMZ, Khe Sahn area, the Citadel, Rockpile, and the Tri-Border Area until they began stand down procedures on 23 July 1971. All personnel were transferred out of the unit by 5 August 1971.

Co. P (RANGER) 75th Infantry was officially de-activated on 31 August 1971.

Advisors to ARVN Rangers

(Biêt Dông Quân)

During 1951, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) suggested to General De Lattre (Jean de Lattre de Tassigny – Commander in chief Indochina) that the French should form “counter-guerilla” warfare groups to operate in Vietminh – controlled areas. The French command rejected the concept of unconventional warfare units, although they did establish a Commando School at Nha Trang. By 1956, the US Advisory Group would turn this facility into a physical training and ranger-type school.

As the seriousness of the insurgency became more apparent during the early weeks of 1960, American and South Vietnamese leaders began to consider what measures might be adopted to deal with the deteriorating security situation. President of the Republic of Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem had his own solution. On 16 February 1960, without consulting his American military advisors, he ordered commanders of divisions and military regions to form ranger companies from the army, the reserves, retired army personnel and the Civil Guard.

In the Beginning

Activated in 1960, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Rangers (Biêt Dông Quân [BDQ]) initially organized into separate companies to counter the guerilla war then being waged by the Viet Cong (VC). From the beginning, American Rangers were assigned as advisors, initially as members of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), deployed from the U.S., at training centers, and later at the unit level. A small number of promising Vietnamese Ranger leaders were selected to attend the U.S. Army Ranger school at Fort Benning. As a result of their common experiences, lasting bonds of mutual respect were formed between the combat veterans of both nations. During the early days, Ranger missions focused on raids and ambushes into such VC zones as War Zone D, Duong Minh Chau, Do Xa and Boi Loi (later to be called the “Hobo Woods” by the American forces) to destroy the VC infrastructure. The well-known shoulder insignia, bearing a star and a Black Panther’s head, symbolized the courageous fighting spirit of the Vietnamese Rangers.

Training

Ranger courses were established at three training sites in May 1960: Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Song Mao. The original Nha Trang Training course relocated to Duc My in 1961 and would become the central Ranger-Biêt Dông Quân-Company and Battalion sized unit training was later established at Trung Lap; to ensure a consistently high level of combat readiness, BDQ units regularly rotated through both RTC’s. Graduates of the school earned the coveted Ranger badge with its distinctive crossed swords. Ranger Training Centers conducted tough, realistic training that enabled graduates to accomplish the challenging missions assigned to Ranger units. Known as the ‘steel refinery ‘ of the ARVN, the centers conducted training in both jungle and mountain warfare.

South Vietnamese combat reconnaissance was a responsibility of the Ranger Training Command and ARVN reconnaissance units and teams were trained at either the Duc My RTC Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) course or at the Australian-sponsored Long Range Patrol (LRP) course of the Van Kiep National Training Center; graduates were awarded the Reconnaissance Qualification badge (a pair of winged hands holding silver binoculars).

Operations

In 1962, BDQ companies were grouped to form Special Battalions: the 10th in Da Nang, the 20th in Pleiku, and the 30th Battalion in Saigon. These Special Battalions operated deep inside the enemy controlled regions on “Search and Destroy” missions. By 1963 the war expanded as main force North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units began invading the South, launching battalion and regimental-size attacks against ARVN units. To cope with the escalation by the Communists, Ranger units were organized into battalions and their mission evolved from counter-insurgency to light infantry operations. During the years 1964-66, the Ranger battalions intercepted, engaged and defeated main force enemy units. During July 1966, the battalions were formed into task forces, and five Ranger Group headquarters were created to provide command and control for tactical operations. This afforded the Rangers better control and the ability to mass forces quickly and strike more rapidly. ARVN combat divisions as well as Regional and Popular Force (RF/PF) units had a territorial security orientation that tied them to a limited geographic area. Ranger units assumed the responsibility of providing the primary ARVN mobile reaction force in each Tactical Zone a far larger geographical operating area.

When the VC and NVA forces opened the 1968 Tet Offensive in the major cities of Vietnam, the maroon beret soldiers were rushed to the scene and were an active force in defeating the Communists threat. The 3d and 5th Ranger Groups defended and secured the capitol, Saigon and the 37th Battalion fought alongside the U.S. Marines at Khe Sanh. Rangers continued to distinguish themselves on battlefields throughout Vietnam as well as the 1970 incursion into Cambodia and Operation “Lam Son 719” in Laos. As American ground forces reduced their tactical role and began to withdraw from Vietnam, an additional mission was assumed by the BDQ. On 22 May 1970, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), formerly under the operational control of 5th U.S. Special Forces Group, integrated into Ranger forces, along with responsibility for border defense. With the conversion of CIDG camps to combat battalions, Ranger forces more than doubled in size.

When the NVA launched major attacks on three fronts on Easter Sunday of 1972 in an all-out effort to gain a decisive military victory Ranger units once again answered the call to defend the fatherland. Near the DMZ in Quang Tri Province, Rangers, together with ARVN, Marine and Regional Forces units, stopped the enemy after a 22-day fight in which 131 NVA tanks were destroyed and approximately 7,000 NVA soldiers were killed. At An Loc, Ranger, ARVN and Regional Force units stopped four NVA Divisions, reinforced with armor and artillery in what was probably one of the bloodiest battles of the Vietnam War. In Kontum Province, the Rangers participated in the battle of Tay Nguyen, in which still another multi-division NVA attack was smashed.

At the time of the “cease-fire,” 28 January 1973, Ranger High Command estimated that the Rangers had killed 40,000 of the enemy, captured 7,000 and assisted 255 to rally to the government side. It was also reported that 1,467 crew-served weapons and 10,941 individual weapons had been captured. Of course, there was no true cease-fire, and the war continued. In 1973, the role of the Ranger Advisor was curtailed. As individual advisors rotated back to the United States, they were not replaced. Finally, by the end of 1973 the last Ranger Advisor was quietly ordered home.

During 1973, 1974 and 1975, the Rangers continued to be employed in a variety of critical combat roles, performing intelligence and reconnaissance missions and providing the ARVN with a quick reaction force. In addition, their mission of border security continued. In the last days of the war, the BDQ fought to the end, units totally destroyed in battles from the North to Saigon, many of the Ranger units fought back independently against orders – refusing to surrender – bloodying the advancing Communist forces. In Tay Ninh province, the Rangers fought until Saigon fell. In Saigon, Rangers fought until the morning of 30 April, when they were ordered to lay down their arms.

When the war finally ended with the fall of Saigon in 1975, most of the Ranger leaders were considered too dangerous by the communist government, and sentenced to long periods of incarceration in the dreaded “reeducation camps.” As an example, General Do ke Giai, the last commander of Ranger forces, spent more than 17 years imprisonment for his fervent anti-Communist resistance.

The Role of the Advisor

The experiences of the American advisors (and a few Australians) to the BDQ were unique from other advisors and definitely different from their U.S. unit counterparts. Their mission and the force structure of the units they advised demanded more experienced and thoroughly trained individuals. Officers were almost all Ranger qualified, and after 1966 most were on a second or subsequent combat tour. The Non-Commissioned Officers were arguably the most talented Sergeants that the Army had to offer. Many of these Sergeants were experienced cadre from the Ranger Department at the Infantry School, or experienced small unit leaders with Infantry, Special Forces or Marine backgrounds; some had fought in World War II and / or Korea. It was fairly common for the more senior NCOs to serve as Ranger advisors between tours at one of the Ranger Training Camps.

According to the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam Joint manpower authorization documents, advisory teams were fairly robust. Each was authorized eight personnel to perform the support mission. The authorized grades for the Ranger battalion and group Senior Advisor were Major and Lieutenant Colonel respectively. This was usually not the case however, as a battalion advisor team routinely consisted of an experienced Captain, a Lieutenant, two NCOs and a RadioTelephone Operator (RTO). It was not uncommon to field teams of two or three personnel. The Ranger Group Headquarters advisor team was comprised of a Major, one or two Captains, two or three NCO’s, and an RTO.

Living and military operations experience for the Ranger advisor varied dramatically from area to area, unit to unit, and year to year. Operations were normally conducted by Ranger battalions, but were often smaller in some locales. Frequently, multi-battalion operations were conducted under the command and control of the Ranger Group headquarters. In addition to being selected for tactical and technical proficiency, many Ranger advisors were graduates of the Military Assistance and Training Advisory Course (MATA) and Vietnamese Language School. However, the tactical requirements always exceeded the number of school slots, and most advisors depended upon lessons learned the hard way, and the good luck to have a Vietnamese counterpart who understood English. Each team was authorized a local interpreter / translator, however these proved to be of varied skills and reliability.

The primary mission of an advisor was to counsel his Vietnamese counterpart on development and implementation of operational plans as well as the tactical execution of military operations. The advisor coordinated any available combat support from U.S. forces such as artillery, armored vehicles, air strikes, helicopter gunships, naval gunfire, and medical evacuation. Additionally, the advisor was expected to escort and directly communicate with a variety of specialist teams that might accompany the unit on operations, such as artillery forward observers, Air Force forward air controllers (FAC), naval gunfire teams, canine handlers, or combat correspondents.

While differences were evident from team to team, the Ranger advisors led a unique life under an unusual set of circumstances. The highly mobile advisory team was with the Vietnamese unit at all times when it was in the field on military operations, which could last for days or weeks. Living conditions were Spartan and arduous. Frequent and intense combat was the rule for Ranger units. The team survived on limited supplies and rations (resupply in the field was sporadic at best), often with a limited knowledge of the operational plan and enemy intelligence situation. The team’s communications lifeline and link was often a single PRC-25 tactical radio. Despite, or because of these circumstances and conditions, the Ranger advisors became very adept at accomplishing their responsibilities and fulfilling their missions.

Awards and Honors

Vietnamese Ranger units and individual soldiers received a wide range of awards for valor and heroism from both the Republic of Vietnam and the United States. The 42nd and 44th Battalions were awarded their country’s National Order Fourragere, the 43rd Battalion the Military Order Fourragere, and the 21st, 37th, 41st and 52nd Battalions the Gallantry Cross Fourragere. Twenty-three Ranger units were awarded the Vietnamese Gallantry Cross with Palm unit award, with the 42nd Battalion receiving the award seven times, the 44th Battalion six times, and the 1st Group and 43rd Battalion each four times.

Eleven U.S. Presidential Unit Citations (PUC) were awarded to Vietnamese Ranger units. The 37th Battalion three times, the 39th and 42d twice, and the 1st Ranger Task Force, 21st, 44th and 52nd Battalions each received the PUC once. The U.S. Valorous Unit Award was awarded to the 21st, 32d, 41st, 43d, 77th and 91st Ranger Battalions. Large numbers of individual Vietnamese Rangers were presented U.S. awards such as the Silver Star, Bronze Star, and Army Commendation Medals for acts of valor in the face of enemy forces.

A number of American Ranger Advisors were decorated for gallantry under fire, the best known is SFC Gary Lattrell, an advisor to the 23d Ranger Battalion, who was awarded the Medal of Honor for valor on 4 – 8 April 1970. Additionally, Colonel Lewis L. Millett, a Medal of Honor recipient during the Korean War, was a member of the first Vietnamese Ranger MTT. Staff Sergeant David Dolby who was previously awarded the Medal of Honor while serving with the First Cavalry Division in 1965, was an advisor to the 44th Ranger Battalion in 1970. LTC Andre Lucas, who served as Senior Advisor, 33d Ranger Battalion in 1963, later received the Medal of Honor posthumously while commanding an infantry battalion in the 101st Airborne Division in 1970. First Sergeant David H. McNerney, who was an advisor with the 20th Special Battalion in 1962, was later awarded the Medal of Honor while serving with Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division for actions on 22 March 1967. More than two dozen Ranger Advisors received the Army Distinguished Service Cross or the Navy Cross, the second highest valor award. Finally, nearly 50 American Advisors were killed while fighting alongside their Vietnamese Ranger counterparts. Theirs was the ultimate sacrifice in the performance of their duty.

Memorial

On 11 November 1995, more than 20 years after the fall of Saigon, American Ranger Advisors and their Vietnamese Ranger counterparts gathered at Arlington National Cemetery to unveil a living memorial and bronze plaque to honor their comrades. The plaque reads, “Dedicated to the honor of the Vietnamese Rangers and their American Ranger Advisors whose dedication, valor and fidelity in the defense of freedom must never be forgotten.”

F/51 LRP & F/51 LRS HISTORY

F Company (AIRBORNE), 51st Infantry (Long Range Patrol), 2nd Field Force

First, I want to thank those who put together the original text and pictorial history of F/51 (LRP). In particular, the men who helped with pictures and reference material, SGT. J.D. Barrow for getting this undertaking published, Captain Thomas P. Meyer-proof editor, Specialist Mark G. Eastman and Dave Peace-art work, Specialist William D. Ellis- cover and emblems. I would also like to thank John W. “Pappy” Burke JR for a copy of the above pictorial history that one of our reunions. Gary D. Ford for the total list of missions on the Companies Activities Board, from his book “4/4 A LRP’S NARRATIVE”, and Shelby L. Stanton, for the information about D/151 replacement of F/51 from his book “RANGERS AT WAR, LRRPs IN VIETNAM”. To Naamon Grimmett’s web site that is linked to by going to military.com unit pages and going to F Co INF ABN LRSC for the inception of F/51st and their lineage to Vietnam. Finally, to David Peace and Mark Eastman for their help in suggestions and corrections and keeping me straight.

F/51 INF INCEPTION

F/51 was first organized during WWI on June 6,1917. Since then, it has gone through a number of redesignations and activation. Lineage is as follows: WWI assigned to 6th Division, 1946 converted and redesigned as Troop C 10th Constabulary as part of 14th Constabulary Regiment. Dec,1948 converted and designated as C/10 Armored INF Battalion a part of 4th Armored Division, Feb 1953 became C/510 Armored INF Battalion and still part of 4th Armored Division. July 1959 designated as Headquarters Company, 6th Battle Group, 51ST INF. Aug., 1967 designated as Co, F (Long Range Patrol) 51st INF (AIRBORNE).

As the above lineage shows, we have a long history, rich in tradition. F Company was reactivated and organized for Vietnam and was designated as a LRP unit on 9/27/67. The company was formed at Bien Hoa, where we were stationed, somewhat permanently. F/51 LRP became fully operational on 11/28/67.

F/51st INF ABN LRP VIETNAM

F/51 LRP’s first commander was Major William C. Maus, who started the company in September of 1967. Our second commander was Major Joseph J. Zummo who assumed command in February of 1968. Major George M. Heckman replaced Major Zummo in November of 1968 and remained until the Company was disbanded in January 1969.

The company differed from other infantry companies in that it had 4 independently operating line platoons with each having seven six-man patrols. In addition, F company had it’s own TOC and motor pool. The Company was placed under the control of G3, II FIELD FORCE and were OPCON to specific Brigades and Divisions operating in III Corps Tactical Zone. The only other company to have the distinction of a FIELD FORCE company is E/20 LRP AIRBORNE who were assigned to I FIELD FORCE and operated in and around the Central Highlands. As I am finding out, being assigned, as we were, makes it difficult to find records of actions where F/51 and E/20 were involved in. I commend those who have found the information for their books on LRP and RANGER books.

F/51st INF LRP Airborne was reactivated in 1967 due to the relocation of Special Forces to cross boarder operations and the relocation of 173rd to the upper part of South Vietnam. This left General Weyland’s II Field Force without any long range patrols for intelligence gathering that the infantry units needed. Westmoreland, realizing that the line Companies needed intelligence, authorized the formation of E/20 and F/51 LRP Airborne. F/51st LRP was for the most part filled by taking volunteers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade LRRP, with the remainder coming from the 1st Infantry Division, the 25th Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne, the 1st Cavalry Division, and various units from the States, Canada and the 90th Replacement Battalion. The main prerequisite for service in F/51st was that every volunteer was to be Airborne qualified.

On 11/22/67 F/51 LRP sent its first team out and compiled an impressive combat record until it’s deactivation in 2/1/69.

Operations that F/51 LRP were involved in include the following operations: Virgin- 11/28/67 to12/2/67, Kick-Off I- 12/3/67 to 12/5/67, Kick-Off II- 12/13/67 to 12/27/67, Uniontown III-Boxspring- 2/10/68 to 3/28/68, Wilderness-Toan Thang I- 4/2/68 to 5/23/68, Toan Thang II- 5/23/68 to 6/22/68.

Operational areas included but not limited to Bien Hoa- Long Binh Uyen area, The Mountain of the Black Virgin (Nui Ba Dinh), Phouc Vinh, Cu Chi area, Catchers Mitt, and the Pineapple Plantation area.

CONTROL AND SUPPORT

When we became operational we were under the operational control of II FIELD FORCE who assigned us to units that needed us for their eyes and ears in areas that they were interested in. Since we were under FIELD FORCE command along with LRPing for IIFF, they would assign us to other units, such as 199th LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE, and 3rd BRIGADE 101st AIRBORNE (when they first arrived in-country).

Our support came in the form of a ground reactionary force and support for helicopter insertion and air fire support. The ground support was provided by D Troop, 3/17 CAV. Our insertion and extraction helicopters and Cobra gunships were provided by a variety of units. One unit was 195th AHC who went by the call signs “Ghost Riders” and “Thunder Chickens” that supplied insertion and extraction helicopters and the gunships respectively. The other units were 117th AHC “Annie Fannie” for insertion and extraction and the 334th AHC “Playboys” for the Cobra gunships.

DEACTIVATION

Before the company’s deactivation we were told that an Indiana National Guard unit – D/151 (LRP) – was taking our place as we were slated to be part of the nucleus for the formation of the 75th Rangers. Part of the Company was slated for O and P Companies of the 75th Rangers, while the remainder went with D/151.

When D/151 arrived in country and got settled, training and familiarization with their area of operation began under the guidance of seasoned F/51 veterans. It included insertions to give them actual experience with patrolling methods used in our area of Vietnam.

POST VIETNAM

F/51st INF ABN was reborn again in 1986 in Germany as F/51st INF ABN LRSC (Long Range Surveillance Company) and was attached to VII Corps, and was used in Desert Storm in 1990. They were again deactivated along with VII Corps in Germany in 1991. In 1993 F/51st was reactivated again as a LRSU under the 519th MI Battalion, 525th IM Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corp.

VIETNAM ACTIVITY BOARD

Taken from Gary Ford’s book that is mentioned above. The Activity Board of F/51 LRP from 11/22/67 to 1/23/69 stands for itself as to the job we did.

• Days operational: 438
• Number of light team infiltrations: 638
• Number of heavy team infiltrations: 133
• Times enemy sighted: 808
• Contacts made with enemy: 403
• Enemy killed, body count: 293
• Probable killed, visual: 189
• Enemy wounded by visual report not counted as probable: 54
• Captured enemy weapons 45
• Enemy POW’s taken: 45
• Artillery fire missions to support F/51 LRP: 292

F/51 LRP’s KIA/died as result of combat action 12

• Wounded in action: 139
• Missing in action: 0
• Other friendly KIA in action: 4
• Other friendly wounded in action: 7

D/151 RGR / LRP / LRS HISTORY

D Company (AIRBORNE), 151st Infantry (LRP), 2nd Field Force

D Company (RANGER), 151st Infantry (AIRBORNE), 2nd Field Force

On 20 November 1969, Co D (Ranger), 151st Infantry (Airborne) ‘Stood Down’. Mission accomplished, job well done!

The operations were turned over to Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry, just as smoothly as they had been turned over from Company F, 51st Infantry (LRP) on 26 December 1968. What is so significant about this change of designation is that Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry (Airborne) was a National Guard unit from Indiana. Before we discuss the ‘Stand Down’ perhaps a little history of how this unit arrived in Vietnam in the first place would be more appropriate. In November of 1965 the Indiana National Guard organized its’ first and only Airborne Infantry battalion in response to the high mobilization priority Selected Reserve Force. With the build up of the Vietnam war, the entire 38th Infantry Division fully expected to be called to active duty and the inclusion of an Airborne Battalion would be highly valued.

In December 1967 the Department of Defense changed its direction and restructured the National Guard through the United States, thus changing the status of the 38th Infantry Division. The Indiana Adjutant General was able to retain most of the Airborne qualified personnel and formed two long range patrol companies. Thus, was born Companies D & E (Long Range Patrol), 151st Infantry, later to be combined into a single company, designated Company D. Ironically most training on weekend drills was divided between long range patrolling techniques and riot control training.

War in Vietnam continued to escalate and so did the resistance at home. Several states were utilizing the Guard to control demonstrations, especially on college campuses. A new twist came when it was announced that summer camp training for 1968 would be held in March at the Army’s Jungle Warfare Training Center in the Panama Canal Zone. You can imagine what rumors started flying when the cadre at the Jungle School started telling the members that they were headed for Vietnam. No one could believe it when just three weeks after returning from Panama the unit was called to active duty.

On Monday May 13, 1968 the unit departed from Indianapolis, Indiana for Ft. Benning, Georgia. Of all the 20,000 reservists activated, D Company was the only infantry unit of the National Guard in the United States. A total of 195 enlisted men, 1 warrant officer, and 8 officers convoyed in World War II vintage trucks to Georgia on the same day that the peace talks started in Paris, France.

All members were already jump qualified and 98% were jungle qualified. Co D would undergo 6 months of additional training with the 197th Infantry on Kelly Hill. Several members were sent TDY for special schools, including Radio school and Ranger school. The entire unit spent one week each at the three Ranger school courses in Georgia and Florida. Several jumps were made at Benning in the 6 months while in training.

Rumors were rampant among the men up until departure day, that the unit would never go to Vietnam. On December 20, 1968, 6 men departed as an advance team to set up the base camp which was to be located next to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade, in an old missile base. On December 28, 1968 the entire unit left for Bien Hoa. By this time about 20% enlisted and drafted men joined the unit taking the place of those National Guard personnel that had been transferred or ETS’d.

Only after arriving in Vietnam did the unit find out that they would be replacing another Long Range Patrol company that was being dismantled. We were told that due to severe losses the unit could no longer function. Obviously, some higher ups had to justify us being there. Later, when members of Company F, 51st began transferring in to D Co, we learned the real truth. Co F was doing a great job and all were extremely upset that we had taken their place. Things calmed down a great deal when Co F’s commander Major Heckman took over as commanding officer of Company D. Years later we would learn that someone in the Indiana National Guard made a deal with the Department of the Army in Washington that the unit would stay together and not be dismantled. Other reservist that were activated were sent to Vietnam on an individual replacement basis (sans an artillery unit from Bardstown, Kentucky).

The 199th Light Infantry Brigade conducted a one week orientation course with the unit. Physical training became intense and difficult. The unit had just left Indiana winter and a 30 day leave of absence, and Vietnam’s summer heat was a difficult adjustment. The unit was attached to the II Field Force to become their eyes and ears in the free fire zones north of the Bien Hoa Air Force base and Long Binh.

Work was around the clock getting the base camp set up and all the supplies and equipment in place. By mid January 1969 members were going on patrol with members of F Co for long range patrol orientation. By February, the unit had passed its’ test and was deemed operational. At the same time the unit’s status and name was changed from Long Range Patrol to Ranger. Patrolling was on a regular schedule by then with all 12 to 18 teams in the field at all times. 30 members attended the MACV Recondo school run by the 5th Special Forces at Nha Trang, all graduating with the Arrowhead patch and diploma.

In March the Company received Chieu Hoi scouts which were assigned to the teams. The new team members were received with caution, but after a few patrols and contacts, the Chieu Hois were very much accepted and welcomed with few exceptions.

After a briefing by II Field Force Intel Officer, in which the company was told that the only true information was bodies, equipment, and documents. They didn’t seem to trust our reporting from a reconnaissance report. The missions now became more as hunter-killer teams than the true reconnaissance teams.

The members were all highly motivated and well educated. All were older than the typical Vietnam personnel. The average age of the members was around 24. Several were in college, or had well established careers.

Many ambush patrols into the “D Zone” along trails, and the Song Dong Nai and the Song Bong rivers. Several patrols reported a massing of the enemy troops during the Tet of 1969. Most patrols were 5 or 6 man teams, but several heavy 12 man patrols were conducted if previous information suggested that a contact was likely. Many contacts were made by the teams against 3 to 4 NVA/VC patrols, but there were some teams that initiated on much larger enemy forces.

One heavy mission in May 1969 counted 380 NVA as they advanced south. On this particular night, the team did not pull back to a RON, but stayed up on the trail within 5 feet of it. Indirect fire claimed many enemy lives, as it was directed by the Ranger team on the ground.

As some of the initial National Guardsman rotated out due to ETS, hardships, wounds, and early out for college, regular army personnel were recruited or assigned to take their place. These new members were well trained by the time the company “Stood Down”. In early November 1969, the remaining National Guard members were moved from the base camp at Long Binh to Bien Hoa in preparation for the units’ return to Indiana.

Six members of the unit made the supreme sacrifice on Ranger missions. They, and lots of other members were decorated for Valor and Duty. In all, 19 Silver Stars, 175 Bronze Stars, 86 Army Commendation Medals, 120 Air Medals, 110 Purple hearts, 19 Indiana Distinguished Service Crosses, and 204 Indiana Commendation Medals were awarded.

On November 20, 1969 Company D (Ranger), 151st Infantry (Airborne) became Company D, 75th Ranger. The 75th was made up of the 151st Rangers as well as new members, and continued to carry on the same missions operating from the same base camp at Long Binh until they “Stood Down” later in 1969.

3rd ID LRRP & 3rd ID LRS HISTORY

Long Range Reconnaissance (LRRP) Detachment, 3rd Infantry Division

This is an abbreviated history of the 3rd Infantry Division Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Detachment during the period of its existence from 20 November 1961 to 14 August 1964. This history also includes reference to a predecessor unit, the provisional V Corps Long Range Patrol Co. established in October 1960.

The history of U.S. Army’s Long Range Recon Patrols in Germany evolved from NATO’s development of the concept in the late 1950s. This concept was influenced by the British Special Air Service’s (SAS) successful use of small independently operating deep reconnaissance patrols. Among the first such U.S. Army units to be activated in Germany was USAREUR’s (U.S. Army Europe) V Corps Long Range Patrol. This unit was initially a TDY unit comprised of highly motivated volunteers from various units of the 3rd Infantry Division and the 3rd Armored Division. The unit was organized in October 1960 for the specific purpose of providing Corps level long-range intelligence from behind enemy lines. The upcoming Wintershield II maneuvers were to provide both a test of the feasibility of the concept and to evaluate its effectiveness. The success of this unit in the Wintershield II exercises led to the formal establishment of the V Corps (ABN) LRRP Co. at Wildflecken on 15 July 1961. This unit ultimately became Company A (Airborne Ranger), 75th Infantry.

The 3rd Infantry Division LRRP Detachment had its roots in the provisional V Corps LRRP Co. formed for the Wintershield II operation and the Division’s Battle Group (Battalion) level LRRP units. Among these were LRRP detachments from the 2d BG, 4th Infantry and the 1st BG, 15th Infantry stationed at Warner Kaserne in Bamberg. The members of these units formed the nucleus for the first division-level LRRP detachment in the U.S. Army, and, as with the British SAS, were all volunteers and were “returned to unit” if found unsuited for duty in a special operations environment.

The 3rd Infantry Division Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) Detachment was formed on 20 November 1961 with 1LT Edward M. Jentz as Detachment Commander. 1LT Jentz was an Airborne Ranger from the 1st Battle Group, 30th Infantry in Schweinfurt. The Detachment’s Operations Officer was 1LT John H. Peyton from the 3rd Infantry Division’s Security Platoon in Wurzburg. 1LT Peyton was also an Airborne Ranger.

The unit’s First Sergeant was SFC Gerald M. “Mike” Tardif. SFC Tardif was also an Airborne Ranger who had served previously with the Canadian Army. The unit’s operations NCO was SSG Robert H. Schroeder. SSG Schroeder (“Red Dog”) was a master parachutist and instructor at the Army’s Ranger School at Fort Benning for nine years prior to being sent to Germany. Bob Schroeder had jumped into Nijmegen, Holland on D-Day 1944 with the 82d Airborne Division and had served in the Korean War. His experiences as both a combat veteran and as a Ranger instructor set very high standards for the unit. Other Airborne Rangers forming part of the initial detachment were SGTs Clifford N. Mize, Bobby Freeman, and SFC Bobby McMeans. SGT Mize was a hand-to-hand combat instructor from the Ranger School and was later killed in Vietnam. SFC McMeans had served with the 10th Mountain Division. SGT Freeman had also served with the provisional V Corps LRRP Co. and returned to that unit in 1962.

The 3rd Inf. Div. LRRP Detachment was based at Daley Barracks in the Northern Bavarian resort town of Bad Kissingen, approximately 60 miles east of Frankfurt and about 20 miles from the E. German border. It was attached to the 10th Engineer Battalion in Wurzburg for logistical and administrative support. The unit was originally billeted with troops of the 2d Squadron of the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The Cav troops weren’t sure who these crazy “Lurps” were, who got up and ran several miles every day regardless of the weather, even in deep snow. The fact that the unit wore distinctive German Army camouflage uniforms and carried rucksacks instead of standard issue web gear only heightened the Cav’s interest. The unit also wore a distinctive, but unauthorized “Long Range Patrol” scroll on its headgear.

The Berlin Wall had gone up in August of 1961, and international tensions were quite high. It was a time of great danger between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and everyone knew that if the Russians started World War III, the unit’s chances of survival were slim to none. Hence, everyone concentrated on learning everything they needed to know to enhance their chances of survival. As a result, the men’s confidence grew and they took pride in being a part of an elite unit. This pride was reflected in the detachment’s motto:

“May the fires of Hell forever crackle and smell with the meat and the bones of a thing called a man who says, I can’t!”

As a consequence of this esprit de corps, the unit was extremely cohesive, and in this regard would have been a good subject for a case study in small unit leadership, i.e., unit members were motivated to accomplish the mission because of positive, as opposed to negative stimuli. In other words, the men were motivated to get the job done with the highest degree of efficiency because they wanted to, not because they were coerced or forced.

The unit’s training reflected its mission: to act as the eyes and ears of the Division behind enemy lines and to observe enemy movements, pinpoint targets, and report back to Division Intelligence. In addition to its rigorous physical training program, the unit practiced patrolling (both day and night), map reading and land navigation, forward observer techniques, cover and concealment, explosives and demolitions, rock climbing and rapelling, escape and evasion, path finding and helicopter operations, hand-to-hand combat, CBR, first aid, and the recognition and identification of Soviet Bloc uniforms and equipment. The unit also underwent 6 weeks of intensive radio and morse code (CW) training at the 123d Signal Battalion’s radio school in Wurzburg. During the course the detachment was taught how to operate CW (Morse Code) on the AN/GRC-9, AN/GRC-41, and AN/GRC-26 radios. The students also learned defense against jamming, communications security, and field radio maintenance procedures. The men also learned how to set up the radios in the field and how to orient and string the “long wire” antenna.

At the height of its proficiency, the detachment lost Captain Jentz and 1LT Peyton to the 10th Special Forces Group in Bad Tolz. This was just before the detachment was scheduled to deploy on its first major field training exercise. SSG Bob Schroeder was the NCOIC of the detachment during this interim period and directed the unit’s deployment on the FTX. The exercise was a huge success, with the Lurps providing real time intelligence on “enemy” troop movements and concentrations for the first time in the Division’s recent history.

The unit’s second commanding officer was 1LT Wilbur G. Bowersox. 1LT Bowersox was also an Airborne Ranger who was assigned to the unit in late-1962. During 1LT Bowersox’s tenure as CO, the detachment continued its rigorous training schedule and participated in numerous FTXs and war games, often playing the role of aggressors or guerrillas. Most of these missions involved helicopter insertions behind “enemy” lines with 3-4 man patrols.

These patrols typically consisted of a patrol leader, radio operator, asst. radio operator, and a scout observer. On a 3-man patrol, the patrol leader usually acted as the radio operator (as the assistant had to hand-crank the AN/GRC-9’s generator). Early on, the patrol leaders were all E-6s and E-7s, but as these career soldiers “derossed,” SP/4s and PFCs became patrol leaders. These young EM were also experienced soldiers, many with over two years time in grade, but who were passed over for promotion by their TO&E units because of their detached duty status. Many top notch soldiers went home as E-3s because they chose to remain with the detachment. Such was the level of pride and camaraderie among the LRRPs of the 3rd Infantry Division. It was also during this period that the unit’s name was changed to the “Marne Scouts Recon Patrol (MSRP).” No one really cared for this name, but the unit bore it proudly knowing all the while they were still Lurps!

In late 1963 both 1LT Bowersox and SSG Schroeder rotated back to the States. SSG Schroeder was sorely missed by the remaining members of the detachment. His replacement as First Sergeant was a SSG Turner who was assigned to the unit from Division HQ. SSG Turner was a good soldier, but was not Airborne or Ranger qualified, and the unit’s training activities and field operations diminished accordingly.

The detachment’s third and last CO, 2LT John A. Walden joined the unit at the end of 1963. 2LT Walden was an Airborne Ranger, but by this time the Division had other plans for the unit. The Year 1964 was spent mostly in garrison duty, with only some opportunities for LRRP actions, most notably along the E. German Border with the 14th AC. In June 1964, the detachment participated in a 100-mile march to Nijmegen, Holland to commemorate the 20th anniversary of D-Day. The unit also led the Division in the Expert Infantry Badge (EIB) competition, with most of the detachment earning the coveted award. SGT Dalton Naill achieved the highest overall score in the Division, and was awarded a large trophy in addition to the EIB. SSG Don Rampanelli scored second highest in the Division and also received an award.

On August 14, 1964 the 3rd Infantry Division Long Range Recon Patrol was disbanded and its troops returned to their TO&E units. Several men offered to extend their tours for duty with the V Corps and VII Corps LRRP Companies, but were turned down by their TO&E unit commanders as being too valuable to be let go.

Although the 3rd Infantry Division LRRP Detachment never served in combat, it nonetheless trained hard, often in extreme weather conditions, and was arguably one of the finest units in the U.S. Army of its era. Even though it was disbanded over 33 years ago, the unit still exists today in the hearts and memories of the 100 or so men who served with it during its short existence. Among those memories is that of the unit’s disbandment party, which, even by Lurp standards, was one hell of a party!

In August 1997, twenty-six former members of the unit, along with wives and guests, attended the detachment’s first reunion in Columbus, Georgia. Ceremonies were held at the Ranger Memorial at Fort Benning to honor former LRRP/Ranger comrades who have made their last patrol. During a Friday evening banquet held at the historic Columbus Hilton Hotel, COL Ed Jentz (Ret.), LTC John H. Peyton (Ret.), CSM Mike Tardif (Ret.) and MSG Robert H. Schroeder (Ret.) received awards from the detachment recognizing their commitment to the unit and honoring their leadership. After more than 30 years we still remember and revere these old warriors, and appreciate the sacrifices made by them and those who came after us, and who continue the Lurp/Ranger tradition today.

And that’s the way it was in the 3rd Infantry Division LRRPs.